' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---The petitioners (239 in number) who were serving in the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (respondent No,2) in different capacities were' prematurely retired on 31-10-1997 and appear to be aggrieved by the order of the retirement and in the alternative non-payment of certain monetary benefits including Golden Shake Hand. They moved this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution for redress but on realising that the jurisdiction of this Court was barred in respect of persons in the service of any organisation established by or under a federal law or owned or controlled by the Federal Government in view of the provisions of section 2-A. Of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (as amended by Act XVII of 1997) read with Article 212 of the Constitution, proceeded to amend the petition seeking declaration that the aforesaid section 2-A is ultra vires the constitution. Admittedly the relief could only be granted to the petitioners in case the aforesaid section 212 was found to be void and inoperative whereupon it could be held that this Court did have the jurisdiction to provide relief. Therefore, the entire arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners was focused on the Constitutional validity of the aforesaid section 2-A which was inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 through the Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act XVII of 1997 and is reproduced as under: "2-A. Service under certain corporation, etc. To be service of Pakistan.--Service under any authority, corporation, body or organisation established by or under a Federal law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall he deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act."
2. It may be added that through the same Act XVII of 1997 the definition of the expression "civil servant" in section 2-A was enlarged to include a person declared to be a civil servant under section 2-A. Mr. Muhammad Akmal Waseem learned counsel for the petitioners in the first place argued that the petitioners could not be deemed to be civil servants in terms of the aforementioned section 2-A because the mere fact that the Federal Government was holding majority shares did not mean that the respondent No,2 Corporation was owned or controlled by the Federal Government. In support of his contention he attempted to rely upon the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in Printing Corporation of Pakistan v. Province of Sindh (PLD 1990 SC 452). With all respects we find the arguments to be entirly misconceived. In the first instance the question before the Court in the abovementioned precedent was altogether different. The appellant Corporation was incorporated under the Companies Act and 60% of its share capital was owned by the Federal Government. A question arose as to whether the employees of the Corporation could be deemed to be employed in the service of State for the purpose of Industrial Relations Ordinance and it was in this context that their Lordships held that mere owning of majority shares or having the power to appoint some Directors did not mean that the control of the Government over the management of the Corporation was of such nature that their employees could be treated to be involved in the service of State. The abovementioned section 2-A, however, expressly provides that persons holding posts in any organisation where controlling shares of interest are held by the Government would be deemed to be in the service of Pakistan and civil servants for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act. In any event a careful reading of the abovementioned section 2-A would show that the question of controlling shares would arise only in the case of an incorporated Companies and section 2-A would in any case cover employees of an authority or Corporation or organisation established under a Federal law. Admittedly the respondent No,2 is established under P.I.A. Corporation Act 1956.
3. Learned counsel then argued that the petitioners are not covered by the expression "Service of Pakistan" in terms of the definition/connotation of this expression in Articles 212, 240 and 260 of the Constitution and therefore, any provision in sub-Constitutional legislation purporting to treat them as such would be ultra vires the Constitution. With all respects we find no force in this contention either. Though Articles 212 and 240 do deal with persons in the service of Pakistan they do not define the meaning of this expression. Article 260, however, stipulates that: "Service of Pakistan means any service, post or office in connection with the affairs of the federation or of a province and includes an all Pakistan service, service in the Armed Forces and any other service declared to be a service of Pakistan by or under Act of Mailis-eShoora (Parliament) of a Provincial Assembly but does not include "(Underlining ours.)"
4. Admittedly through the provisions of service under the respondent No,2 Corporation has been declared to be service of Pakistan for a limited purpose under an Act of Parliament. Therefore, examination of the question whether they are holders of civil posts in connection with the affairs of the federation is unnecessary.
5. Mr. Akmal Waseem, however, continued to emphasise that the statute in question proposed to take away the legal remedies available to the petitioners, and therefore, ought to be strictly construed. In our humble opinion, however, no rights have been impaired. In the first place terms and conditions of the employment of the petitioners were not varied by the aforesaid dispensation as has been held by the honourable Supreme Court in United Bank Limited v. Shamim Muhammad Khan (PLD 1999 SC 990), the petitioners are deemed to be civil servants only for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act which means that the forum for redress of grievance has been altered and obviously no person has a vested right in any forum. On the other hand the rules of employment of the petitioners being non-statutory as held by the honourable Supreme Court inter alia in Riazuddin v. Pakistan International Airlines (PLD 1992 SC 531) they could not seek enforcement of these rules through the ordinary Courts and at best could claim damages for unlawful termination.
On the other hand once they become civil servant for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act, the Tribunal can on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against in terms of section 5(1) of the Act. These non-statutory rules also become enforceable as has been held in Mrs. M. N. Arshad v. Miss Naima Khan (PLD 1990 SC 612) and acknowledged in the abovementioned case of United Bank Limited v. Shamim Ahmed Khan. As such we are inclined to treat the abovementioned section 2-A as a piece of beneficial legislation which enables an employee of a statutory corporation or a Government-controlled company to invoke the jurisdiction of an independent Tribunal for the purposes of rectifying any illegality in the application of the terms and conditions of a service, whose decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court.
5. Mr. Akmal Waseem then argued that the Service Tribunal cannot award monetary relief to the petitioners. We regret we are unable to agree. If the authority competent to make an order in respect of terms and conditions of the petitioners unlawfully refuses to pay what the petitioners are entitled to receive under the terms and conditions of their employment, there is no reason to assume that such illegality cannot be rectified under the vast amplitude of powers under section 5(1) of the Service Tribunals Act available to the Tribunal. On the other hand if it be assumed that such relief cannot be granted by the Service Tribunals the petitioners could always approach the Civil Courts because the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other form in terms of Article 212 applies only to the extent to which a Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant relief. If any authority is needed one may refer to the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in I.A. Sherwani v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1991 SCM R 1041). However, this Court in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction is not an appropriate forum for settling monetary claims.
6. Finally Mr. Akmal Waseem argued that section 2-A was ultra vires Article 25 of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to create an irrational discrimination between employees of public sector organisation and those in the private sector. We are unable to appreciate this contention either. As distinguished from a private enterpreneur/employer a person managing the affairs of a public sector organisation is exercising a public trust. He is by law required to act honestly, fairly and in the public interest. He cannot act whimsically or capriciously in respect of the terms and conditions of employees. The Legislature by enacting section 2-A intended to place his actions subject to the supervisory control of an independent quasi-judicial Tribunal having authority to nullify them in case they were found to be illegal. The classification in our opinion is perfectly rational and in the interest of employees. We, therefore, find this petition to be misconceived and dismiss the same in limine. The petitioners, however, are free to approach the competent forum for redress if so advised which will take into consideration the time spent - in these proceedings for the purposes of limitation if any.