1. ' SYED MUHAMMAD ZAFAR BABAR, (MEMBER).--This appeal has been heard under the Remand order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 5-5-1998 whereby a judgment of this Tribunal dated 28-10- 1997, passed in Appeal No, 652(R) of 1997 filed by the appellant against the order of his termination from service dated 21-8-1977, was set aside and the case remitted for the decision on merits and in accordance with law.
2. ' The brief facts are that tie appellant was appointed as officer in the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation on 18-9-1975. His services were terminated on 21-8-1977. The Grievance Petition No,435 of 1977, filed by him under section 25 of the I.R.O., 1969, was dismissed by the Labour Court No,1 Lahore, vide order, dated 31-1-1978, on the ground that he was not a workman. On appeal, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, vide its judgment dated '7-8-1978 reinstated the appellant with back benefits. On respondents' Writ Petition No,4129 of 1978, the High Court set aside the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellant challenged the aforesaid judgment of the High Court before the Supreme Court through Civil Appeal No, 38 of 1979, which was dismissed as per judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 3-5-1992. Review petition filed by the appellant was also rejected on 27-10-1992. Thereafter, the appellant filed his Service Appeal No, 652(R) of 1997 before this Tribunal which was dismissed in limine vide judgment, dated 28-10-1997, on two considerations, firstly, that the appellant had availed his remedy against the order of termination of service right upto the Supreme Court without success, and thus, he could not impugne the same order before this Tribunal on the ground that his other points had not been considered. Secondly, that the newly inserted section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereafter referred to Act), has no retrospective application and since the services of the appellant had been terminated on 21-8- 1977, he could, thus, not file the appeal before this Tribunal competently. As said earlier, this order was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which set it aside and remitted the case for decision on merits.
3. ' We heard the appellant, who had appeared in person, and the learned counsel for the respondent-PIAC, on two date of hearing and perused the record minutely.
4. ' Case of the appellant is that the termination of the appellant as Liaison Officer, PIA-Rawalpindi vide the impugned order dated 21-8-1977 was result of a conspiracy between Mr. Arshad Mehmood, the then Director Financial Services and currently acting as Managing Director, PIA, and Agha Arshad Ali, District Manager and their other henchmen. He submitted that there was no proof of allegations of misconduct or illegality against him. It is his case that he had joined PIA service as an officer in the Finance Department and was later on transferred against the post of Liaison Officer and re-designated as Senior Liaison Officer. He contended that even if his termination was of the result of abolishion of the post of liaison officer that was legally wrong and malafidely unjust because in that case he was to be sent back to the original position in the Finance Department. He submitted that under the PIAC Act, 1956 and Rules of 1958, the post he was holding could not be abolished nor he be terminated, and thus, the impugned order was patently illegal. He also submitted that the post he was holding was abolished, only to harm the interests of the appellant, by an incompetent person. He also submitted that in the year 1989, Federal Government constituted a Review Board to review the cases of employees of Industrial and Commercial Establishments whose services had been dispensed with during the Martial Law. Regime. Case of the appellant was considered and he was ordered to be reinstated with all the back benefits but Respondent No, 4 (Managing Director, PIA) refused to implement the order, and thus, he filed the writ petition before a Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench. On the basis of these submissions, he argued that the impugned order be set aside and he should be reinstated with all the back benefits since from 21-8-1977 in the Finance Department of PIAC respondent.
5. ' The learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation raised some factual and legal objections.
6. First of all, he submitted that the appellant seeks the setting aside of the impugned order on the ground that it was the result of conspiracy between the then Direetor Finance and his henchmen and on the ground of mala fides. He submitted that it is now well-settled through a chain of authorities of the superior Courts in this country that the allegations of mala fides and that of conspiracy etc., should be at least prima facie seem to exist and the Memo. Of appeal should be accompanied by some documents evidence containing a summary of the documentary or oral evidence which was to be produced by the appellant in proof of such allegatiqns. We find that there is nothing on record to substantiate even, prima facie, the allegations of malafide etc., being levelled by the appellant. And in deed there is a great deal of legal authority in support of the contention that mere allegation of mala fides without any proof or production of any substance which might lead to proof cannot be given credence.
7. ' Another point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that 'this appeal must fail since the appellant had Jailed to file any departmental appeal since after he became a civil servant, with the addition of section 2-A of the Act, which was promulgated on 10-6-1997. He submitted that under section 4(1) of the Act, it was incumbent upon the appellant to file departmental appeal, beforecompetent Authority, against the impugned order and since he had failed to do so, his appeal was not competent. He submitted that contention of the appellant that he had filed a grievance petition before the Labour Court, when he had challenged the impugned order as a workman would not be a substitute to the making of the departmental appeal, as required under the Act. And, thus, he submitted that the appeal is incompetent. At the pointation of the learned counsel we have gone through the PIAC Regulations (Chapter VII of PIA Admin Manual) which gives the right of Appeal to all categories of employees who feel aggrieved of any order passed by the Management Chairman Managing Director etc. Of the respondent-Corporation. The appellant admittedly failed to do so, i,e, he did not file the departmental appeal, right of which was given to him under the Rules/Regulations which existed since 1958 for the guidance and conduct of the Management and the employees. The Rules and Regulations, which the appellant undertook to abide by since the time of his induction into service with the respondent-Corporation and his promotions/transfers and courses abroad were all in accordance with the mentioned rules. We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that this appeal is incompetent under the law because it is not preceded by a part mental appeal either before or after he became a civil servant.
8. ' The most important question in this matter is that admittedly the respondent-PIAC, in which the appellant was serving and in which the appellant now seeks reinstatement, does not have any statutory rules. Hence, under the law declared, the appellant cannot seek or get the remedy of his grievance by way of reinstatement into service. He in his arguments in support of the plea of reinstatement, relied on Mrs. Anisa Rehman's case, reported in 1994 SCM R 2232, but that case does not help the cause of the appellant because Mrs. Anisa Rehman had been reduced in rank and pay (group) by the PIAC. She had not been dismissed or removed from service as in this case.
9. Moreover, the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman (supra) was distinguished in the case of Habib Bank Ltd.
10. And others v. Syed Zia-ulHassan Kazmi (1998 SCM R 60) and United Bank Ltd. And others v. Ahsan Akhtar and others (1998 SCM R 68). In these two judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while relying on the previous judgments in the case of the Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v.
11. Muhammad Shoaib Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170), 1971 SCM R 568, PLD 1981 SC 224 and post of other illuminating authorities held: "Employee of a corporation in absence of violation of law or any statutory rule cannot press into service Constitutional jurisdiction or civil jurisdiction for seeking relief of reinstatement in service, his remedy for wrongful dismissal is to claim damages."
12. In view of the fact that the respondent Corporation does not have any statutory rules, this appeal by the appellant seeking reinstatement into service is totally misconceived. He cannot be granted the relief prayed for and his only remedy under the rules was a claim for damages.
13. ' The learned counsel for the respondents also argued that at the time of termination, the appellant was an officer of Pay Group-VII and the employeer-Corporation could terminate his services validly, by giving him one month's notice, as was done in his case under Rule 35..02.02 read with rule 35.01.02. We have gone through the relevant rules appended with the written statement as R/3 and find that the proposition put forward by the Learned counsel for the respondents is correct. He submitted that the appellant's services, according to the rules, were terminated on one month's pay in lieu of notice. He submitted that the appellant accepted the notice pay, and thus, was legally estopped from claiming reinstatement because he accepted the terms of termination without any protest when he received the pay in lieu of notice.
14. 'The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
15. ' Before parting with the case a few things which came to our notice at the far end of arguments need to be mentioned here. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant, on 13-8-1998, made an application for: "Highlighting distrust confidence on the Hon'ble Members, seized of the matter on solid ground, ...."
16. ' While commenting on the earlier decision of this Tribunal, dated 23-10-1997, he stated in para. 3 of the said application: "3. This illegal and arbitrary order was assailed before the Supreme Court as the learned Benchhad exceeded its vested jurisdiction by one sided commenting merits having ousted its jurisdiction at the first instance. Supreme Court vide judgment dated 5-5-1998 in C.A. 158 of 1998 remanded the case back to this Tribunal with concluding observations: 'Of course, the Tribunal would decide the same in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the submissions made on their behalf; justly, fairly and in accordance with law. We would, therefore, allow the appeal and remit the same to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits and in accordance with law.' Meaning thereby that this appeal was not decided fairly, justly, on merits and in accordance with law, by the Tribunal."
17. (underling is ours)
18. ' We could have dealt with the matter ourselves for the language used but since he had "interpreted" and attributed meanings to the words used in the Remand Order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence,' we stay our hands from taking any action. But we must observe that whatever he has. Said, in the above quoted paragraph of his application, was not a fair comment.
19. Secondly, when a superior Court gives any direction to a subordinate Court, it is strictly a matter between the two Courts. The lower courts fully and - completely comprehend the import of the words and the language used in the Remand order and of the directions given by the superior Court. It does not need the intervention of any interpreter to elucidate. By doing so he transgresses his limits. Our judgments can be challenged before the superior Courts in any language or with any remarks of course, within decent limits, but it is quite a different matter to say that the Hon'ble Supreme Court meant this, this and this. The situation so brought to notice was all the. More tantalising when we were told by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant was Graduate in Law and was a practising lawyer. This assertion was not denied by the appellant. It is a pity that an Advocate should be using such language before us and that too in an application addressed to the Tribunal.
11. Parties be informed that the appeal has been dismissed with costs.