' Concurrent findings have been recorded by the learned Rent Controller, Multan vide his order, dated 12-10-1995 and learned Additional District Judge, Multan, dated 8-4-1997 whereby the ejectment petition moved by the respondents Nos.1 to 7 who are successor-in-interest of Karim Nawaz, original landlord, against. P.S.O. Company Ltd was accepted and the appellant had been ordered to hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondents.
2. The facts of the case have been detailed in the orders passed by the learned Courts below.
However, the facts relevant for the disposal of the instant appeal are hereby reproduced in brief:- "The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents Nos.1 to 7 namely Karim Nawaz Khan filed an ejectment petition against the appellant P.S.O. Company Ltd. Seeking its eviction from a plot measuring about 1389 Square Yards described in the head note of the petition as well as in the accompanying site plan. The premises had been given on lease to the appellant company at the rate of monthly rent of. Rs,700 in the year 1968 for a period of twenty years to commence from 15- 11-1968. It was alleged that the appellant had sublet the part of the demised property and had also violated the terms and conditions of tenancy, the appellant had defaulted in payment of rent for more than three years and he also failed to enhance the rent by 25% as mandated by section 5-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance added by Punjab Act, 3 of 1991. It was further averred that the appellant did not discharge his liability by paying Property Tax and Municipal Tax etc. Of the property; damage has also been caused to the property which had impaired its utility; lastly the property was sought to be required for the personal use of the 'landlord."
3. The petition was contested by the appellant. Apart from almost controverting the material facts the claim to seek ejectment was also refuted. Various preliminary objections were raised. As a result of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed:-- ISSUES.
(1) Whether the present petition is mala fide and has been filed with ulterior motives ? OPR.
(2) Whether the petitioner has got no locus standi to file this petition and the same is in competent? OPR.
(3) Whether the present ejectment petition is wholly incompetent and merits to be dismissed on the ground that it was filed in violation of arbitration clause? OPR.
(4) Whether the respondent company under the lease deed has the option to renew lease for further ten years on the same terms and conditions? If so its effect? OPR.
(5) Whether the respondent has made default in the payment of rent and hence it is liable to be ejected from the demised premises? OPA.
(6) Whether the respondent in violation of the terms and conditions has not paid the property tax and municipal tax for the last three years? If so its effect? OPA.
(7) Whether the respondent has sublet the demised premises and is, thus liable to be ejected for violation of the terms of rent? OPA.
(8) Whether the respondent had damaged the demised premises and materially impaired its utility? OPA.
(9) Whether the petitioner requires the premises for personal bona fide need? OPA.
(10) Order.
4. The parties were called upon to lead the evidence and some evidence had been led by them, when the respondents moved an application under section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 alleging that the appellant failed to comply with order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance passed by the learned Rent Controller and as such did not deposit the rent for the period commencing from January, 1994 to December, 1994. It was further alleged that the rent was not paid by adding the enhanced rent by 25% as envisaged by section 5-A of the Ordinance w,e,f, from July, 1989.
5. The appellant contested the application. However, it was admitted that no rent was deposited in compliance with the order of the learned Rent Controller, dated 6-11-1990. It was, however, claimed that the respondents had already received Rs, 24,500 in access of the amount of rent due from the appellant, therefore, the appellant was not in default, rather he had paid more rent than due.
6. In order to clarify this contention, it is pertinent to note that in the ejectment petition the respondents-landlord had averred that the appellant did neither pay the rent from February, 1986 to January, 1989 nor the same was tendered. The learned Rent Controller while passing the order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance on 6-11-1990 (one page is missing from the original file of the rent Controller), although passed the order for deposit of rent from February, 1986 to January, 1989 at the rate of Rs,700 per month, yet it was qualified that the respondent landlord will not be permitted to withdraw the amount till the final decision. The amount comes to Rs,24,500. The appellant (tenant), therefore, claims that in view of the access deposit of Rs,24,500 he cannot be treated as a defaulter and as such prayed that the order under section 13(6) had not been violated, therefore, his defence could not be struck off and accordingly he could not be ejected from the premises.
7. Both the learned Rent Controller as the learned Additional District Judge considered the appellant's plea in detail and after assigning elaborate reason came to the conclusion that the appellant failed to comply with the order under section 13(6), therefore, following the mandatory provision of law struck off the defence and ordered that respondents be put into possession.
8. Before this Court as well, the main plea raised by the learned counsel related to the deposit of Rs, 24,500 which according to him had been deposited in access of the rent due from him. As noted above the deposit of Rs,24,500 is calculated as a rent from February, 1986 to January, 1989, which according to the respondent landlord had not been paid and was deposited under the orders of the Rent Controller in Court. The learned Rent Controller, however, while disposing of the application observed that the appellant had satisfactorily explained that the rent for the period had been deposited by them and, therefore, ordered that the same may be adjusted while calculating the rent due from the appellant. The appellant, therefore, impliedly claimed exemption from the payment of rent as specifically ordered by the learned Rent Controller under section 13(6) of the Ordinance, to be regularly paid in accordance with the said provision till the final adjudication of the ejectment petition. The point for determination, therefore, emerges whether the excess payment of rent by a tenant may be of his own accord or under the orders of the Rent Controller, provides him an exemption from the order of the Rent Controller, passed under section 13(6) of the Ordinance. In order to appreciate this proposition reference to the language in section 13(6) of the Ordinance is necessary which is reproduced as follows:-- "(6) In proceedings under this section on the first date of hearing or as soon as possible after that date and before issues are framed, the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit all the rent due from him, and also to deposit regularly till the final decision of the case, before the fifteenth day of each month the monthly rent due from him. If there is any dispute about the amount of rent due or the rate of rent, the Controller shall determine such amount approximately and direct that the same be deposited by the tenant before a date to be fixed for the purpose. If the tenant makes default in the compliance of such an order, then if he is the petitioner, his application shall be dismissed summarily and if he is the respondent his defence shall be struck off and the landlord put into possession of the property without taking any further proceedings in the case.
' The Controller shall finally determine the amount of rent due from the tenant and direct that the same may be paid to the landlord, subject to adjustment of approximate amount deposited by the tenant."
9. A bare perusal of this section reflects that in order to ensure the regular payment of rent to the landlord it was found necessary by the legislature that to contest the application for ejectment, the tenant must keep on paying the monthly rent to be ordered by the learned Rent Controller.
Obviously when ejectment proceedings are initiated against the tenant whose possession is protected by virtue of various provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance and cannot be evicted unless otherwise found liable to be so under the Ordinance and so found and held by the Rent Controller. The landlord cannot be deprived of his right to receive rent because in absence of payment of the rent tenant cannot claim any right or protection under the provisions of the Ordinance or for that matter by any rule of justice or equity. This provision i,e, section 13(6) has been inserted to provide guarantee to the landlord of payment of rent. As far as the determination of the real default or what is the fair rent, is a question remains to be decided by the Rent Controller at the time of ultimate disposal of the application but during the interregnum the landlord has a right to regularly receive the rent as ordered by the Rent Controller. The provision of this section has, therefore, been made mandatory and its violation or non-compliance is followed by the penalty that in case of default his defence shall be struck off and the landlord 0111 be put inter possession. If it is left to the tenant to assess himself as to what amount of rent has been paid by him and how much of the amount he can deduct then no safe guarantee would be available to the landlord whose premises are in occupation of the tenant. Any vioaltion or defiance of the order is compulsorily to be followed by the consequence as laid down in section itslef. In the instant case it is admitted that from January, 1994 to December, 1994 no rent was deposited in Court pursuant to the order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance, rather it was just presumed that excess rent had been paid to the landlord, therefore, non-compliance of the order would not amount to any default. The plea, therefore, is totally devoid of force and is unacceptable.
10. Apart from the aforesaid discussion, even on factual plane the appellant has no case because as per order, dated 6-11-1990 the landlord had been ordered to deposit rent from February, 1986 to January, 1989 yet the respondent-landlord was not allowed to withdraw or receive the same unless final adjudication. As noted above the purpose of section 13(6) is to ensure the regular payment of rent to the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings but the landlord could not withdraw or receive the amount of Rs,24,500. The matter was subject to final adjudication, therefore, to say that default in payment of rent did not in any manner affect the right of landlord is fallacious and not tenable. The provision of law i,e, 13(6) is absolutely unambiguous and clear on this point.
11. 1981 SCM R 538, 1983 CLC 2813 and lastly 1979 SCM R 496, have been cited on behalf of the respondents to fortify their view. In the last cited judgment it was held that the "compliance of direction under section 13(6) of Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance is a condition precedent for requiring Rent Controller to examine bona fides or correctness of various defence pleas of tenants or to further proceed with trial and adjudication".
12. In view of the guideline provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there remains no ambiguity that any violation of the order under section 13(6) is to be followed by stricking of defence of the tenant.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant has quoted the case titled "Messrs Islam Coal Co. v. Mir Ghulam Rasool and 2 others" (1988 SCM R 1906) whereby default in future monthly rent had been explained satisfactorily by the tenant, has no application to the facts of the instant case. Similarly, the case titled: "Haji Shakar Khan v. Abdul Qadir and others" (1991 SCM R 1246) has no application where the default in payment of rent of one month was condoned by the learned Rent Controller while exercising his discretion. Another case cited in (1987 SCM R 1788) "Muhammad Akram v.
Muhammad Zafar and others" has no bearing wherein relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties has been denied and before determining the same the learned Rent Controller could not assume the jurisdiction. Apart from said authorities two cases from Hon'ble Supreme Court cited as "Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari" (PLD 1969 SC 617) and case titled "LaL Badshah v.
Sohail Khan." (1970 SCM R 565) have also been cited in support of the contention that even if concurrent findings of fact have been recorded, same are not binding on the Court if same are not in accordance with the evidence or contrary to any relevant provision of law. There is no cavil with the proposition but in the present case concurrent findings have been recorded by both the learned Courts below validly and after assessing the evidence as well as law correctly.
14. Some other grounds have been noted in the appeal yet none of them was urged at the Bar. On the contrary the learned Rent Controller had previously dismissed the application of the appellant tenant relating the arbitration clause in the lease deed and as such lack of jurisdiction by the learned Rent Controller. The appellant tenant committed the wilful default of the order of the Rent Controller and failed to deposit the rent and so much so, that no one appeared before the Rent Controller to address arguments on the application under section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance.
15. As a result of above discussion, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. As the appellant-tenant has installed petrol pump/filling station at the demised premises, therefore, they are allowed two months period to hand over the vacant possession to the respondent/landlord w,e,f, the announcement of the judgment. As- per agreement the appellant will be entitled to remove the structure, equipment's and other installations put by them.