' This Civil Revision Petition under section 115, C.P.C. Has been preferred against the judgment/decree, dated 26-3-1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Pishin by which he dismissed the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge on 30-9-1998 whereby, the suit of the petitioner was dismissed being barred by time.
2. The petitioner Siraj-ud-Din who is father of the respondent Najmud-Din, on 6-10-1997 filed a suit for declaration and specific performance in respect of an agreement dated 11-8-1994 with the averments that the respondent was duty bound to make payment of money on the fixed date i.e 11th September of every year but he failed to do so. It is stated that the relief regarding declaration was withdrawn. It is stated in the suit that the defendant is duty bound to act upon the agreement dated 11-8-1994 effected between the parties on the basis of which during the life time of appellant no one including the respondent is entitled to demand or pose himself as owner of movable and immovable properties belonging to the appellant. The suit was resisted by the respondent by filing written statement. On 7-3-1998 the learned trial Court framed as many as eight issues including the issue of limitation.
3. In support of their claims the parties led their respective evidence. Learned trial Court on the assessm ent of evidence dismissed the suit of the petitioner by deciding issue No,1 regarding limitation. The Appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree of the trial Court in appeal by making the following observation:- ' After framing of issues both the parties exhausted their respective evidence and got recorded their statements in support of their respective claim and denial. The perusal of paragraph No,6 of plaint clearly shows that according to plaintiff/appellant himself firstly the cause of action was accrued to him on 11th September of each year i.e from 11-9-94 at the time of first instalment which was not made whereas the present suit was filed on 6-10-97 which is apparently time barred, moreover no explanation whatsoever has also been advanced by the plaintiff/appellant for the said delay which is not condonable. In such circumstances and specific ground of limitation the trial Court was rightly not duty bound to discuss each and every issue in detail. The learned trial Court has passed a speaking order/judgment which does not suffer from any infirmity or legal defect hence the same is upheld, consequently appeal filed by the appellant is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs".
4. Aggrieved by the judgment of learned Additional District Judge, the petitioner then filed the present revision petition under section 115, C.P.C. On 2-10-1999. Alongwith the petition, an application seeking condonation of delay was also filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application for condonation of delay has been resisted by the respondent by filing reply to the said application.
5. I have heard Mr. Anwar-ul-Haq, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jamal Khan Mandokail, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the judgment passed by the trial Court was not legal as the same is not in accordance with Order XX, Rule 5, C.P.C. As the trial Court framed as many as eight issues but has given finding in respect of one issue without discussing the other issues. The dismissal of the suit was illegal therefore; time of limitation will not run against the illegal order. He has also contended that the petition could not be filed in time as there were cases against the petitioner and his son and were busy in seeking bail.
7. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has contended that even from the bare perusal of the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause is indicated nor the explanation given therein is reasonable for condonation of delay. He has also contended that even the suit was barred by time. Leaned counsel for respondent has also contended that even the interim bails which were granted to the petitioner on 15-6-1999 were confirmed on 22-7-1999 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pishin even then he had not filed the petition thereafter, they filed the same on 2-10-1999 which is hopelessly barred by time.
8. As regards the contention about limitation in the instant case, the revision petition was filed on 2-10-1999 at 11-10 a.m. Challenging the judgment and decree dated 26-3-1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Pishin and the application for certified copies was made by the petitioner on 17-4-1999 and the copies were delivered on 19-4-1999. It is also pertinent to note that even interim bails which were granted to the petitioner and his sons were confirmed by the same Judge of Pishin on 22-7-1999. Section 115, C.P.C. Prescribes a period of 90 days. This revision petition has been filed after much delay without furnishing sufficient explanation. There is also no force in the contention of learned counsel that time of limitation will not run against the illegal order. The order cannot be termed illegal simply for the reason that the trial Court had not discussed all the issues as finding of one issue if sufficient for disposal of the case then the trial Court does not need to dilate on other issues and in not deciding other issues no prejudice would be caused to any party. Neither there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay nor any illegality or irregularity has been pointed out in the impugned order. This Court in an authority reported in PLD 1993 Quetta 121 have made the following observations:- "The Limitation Act contains in its fold remedial provisions like sections 5, 12, 14 which empower the Courts to enlarge the period of limitation in peculiar circumstances of each case. Provided these provisions has been specifically made applicable on the proceedings and in the absence of its application the Court at its own shall not be competent to make applicable the provisions of these sections. In this behalf it is noticed that under C.P.C. There are various provisions where section 5, of the Limitation Act has expressly been made applicable to condone the delay in filing the proceedings if sufficient cause exists in favour of the party who seeks the condonation of delay. But this section of the Limitation Act had not been made applicable in accordance with section 29 of the Limitation Act, on the revision under section 115 C.P.C. Thus application moved under section 5 of the Limitation act, to condone the delay in filing of petition, would not be entertainable."
' In the same judgment the following observations have also been made:-- "I also failed to associate myself with the learned Advocate General that no limitation shall run against the impugned orders which according to him are void in the eye of law. As far as connotation of void is concerned it has been interpreted at various occasions with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is now judicial consensus that such order at the best could be termed as an illegal order which is got to be set aside by filing the proceedings within time.
Because if a void order is in the knowledge of a party who is being adversely affected from it, it becomes its legal obligation to challenge the same before the competent forum in accordance with law before the expiry of statutory period of limitation".
9. In view of the above position the revision petition is not competent lc and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.