1. ' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---Through the order under appeal the High Court has restored the appeal which had earlier been dismissed for want of prosecution. The appellant was granted leave to appeal to examine the legal points raised by him.
2. ' The first point urged by the appellant, who argued the case in person, that the learned Chief Justice of the High Court was disqualified from hearing the case as he had acted as a counsel on behalf of the opposite-party in a case before the Revenue Commissioner decided on 27th April, 1987. In support of this assertion a copy of order passed by the Commissioner on 27th April, 1987 in Case No,23 of 1987 has been annexed with the memorandum of appeal. The certified copy shows the name of Muhammad Aziz Khan, the appellant herein, as the appellant in appeal filed before the Commissioner on 21st of February, 1987. In the title of the case the respondents are described as "Muhammad Afsar son of Bora Khan etc. Sudhans by caste, residents of village Pattan Sher Khan, Tehsil Pallandri, Poonch". Afsar Khan son of Bora Khan resident of Pattan Sher Khan is a pro forma respondent in this appeal. He was also one of the pro forma respondents in the High Court in the appeal filed by Muhammad Hanif and others which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 22nd May, 1995. He was also a pro forma-respondent in the application for restoration of the appeal which was accepted on 29th September, 1997 giving rise to the present appeal. Thus, it stands established that the learned Chief Justice acted as a counsel for Afsar Khan and others in the case before the Revenue Commissioner. However, it is not clear from the present record as to who were the other persons on whose behalf he appeared before the said Court. The record shows that Afsar Khan is not active in the present litigation because, as indicated above, he is a pro forma- respondent in this Court and had the same status before the High Court.
3. ' The order passed by the Commissioner on 27th April, 1987 related to correction of entries to Khasra Girdawri. The order shows that Muhammad Aziz, the appellant herein, filed application before the Assistant Collector Grade-II, Pallandri for correction of entries in the Khasra Girdawari which was dismissed on 14th January, 1987. An appeal was filed before the Commissioner which was also dismissed. The order does not show the survey number of the land in dispute.
4. ' The appeal which has been restored by the High Court arose in the following circumstances.
5. Muhammad Half and others, who are respondents in This appeal, filed a suit in the Court of Sub- Judge, Pallandri on 27th November, 1984 in which they challenged a gift deed executed in favour of appellant Muhammad Aziz. The suit was decreed on 6th January, 1990 but the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree on 31st May, 1992. This was challenged by Muhammad Hanif and others, who are respondents in this appeal, by filing appeal before the High Court.
6. ' We have perused the documents attached with the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court as well as the High Court file. From the present record the only thing which stands established is that the learned Chief Justice in his capacity as a counsel appeared on behalf of Afsar Khan, the pro forma-respondent in the present proceedings, against the appellant but it is not established that the land in dispute was the same which was subject-matter of the civil litigation. The case before the Commissioner concluded on 27th April, 1987 while the suit in the Court of Sub-Judge Pallandri had already been filed on 27th November, 1984. In these circumstances it is not proved that the dispute in the present case was also in respect of the same land which was subject-matter of the litigation before the revenue Courts. The record shows that Muhammad Afsar for whom the learned Chief Justice appeared in the Revenue Court is not active in the present litigation. Rule of disqualification cannot be applied merely on conjectures.
7. ' Even otherwise rule of disqualification does not extend to a remote interest. Even if it is assumed that the land in dispute was the same in both the litigations, the circumstances of the case are such that disqualification is not applicable. In our opinion appearance in the Revenue Court in a case of correction of entry in Khasra Girdawari does not disqualify the counsel to act as a Judge ten years later in an independent proceedings on the civil side. It may be mentioned that the appellant did not bring it to the notice of the learned Chief Justice that he should not hear the case.
8. It is only when the case was decided against him that this objection was raised in this Court. This in itself is not a deciding factor but in the circumstances of the present case due to remoteness of the alleged interest this fact also assumes importance. The hearing before the Revenue Commissioner was brief and it cannot be assumed that the learned Chief Justice was conscious of the fact that he appeared as a counsel in the case before the Revenue Commissioner.
9. ' Now we turn to the merits of the case. Appeal No,30 titled Muhammad Hanif and others v.
10. Muhammad Aziz Khan was instituted at Muzaffarabad on 29th June, 1992. The appeal was transferred from Muzaffarabad to Rawalakot on 31st October, 1993. When the appeal came up for hearing at Rawalakot the learned Judge in the High Court issued fresh notice to the appellants in the said appeal. Out of them two appellants, Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Younas, appeared but no order was passed in respect of the other appellants and it was assumed that the appellants mentioned above represented all the appellants. Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Younas also failed to appear on 22nd May, 1995 and the case was dismissed for non-prosecution.
11. They did not file application for restoration. In the application for restoration it was stated that when the case was transferred to Rawalakot no notices were served on the applicants. They filed an affidavit in support of the assertion. The application was opposed from the other side on various grounds including the ground that the application was barred by time. In the order under appeal it has been observed that presence of Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Younas was considered to be on behalf of all the appellants which was a mistake because they were not the attorneys of the remaining appellants. The application for restoration was, therefore, accepted on payment of rupees one thousand as costs. The order was announced in the Court and rupees one thousand were received by the appellant in open Court, as is noted in the order under appeal.
12. ' We have heard the appellant in person. He addressed the Court at some length. Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan represented the respondents.
13. On transfer of case to Rawalakot it was the legal duty of the Court to inform the appellants that the case had been transferred so that they could attend the Court and also engage a counsel, if so desired. In absence of notice, the appellants were not required to appear on their own. Muhammad Aziz in his arguments stressed the point that two years had elapsed between the transfers of case to Rawalakot and since Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Younas had been appearing, in the High Court the other appellants must have also come to know during this long period that the appeal had been transferred to Rawalakot. This submission is not supported by any principle of law. Absence of notice cannot stand cured on such assumptions.
14. ' The appellant received rupees one thousand in open Court and then challenged the order in this Court. Confronted with this contradictory position, the appellant stated before this Court that he accepted the amount because he thought that if he did not do so it would amount to disobedience of the order of the Court. This is also what he stated in para.21 of the petition for leave to appeal.
15. However, in the concise statement he stated as follows:--- "(n) That the amount was taken in the doubt that the appellants-respondents were penalized to pay me the cost for wasting my time and energy due to submission of their false and entirely time- barred petition, dated 2-12-1996 which was to be dismissed."
16. ' These two submissions are contradictory to each other and must be rejected for this reason.
17. ' It was also argued that the application for restoration was time-barred if the order is passed behind the back of a party limitation begins from the date of knowledge. It was pleaded in the restoration application that the petitioners came to know in November, 1996 from the counsel at Muzaffarabad that the case had been transferred to Rawalakot. It was further stated that petitioner Muhammad Fazil came to Rawalakot on 30th of November and was informed by the High Court office that the appeal had been dismissed on 22nd May, 1995. He moved an application in the High Court office which was returned to him under the signatures of the Reader of the High Court with a note that the appeal stood dismissed for default of appearance. Thereupon, restoration application was filed in the High Court. An affidavit sworn by as many as fourteen persons was also filed in the High Court. This stood un-rebutted. Thus, there was no delay.
18. ' The appellant filed written proof to show that Sub. Muhammad Younas Khan obtained a copy of the order passed by the High Court in appeal titled Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad Aziz on 4th December, 1995.
19. ' The proof is in the shape of a certificate issued by the in-charge of the copying agency.
20. Muhammad Younas is the same person who had been appearing, along with Muhammad Hanif, before the High Court and it is due to their absence that the case was dismissed for non- prosecution. He has not filed application for restoration. Therefore, the certificate does not improve the case of the appellant.
21. ' In light of the foregoing we find no force in the appeal and order its dismissal. However, there will be no order as to costs in this Court. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.