' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment passed by the High Court on 3-6-1998, whereby the writ petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 was accepted and it was ordered that they would not be repatriated to their parent departments.
2. The necessary facts giving rise to the present appeal are that respondent No,1 was serving as Drafting Officer in the department of Islamic Ideology Council but was transferred in the department of Law against the post of Section Officer for a tenure of three years vide notification dated 12-8-1992, and respondent No,2 who was serving as Statistical Officer in Central Design Office was also transferred against the post of Section Officer vide notification dated 7-1-1998. Subsequently the Government adjusted both the respondents permanently against the post of Section Officers while exercising its powers under section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1976, vide notifications dated 17-3-1993 and 18-11-1992, respectively. Respondents Nos,1 and 2, as stated earlier, filed a writ petition in the High Court whereby the High Court vide order impugned accepted their writ petition and issued a direction that they shall not be sent back to their parent departments. It is the aforesaid order of the High Court against which the present appeal has been filed.
3. Arguing the case on behalf of the appellants, Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, the learned counsel, vehemently contended that the Government was not competent to exercise its powers under section 22 of the Civil Servants Act against the interests of the appellants. The powers under the said section could have been exercised in just and equitable manner as held by this Court in its numerous pronouncements. According to the learned counsel the matter was relating to terms and conditions of service of civil, servants which was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the High Court: The learned counsel also submitted that according to the prescribed method of recruitment against the posts of Section Officers 80% quota has been reserved for permanent induction while 20% quota has been reserved to fill in from amongst the Officers of technical and other services by transfer as tenure posts, as such any civil servant of other department who was to be promoted by transfer against 20% quota could not be permanently inducted against the post of Section Officer. The learned counsel also submitted that a civil servant can be permanently inducted against a permanent post by transfer on the recommendation of appropriate Selection Board, Committee or prescribed authority but any such induction without the recommendations is not recognized by law and is void.
4. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, the learned counsel for respondents Nos,1 and 2, raised a preliminary objection that the petition for leave to appeal and the appeal were hopelessly barred by limitation. The learned counsel contended that the appellant obtained the relevant copies of notifications on 29-6-1998 but petition for leave to appeal was filed on 10-9-1998.
Similarly the petition for leave to appeal appears to have been prepared on 15-8-1998 but despite that the appellants have been deliberately waiting till it was filed on 10-9-1998. The learned counsel has argued that each day of limitation was to be explained by the appellants whereas they have failed to do so. The learned counsel also maintained that the appellants were not aggrieved persons, therefore, the petition for leave to appeal and the appeal were not maintainable. The learned counsel contended that the appellants have challenged the quota of promotion of respondents but the induction of respondents as Section Officers was from the quota of other departments. Had the induction of respondents been as promotees then the appellants certainly would have some grievance but the induction of respondents, being from other departments the appellants had no locus standi to file the petition for leave to appeal. The learned counsel contended that respondents Nos,1 and 2 were absorbed as Section Officers on 12-81992 and 18-11- 1992 respectively, whereas the appellants became Section Officers according to the seniority list on 16-2-1993, onwards. Againnt the induction of respondents the appellants could have filed departmental representation or an appeal before the Service Tribunal but after lapse of a period of about six years they had no locus standi to object to the induction of respondents.
5. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, we in the first instance want to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents Nos,1 and 2, Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, that the appeal filed by the appellants against the impugned judgment of the High Court was barred by limitation. The main attack of the learned counsel for respondents appears to be that the appellants obtained the relevant copies of notifications on 30-6-1998, whereas the petition for leave to appeal was filed on 10-9-1998. Therefore, it was contended that after obtaining the relevant copies of notifications there was no justification for such a long delay for filing the petition as each day of limitation is to be accounted for by the appellants. Similarly the learned counsel also maintained that the petition for leave td appeal was ready on 15-8-1998, for institution but the same was filed on 10-9-1998.
Even in this view of the matter the petition being time-barred was liable to be dismissed. It may be pointed out that the appellants in their ;petition for leave to appeal have specifically averred that they acquired the knowledge of the impugned judgment of the High Court on 25-7-1998, as they were not party in the writ petition filed by respondents Nos,1 and 2 in the High Court. So, on obtaining the knowledge of the impugned judgment of the High Court on 25-7-1998, they filed a petition for leave to appeal and the "same was within time from the date of knowledge. From the perusal of record it transpires that the impugned judgment of the High Court was announced on 3- 6-1998, whereas, as said earlier, it is claimed by the appellants that they acquired their knowledge of the aforesaid judgment on 25-7-1998. On 27-7-1998, the appellants applied for obtaining the copy of the judgment of the High Court and the same was delivered to them on 27-7-1998.
Similarly the appellants moved an application for obtaining the copy of writ petition filed in the High Court on 27-7-1998, and the same was delivered to them on the same day. Therefore, when the appellants came to know about the passing of the impugned judgment by the High Court on 25-7-1998, as averred by them, they filed the petition for leave to appeal on 10-9-1998, which was well within time from date of their knowledge. The learned counsel for respondents appears to be under a misconception that since the copies of relevant notifications were obtained on 30-6-1998, therefore, the period of limitation shall reckon from that date. The argument on the face of it is misconceived. What was required of the appellants was to attach the copy of the impugned judgment or the order sought to be appealed from and the copy of the writ petition filed before the High Court. The appellants in support of their memorandum of appeal have filed an affidavit that they acquired knowledge of the impugned judgment of the High Court on 25-7-1998. Therefore, on careful consideration the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents seems to be of no substance and the same is, therefore, repelled. Even if we assume that the notifications came in the knowledge of the appellant on 29-6-1998, on which date it was applied for obtaining their copies, it does not transpire from the record as to who applied for obtaining the copies of these notifications. Thus, the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents does not found well.
6. Now coming to the merits of the case it may be stated that the matter of permanent adjustment of respondents Nos,l and 2 was under consideration of the Government and a Review Committee was constituted to make recommendations as to whether respondents could be adjusted against the posts of Section Officers or not. The respondents apprehending that they might not be adjusted permanently against the posts of Section Officers, filed a writ petition before the High Court and the High Court issued a direction that status quo shall be maintained and that the respondents shall not be repatriated to their parent departments. This direction issued by the High Court clearly relates to the terms and conditions of a civil servant and by this direction the rights of appellants have been adversely affected. The direction issued by the High Court was beyond its jurisdictional competence as where the terms and conditions of services of Civil servants are involved, the jurisdiction of High Court under section 47 subsection (2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, is totally ousted. Even the Government was also not competent to exercise the powers under section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1976, in favour of respondents because this power could not have been exercised in violation of just and equitable purpose in the light of principle laid down by this Court in various cases.
7. Another objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellants were not aggrieved persons within the meaning of section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, as when respondents Nos,1 and 2 were inducted in service, the appellants were not in the service. To meet the aforesaid point, it may by stated that the appellants have not challenged the order of induction of respondents Nos,1 and 2 in service nor they have challenged the order when the respondents' services were transferred as Section Officers for a tenure of three years. The grievance of the appellants started when the respondents got a direction from the High Court that they shall not be repatriated to their parent departments. When this order was passed the appellants were already in regular branch of Section Officers. Therefore, it was likely that their interests would be adversely affected. Therefore, in our view, they were aggrieved person in all respects to file the petition for leave to appeal. It may be reiterated once again that to be an aggrieved person it is not necessary that an applicant should be an aggrieved person in strict juristic senso. If his interests are liable to be jeopardized by an act of the functionary of the Government which is not in accordance with law, the applicant for the redressal of his grievance becomes an aggrieved person. Therefore, this objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents too is repelled.
8. We need not advert to their other points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants or the respondents for the reason that the appeal has to succeed on the point that the matter between the parties relating to C terms and conditions of service was outside the jurisdiction of the High Court.
9. In the light of what has been stated above, we by accepting the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and order the dismissal of writ petition filed by respondents Nos,1 and 2, However, there will be no order as to costs.