' RANA BHAGWAN DAS, J.--- The petitioner, State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through this Constitutional petition has called in question vires of the order, dated 7-3-1991 as without jurisdiction, illegal and of no legal effect.
2. Petitioner is a statutory corporation constituted under Article 11 of the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972 carrying on business of life insurance. By reason of Article 15 of the above Order, 1972 on 1-11-1972 all assets and liabilities appertaining to life insurance business in Pakistan of all insurance companies including Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company Ltd.
(E.F.U.) and Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. (M.I.C.L.) stood transferred by law and vested in the petitioner. In May, 1971, Chenab Textile Mills Ltd. a listed public company with registered office at Lahore issued capital of Rs,35,00,000 for public subscription which was underwritten by E.F.U. And M.I.C.L. At the request of its sponsors/Directors. Under the agreement of under-writing, respondent No,2 who is one of the Directors of Chenab Textile Mills Ltd. Guaranteed a minimum dividend during the holding period of five years by the insurance companies. In the event of company failing to pay guaranteed dividend or to pay a sum in full or pay any short-fall therein, at the end of holding period of five years, respondent undertook to buy-back all the shares from the abovesaid two insurance companies. In May, 1976 on expiry of the aforesaid holding period in respect of defaulted guaranteed minimum dividend and buy-back price aggregating to a sum of Rs,12,29,340.95 petitioner filed Suit No,423 of 1997 in the High Court of Sindh on original side which was decreed on 3-5-1982. Respondent No,2 preferred High Court Appeal No,63 of 1982 form the aforesaid decree which was dismissed vide judgment, dated 3-11-1982. From the dismissal of their appeal, respondent s filed a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in which leave to appeal was granted. Petitioner's execution and recovery proceedings in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Lahore reached the stage of auction of properties of the judgment-debtor at Lahore when in the meanwhile respondent No,2 invoked the jurisdiction of respondent No,1 i,e, Wafaqi Mohtasib alleging maladministration in relation to the affairs of the petitioner corporation. The said respondent complained that the petitioner had agreed to accept the par value of the shares in full and final settlement of its dues but later refused to implement the so-called agreement. However, it was not disclosed :1 the complaint that proceedings in Court had resulted in the decree and an appeal was pending before the superior Court. Petitioner in its reply denied the allegation and impugned the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib for the reason that the matter was sub judice in the High Court.
' However, respondent No,1 in his findings/recotnmendations, dated 6-1-1988 observed: "thus, while it cannot be said that a compromise has actually and finally been arrived at, the parties, however, were directed that they meet (under the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce) to provide another opportunity to negotiate with the petitioner, the terms of compromise in the light of the background of the case". The meeting was accordingly held on 19-9-1989 in the office of Dr. A.H.
Khan, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce at Islamabad who made certain proposals for considering a settlement which was however rejected by respondent No,2. A report of the meeting was sent by respondent No,2 to the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib pointing out that the petitioner will have to forego 25% of the assessed interest if the judgment debtor made a lump sum payment who did not accept it. However, the petitioner did not offer higher waiver of any interest amount as it was not possible. In August, 1989 respondent No,2 re-submitted the application to the petitioner with a copy to the then Commerce Minister and this time carrying recommendations of M.N.As.
Who were placed on the Board of Directors by the then Government. The matter was reconsidered by the petitioner's Board afresh and it was held that the waiver of 25% of interest amount could be allowed provided the balance amount is repaid immediately and in lump sum. It was at this juncture that the petitioner without any reference/notice received the impugned findings of respondent No,1 directing the petitioner to accept Rs,5,63,500 and return the shares of Chenab Textile Mills Ltd. It is the said order as against the decretal amount swelling over at Rs,34,84,575 as on 15-3-1991 that the petitioner filed this petition.
3. At the hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, apart from the grounds namely the order being contrary to law, arbitrary, unreasonable and based on irrelevant grounds, urged that this was a glaring instance of wrongful assumption of jurisdiction which was specifically barred by proviso to section 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 which inter alia, clearly postulates that Mohtasib shall not have any jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into any matters which are subjudice before a Court of competent jurisdiction or judicial tribunal or Board in Pakistan on the date of the receipt of a complaint, reference or motion by him.
4. President's Order 1 of 1983 providing for the appointment of Wafaqi Mohtasib was promulgated in pursuance of the proclamation of the Fifth day of July, 1977 in order to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify an injustice done to a person through maladministration. In Article 2 of President's Order "maladministration" is defined as under:-
(2) "Maladministration" includes,-
(i) a decision, process, recommendation, act of omission or commission from which--
(a) is contrary to law, rules or regulations or is a departure form established practice or procedure, unless it is bona fide and for valid reasons; or
(b) is perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, biased, oppressive, or discriminatory; or
(c) is based on irrelevant grounds; or
(d) involves the exercise of powers, or the failure or refusal to do so, for corrupt or improper motives, such as, bribery, jobbery, favouritism, nepotism and administrative excess and
(ii) neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence inefficiency and inaptitude, in the administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities;"
5. Wafaqi Mohtasib's Order is an extraordinary statute enacted for taking expeditious action in order to redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through maladministration. Mohtasib's jurisdiction extends to a Ministry, Division Department, Commission or Office of the Federal Government or a statutory corporation or other institutions established or controlled by the Federal Government but does not include the Supreme Court, Supreme Judicial Council or a High Court.
6. In order to re-enforce his submissions, Mr. I.H. Zaidi learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Prince Glass Works Limited v. National Bewerages Limited PLD 1987 Kar. 49 authored by Dr. Tanzeel- ur-Rehman, J. (as his Lordship then was) which is, however, not relevant in the facts of the case in hand as in the reported case compliant was lodged with the Mohtasib prior to filing of suit, thus, it was held that by reason of Article 29 of President's Order of 1983, Court has no jurisdiction to grant injunction or stay or to make any interim order in relation to any proceeding before Mohtasib.
7. Conversely, Mr. Abdul Hafeez Lakho learned counsel, for respondent No,2 submitted that pendency of proceeding before a Court of law does not take away the right of the parties from negotiating a contract or a compromise which in the instant case was negotiated between the parties. There may be no cavil with the proposition of law canvassed by the learned counsel. He was not able to satisfy the requirement of the proviso to Article 9 of the President's Order referred to hereinabove. Position would have been different, had one of the debtors invoked the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib prior to the institution of Court proceedings. It is not controverted that decree in favour of the petitioner for a sum over Rs,12 lacs alongwith costs and interest remained valid and intact upto the level of Supreme Court. Recourse to the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib in the circumstances by respondent No,2 in order to pressurize the petitioner corporation, therefore, would seem to be highly unreasonable and open to serious criticism. In the face of clear embargo on the assumption of jurisdiction in matters sub judice before a Court of law much less a superior Court, we are of the view that the assumption of jurisdiction by Wafaqi Mohtasib in the present case was wholly without jurisdiction. No doubt the parties could contract amicably out of Court notwithstanding any decree, it was not open to the Wafaqi Mohtasib to enquire into the agreement between the parties and to enforce compliance of any settlement in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in him under the law. Reference was made to Article 29 of the President's Order which bars the jurisdiction of Court to question the validity of any action taken or intended to be taken or order made or anything done or purported to have been taken, made or done under the aforesaid Order but such protection would be available only in case of the action taken, within the four corners of the President's Order itself and any action taken or order made beyond the scope of authority cannot be held to be immune from judicial review by a superior Court. It was lastly urged that the petitioner has already made a representation against the impugned order before the President of Pakistan in terms of Article 32 of the Order, which remains undecided so far. Be that as it may, we are of the view that making of a representation to the President for review of an order made by Wafaqi Mohtasib per se, would not oust the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. Reference to Habib Bank Ltd. v. Palo Industries Promoters (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 1996 Kar.
218 in the circumstances is, therefore; completely misconceived and of no avail to the contesting respondent.
8. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, the petition is allowed and impugned order declared to have been passed without any lawful authority and of no legal effect.