1. ' Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J,-Leave was granted by this Court in the above-mentioned 15 civil appeals as follows :-- "By this common order, we intend to dispose of the above petitions. Except CPLA No. 533-K/98, which has been filed by an employee of the Pakistan InternationalAirlines Corporation (PIAC) the remaining all petitions have been filed by the PIAC against the judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) setting aside the orders of reversion of certain employees to a lower Group and the orders of termination of services.
2. It may be observed that the Civil Petitions Nos. 490-K, 491-K, 492-K, 493-K, 494-K, 556-K and 557-K of 1998, cover the cases in which the Tribunal has set aside the order of termination of services of the employees through three separate judgments, whereas, in the remaining petitions, except CPLA No. 533-K/98, the Tribunal has set aside the orders of reversion in respect of the respondents to a lower Group. In respect of CPLA No. 553-K/98, it may be observed that the Tribunal declined the employee's appeal, in which the sought the setting aside of an order whereby he was reverted to a Lower Group.
3. We have heard Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, learned counsel who has appeared for the petitioners in all the above petitions, except in CPLA No. 533-K/98, in which he has appeared for the respondent i.e. PIAC, Mr. Shehanshah Hussain, learned counsel who has appeared for the petitioner in above CPLA No. 533-K/98, and Mr. Haider Ali Pirzada and Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada learned counsel for the respondents/caveator.
2. ' We are inclined to grant leave to appeal to consider the following questions :
(1) Whether the enunciation of law by the Tribunal in respect of application of certain provisions of the Constitution and of the Civil Servants Act is correct.
(2) Whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the above orders of termination of services and the orders of reversion to lower Groups in respect of the respondents in the above petitions, except CPLA No. 533-K/98, and;
(3) Whether the Tribunal was justified in declining to set aside the order of the petitioner's reversion to a lower Group in the case covered by the above CPLA No. 533-K/98."
3. ' After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of, the view that as the questions of law and facts arising in these appeals are not indentical, it will be convenient to divide these appeals, in three different categories according to their subject matter, for the purposes of their disposal. We, accordingly, propose to take up Civi] Appeals Nos. 1900, 1906, 1907 and 1908 of 1998 together as they relate to reversion of respondents in Civil Appeals No. 1900, 1906 & 1907 of 1998 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998, who were either working in Pay Group V or VI at the time of their reversion to Pay Group No. IV by the appellants. Similarly, Civil Appeals No. 1911 to 1914 of 1998 will be taken up together as they relate to re-designation of respondents in these appeals in the same pay group without affecting their terms and conditions of service. Civil Appeals Nos. 1901 to 1905, 1909 & 1910 of 1998 will be dealt with together as they relate to termination of services of the respondents in these appeals. Since the allegations against the respondents in the above appeals are different, it is necessary to state briefly the facts in each appeal in order to under stand the controversy in its true perspective.
4. ' We first take up Civil Appeals Nos. 1900, 1906, 1907 and 1908 of 1998. The facts in brief in these appeals are as follows: ' Civil Appeal No. 1900/98 ' Kourai Shah Channa, respondent in this appeal, was appointed as Material Planner in Group-in on 1.1.1989. He was promoted to Group-IV as Material Planning Supervisor on 9.1.1994. He was not considered for promotion to Group-V while his two other colleagues namely, Khalid Ahmed (Respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1906/98) and Ayaz Athar (Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908/98) were promoted to Group-V as 'Planning Officer'. He, therefore, made a representation to the competent authority seeking his promotion to Group-V as Planning Officer in fine with the cases of respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1906 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998. His representation was accepted and he was, accordingly, promoted to Group-V on 15.2.1996 w.e.f. 9.2.1996.
5. ' Civil Appeal No. 1906/98 ' Khalid Ahmed, respondent in this appeal, was appointed as Material Planner on 7.1.1989 in Pay Group-Ill. He was promoted as Material Supervisor Planner in Pay Group-IV on 9.1.1994. He was further promoted to Pay Group-V as Planning Officer on 25.4.1994 w.e.f. 1.6.1995. He was confirmed as Planning Officer in Pay Group-V on 11.1.1996.
6. ' Civil Appeal No. 1907/98 ' Razvi Ahmed, respondent, in the above appeal was appointed as Sales Assistant in Pay Group-Ill on 12,11.1976. He was promoted to Pay Group-IV as Flight Steward on 11.11.1978. On 10.11.1981, his services were dispensed with under MLR 52. He was recommended for re-employment in PIA by the Review Board constituted by the Government in the year 1989. He was, accordingly, re-employed in P.I.A. on 1.2.1990 as Flight Steward in Pay Group-IV. He was promoted as Briefing Officer in Pay Group-VI on 19.7.1995 and was confirmed in that group on 14.2.1996.
7. ' Civil AjapeajJjo.,1908/98 ' Ayaz Athar, appellant was appointed in Pay Group-Ill as Material Planner on 22.1.1989. He was confirmed in that Group on 22.1.1990 w.e.f. 3.1.1989. He was promoted to Pay Group-IV as Material Planning Supervisor on 8.2.1994 w.e.f. 9.1.1994. He was later confirmed in that position on 14.6.1994 w.e.f. 8.2.1994. He was promoted as Planning Officer in Pay Group-V on 20.6.1995 and was confirmed in that Group on 15.1.1996 with effect from 15.1.1996.
8. ' Respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900, 1906, and 1907 & appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998 were issued show- cause notices by the appellants alleging that their promotions in Pay Group-V were irregular and against the Service Regulation, and they were, accordingly called upon to show cause why they should not be reverted to Pay Group IV. The appellants after hearing them, reverted them to Pay Group IV. The precise allegation against the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900 and 1906, & appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908/98 was that at the time they were promoted in Pay Group-V, they did not possess the required length of service. However, against respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1907/98, it was alleged that he neither possessed the required length of service nor the required qualification at the time he was promoted to Pay Group VI.
9. ' The learned counsel for the appellants contends that under the Service Regulations applicable to the employees of PIA for promotion to Pay Group V or VI, the employee must possess at least 5 years service in Group IV besides a master degree in 2nd division in any subject. According to learned counsel for the appellants the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900, 1906, 1907 and appellant in 1908 of 1998 at the time of their promotion to Pay Group V or VI were holding a bachelor's degree (B A) and that too in 3rd Division besides, they also lacked the required 5 years length of service in Pay Group IV. On these premises, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the promotion of respondents in Civil Appeals No. 1900, 1906 and 1907 and appellant in 1908/98 was contrary to the Service Regulations and as such their reversion to Pay Group IV was not open to any exception.
10. ' The learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand, contended that their cases were placed before the competent authority at the time of their promotion from Pay Group IV to Pay Group V or VI and that thecompetent authority duly relaxed the conditions for length of service as well as qualification for their promotion to Pay Group V or VI. The learned counsel for the appellants admits before us that in so far respondents in CivilAppeals Nos. 1900, 1906 and appellant in 1908 of 1998 are concerned, the only objection against their promotion to Pay Group V raised in the show cause notices issued to them was, that they did not possess the required length of service in Pay Group IV. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that these persons also lacked the prescribed qualification for promotion to Pay Group V cannot be entertained. It is also not disputed by the ledrned counsel for the appellants before us that the promotion of respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900 and 1906 and appellant in 1908 of 1998 to the post of Planning Officer in Group V was an internal promotion from amongst the persons holding the posts of Material Planning Supervisor in the management section. The summary prepared on 25.4.1995 for promotion of respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1906/98 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908/98, shows that they were duly recommended by theAdministrative Manager to the post of Planning Officer in Pay Group V and the management was requested to waive the condition of length of service to meet the required criteria for their promotion to Pay Group V as nocandidate with the required length of service was available. The summary was cleared through General Manager (Personnel), Director Engineering & Management and was finally approved by the Chairman, who waived thecondition of 5 years' service in Group IV for promotion to Group V. In so far the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1900/98 (Koural Shah Channa) is concerned, he was not recommended for promotion alongwith respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1906/98 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908/98. However, he made a representation to the concerned authority for his promotion to Pay Group V which was accepted and, accordingly, he was also promoted to Pay Group V on 15.2.1996, after relaxing the condition of length of service. The learned counsel for the appellants has very vehemently contended that at the time respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1900/98 waspromoted, there was no vacancy in existence in Pay Group V. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted as no such objection was raised in the show cause notice served on him before his reversion to Pay Group IV. The appellants also raised no such plea before the learned Service Tribunal at the time of hearing of service appeal of respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1900/98. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900 and 1906 of 1998 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998, were promoted in contravention of service rules, also has no merit It is not disputed before usthat the power to relax any one condition of service vested in the Chairman, P1AC and that such power was exercised in favour of respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900, 1906 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998 before their promotion to Group V. There is nothing on record before us to show that the Chairman, PIAC while granting relaxation in the condition regarding length of service of respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900, 1906 and appellant in 1908 of 1998 for promotion to Pay Group V acted on considerations other than those which were relevant for exercise of such power. There is also nothing on record before us to show that the Chairman, PIAC while relaxing the condition relating to length of service in these cases did not act fairly and honestly and in accordance with the rules. Since the learned Service Tribunal did not find any jurisdictional defect in the exercise of powers by the Chairman, no exception could be taken to the judgment of learned Service Tribunal, setting aside the reversion of respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900 and 1906 of 1998. In so far the case of appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998 is concerned, the learned Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal while in other identical cases (Civil Appeals Nos. 1900 & 1906 of 1998) the appeals filed by respondents were accepted.
11. There appears to be no distinction between the cases of respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900 & 1906 of 1998 and that of appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998. As we have reached the conclusion that the relaxation of the condition regarding length of service was granted by the Chairman, PIAC in all these cases in exercise of power vested in him under the Service Regulations, the order of reversion of all the 3 persons from Pay Group V to Pay Group IV was not sustainable in law.
12. ' In Civil Appeal No. 1907 of 1998 which is also a case of reversion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the respondent in this appeal neither possessed required length of service nor qualification. Itis contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that under the relevant rules, the Chairman, PIAC, could only relax one of the conditions of service. It is, accordingly, contended that as 2 conditions were relaxed in this case, therefore, it is distinguishable from the cases of respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 1900,1906 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998. We find that the case of respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1907 of 1998 is on better footing than the rest of the cases of this category. This respondent was an employee of PIAC since 1976 when his services were terminated under MLR 52. However, he was re-employed by PIAC after his case was recommended by the Review Board constituted by the Government in the year 1990, in Pay Group-IV. The post of 'Briefing Officer' in Pay Group VI was internally advertised on 10.6.1990, with the following conditions of eligibility for the candidates :-- "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION ' Manpower Planning Division ' EMPLOYMENT SECTION ' No. EMP.ADV: 17/90 Date; 10th June, 1990 NOTICE FOR INTERNAL RECRUITMENT
1. Applications are invited from the employees of the Corporation or the following position in Flight Service Department
2. Candidates must possess the following qualifications and xperience.
13. ' BRIEFING OFFICER. PAY GROUP-VI (J.O. 24/90); QUALIFICATIONS 2nd class/'B' grade master degree from arecognized university.
14. ' EXPERIENCE Seven years flying experience. Experience of Scheduling/Monitoring of crew rosters will be considered an added qualification.
15. ' AGE LIMIT -Not to exceed 35 years as on June 30, 1990.Relaxable by seven years in accordance withAdmin Manual. RELAXATIONS ualifications may be relaxed to Graduation.
16. ' ELIGIBILITY Employees in pay group IV, V and VI having completed at least 5, 3 and one year of servicerespectively from the date of their initial appointment/last internal selection/ promotion and possessing above specifications shall only be eligible to apply.
3. Applications on the prescribed form through respective Admin/Manager Personnel Officer should reach the Employment Manager, PIA, 42-T, Block-6, Dr. Mahmood Hussain Road, PECHS, Karachi-29 not later than July 1.
17. 1990 by official mail on. Applications received after expiry of the last date fixed for submission of the application will not be entertained. No application will be accepted if delivered by hand by any candidate.
4. Please attach copies of Matric/Senior Cambridge certificate and her qualifications in support The plea that certificates are ttached in the personal file will not be accepted. Candidates concealing any information called for in the application form will render themselves liable to disciplinary action.
5. Authorities forwarding application are requested to ensure the eligibility of the applicants in accordance with the laid-down job specifications before sending the same to the Employment Section.<u>ADMIN MANAGERS/PERSONNEL OFFICERS ARE REQUESTED TO DESPATCH THE EMPLOYEES SERVICE RECORD ON THE PRESCRIBED PROFORMA FOR EACH APPLICANT</u>. While forwarding the application of the candidates, Department/Section must clearly mention the name of the position on the top left side of the envelope.
18. ' <u>THE PRESCRIBED APPLICATION FORM IS AVAILABLE WITH THE CONCERNED ADMIN MANAGER/PERSONNEL OFFICER AND FROM EMPLOYMENT OFFICE. KARACHI.</u>"
19. ' The respondent applied for the above post but he was not called for interview. He, accordingly, represented to the Managing Director of PIAC through his letter dated 14.11.1994 which reads as follows :-- 1.November 14,1994. The Managing Director, Pakistan International Airlines, Karachi.
20. ' Through: Proper Channel Subject: INJUSTICE Dear Sir, The positions of Briefing Officers of Pay Group VI wereinternally advertised on 10.6.1990. I fulfil all the requirements applied for one of the same. My Curriculum Vitae is placed at flag 'A'.
21. Neither I was called for interview nor was informed of the reason. As a result my colleagues who were previously junior to me and possessed less experience were selected.
22. ' My capability to perform the duty of Briefing Officer can be evaluated from my performance on said post from August, 1993 to May, 1994 as I was officially detailed ground/briefing duties (at flag 'B'). I earned incentives awards and appreciation letters were placed on my personnel record (copies placed at Flag 'c'). Since I have been ignored without any sufficient cause I request you to kindly consider my case sympathetically for PG-VI effective July, 1990, in redressal of my grievances with all back benefits.
23. ' Thanking you.
24. ' Yours sincerely, ' Sd/-(RAZI AHMED SIDDIQUI)
25. ' P-49444, Flight Steward.'
26. ' The General Manager Flight Services and Director Flight Services, PIAC strongly recommended his case as would appear from the endorsement on the above letter. The Manager Flight Services also confirmed through hisendorsement on the letter of Razi Ahmed Siddiqui dated 17.4.1995 that he had forwarded his application alongwith other candidates.
27. Copies of Minute-1 dated 2.1.1995, Minute-13 dated 24.5.1995 and endorsements of DirectorFlight Services, General Manager Flight Services, Director Flight Operations, General Manager Personnel, Director Administration and Managing Director, PIAC filed by the appellant clearly bear out that the case of Razi Ahmed Siddiqui was strongly recommended by each of the officers mentioned above and as a result thereof finally on 15.8.1995, Admin Manager Flight Services issued the letter conveying his selection as Briefing Officer in Pay Group VI with effect from 19.7.1995.
28. The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1907 of 1998 has also placed on record a certificate issued by Director Flight Services, PIAC wherein he has been shown to have 13 years 1 month and 18 days service in Pay Group IV with PIAC as on 1st July 1992. The contention of respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1907 of 1908 is that after having been discharged from service under MLR 52, he joined Oman Air Lines and he was serving then in Pay Group-VI. However, as the review board had recommended his re-employment in the same position in which he was at the time his services were terminated, he was employed as Flight Steward in Pay Group IV. It is also on record that he suffered leg injury while in service. The case of Razi Ahmed Siddiqui appears to be a case ofextreme hardship and therefore, relaxation granted in his case by the Chairman, PIAC, in exercise of powers vested in him, cannot be described as a mala fide exercise of powers or exercise of powers on extraneous *consideration. We are, therefore, of the view that the fearned Service Tribunal was justified in allowing appeal of respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1907 of 1998 and no exception can be taken to the order of learned Service Tribunal. As a result of above discussion. Civil Appeals Nos. 1900,1906 and 1907 of 1998 fail while Civil Appeal No. 1908 of 1998 is allowed.
29. ' We now take up the appeals in which respondents were re-designated without any change in their respective terms and conditions of service. These are Civil Appeals Nos. 1911 to 1914 of 1998. The respondentsin these appeals were admittedly in service of PIAC for the last about 20 years when they were declared surplus in the year 1988. It is an admitted position that at the time they were declared surplus, they were serving in Pay Group-IV in the communication department A summary was moved in the year 1989 for absorption of these respondents in other department of PIAC. On the directive of Chairman PIAC, respondents in these appeals were absorbed in the flight department and were, accordingly , re-designated as Flight Steward on 25.11.1993. After having served for about 4 years as Flight Steward, show cause notice was issued to them on 22.10.1997 alleging that their re-designation as Flight Steward was contrary to the rules for the following reason* :--
(a) That their re-designation was not covered by any policy decision of the Corporation;
(b) That they were over aged at the time of their re-designation as Flight Steward;
(c) That they did not possess the required height for being . appointed as Flight Steward; and
(d) That they also lack the required qualification for being appointed as Flight Steward.
30. ' The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1911/98 was stated to be over-aged by 3 years and 2 months and short in height by 1.1/3". He possessed a B.A. and an M.A. degrees in 3rd division as against the required qualification of B.A. 2nd division. The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1912/98 was stated to be over-aged by 9^ years and short in height by 1". He is also a B.A. in 3rd division. The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1913/98 was stated to be over- aged by 10V years and short in height by 'I/"- He possessed educational qualification of 2nd division Intermediate as against required qualification of BA. 2nd division. Similarly, the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1914/98 was stated to be over-aged l\ year and he possessed educational qualification of Intermediate 2nd division as against the required qualification of B.A. 2nd division.
31. ' The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the respondents never applied for being appointed as Flight Steward and therefore, their absorption as Flight Steward was the result of an internaladministrative arrangement of the management. It is, accordingly, contended that the allegation of the appellants that respondents managed or influenced the administration to appoint them as Flight Steward is totally uncalled for as their cases remained under process from 1989 to 1993 for about 4 years and after considering every aspect of their cases they were absorbed as Flight Steward as an internal arrangement sanctioned by the competent authority. The respondents also contended that they were duly confirmed as Flight Steward and they were issued Commendation Letters during the period they served as Flight Steward by the appellant. It is accordingly, contended that their re-designation as Maintenance Supervisor was wholly uncalled for.
32. ' The appeals filed by the respondents before the Service Tribunal were resisted by the appellants amongst other, on the grounds firstly, that the appeals were barred by limitation and that the respondents before filing the appeals before learned Service Tribunal did not exhaust the departmental remedy available to them under the rules. The respondents do not dispute that a departmental remedy is provided under the Service Regulations which they had not availed before filing their appeals before the learned Tribunal. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that they had preferred departmental appeals in the month of January 1998 and therefore, even if the appeals filed by them before the learned Tribunal were filed without awaiting the result of departmental appeals, the same may be ignored as the decision in the appeals was given by the learned Tribunal much after 90 days of the filing of appeals. The learned Tribunal while dealing with this objection, came to the conclusion that in so far appeals before the Service Tribunal against the impugned orders were concerned, they were within time as these were filed within 30 days of the receipt of the impugned order of the departmental authority. However, on the question of filing of appeal before the Service Tribunal without exhausting departmental remedy, the observations of the learned Tribunal were as follows :-- "The departmental appeal was though filed in time but the filing of appeal before the expiry of the 90 days by way of abundant caution cannot be applied against the interest of the appellant particularly when the law has not yet been settled. Even otherwise in view of an earlier judgment the appeal has attained maturity during its pendency and therefore the issue of its being premature on the date of filing becomes immaterial. However, to adjudicate the matters on merits we hold that the appeal was within time."
33. ' The learned counsel for the respondents has reb'ed on the case reported as Aslam Waraich & others vs. Secretary, Planning and Development Division (1991 SCMR 2330) in support of their contention that the provisions regarding filing of departmental appeal were not applicable to the cases of the employees of statutory Corporations. It is also contended on behalf of respondents that in any case, during pendency of appeals before the learned Tribunal they were informed by the departmental authority that their departmental appeals were rejected and therefore, the defect if any in filing of appeal without exhausting departmental remedy should not be made a ground for non-suiting them.
34. ' We have carefully gone through the judgment of this Court in Alam Waraich' case relied by the learned counsel for the respondents and are of the view that this Court has not finally expressed its opinion on the question, whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal could be filed without exhausting the departmental remedy where the service rules34 provided for such a remedy. Since the provisions of Service Tribunals Act have been extended to all the employees of Corporation or a statutory body owned or controlled by the Government and the employees have been given right of appeal, this right of appeal is to be availed subject to all such conditions which are mentioned ia the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that wherever the service rules or regulations applicable te tke employees of a Corporation or statutory body provided for filing of a departmental appeal, such a remedy must be availed before filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal. However, where the service rules applicable to the employees of aCorporation or statutory body did not provide for filing of a review/ representation or appeal against the order of departmental authority, an appeal would directly lie to the Service Tribunal. In the present cases, it is not disputed before us that the service regulations framed by P.I.A. provided an appeal against the order of departmental authority. The respondents, who were in Pay Group-IV, had the right of appeal against the order of departmental authority before the Chairman of the Corporation and such an appeal/representation in fact was filed by them but without waiting for a period of 90 days provided under the Act, they preferred appeals before the Tribunal. No doubt during pendency of appeals before the Service Tribunal, the departmental appeals filed by the respondents were rejected but it is admitted before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that no reasons were assigned by tie appellate authority while rejecting the appeals filed by the respondents. The learned counsel for the appellants also stated that the appellate authority while rejecting the departmental appeals of respondents did not record the grounds of rejections perhaps for the reason that the respondents had already filed appeals before the Service Tribunal whichwere pending. Be that as it may, the rejection of the departmental appeals of respondents by the appellant authority without disclosing reasons could not be treated as proper disposal of the appeals of the respondents in view of thefollowing observations of this Court in the case of Aslam Waraich vs. Secretary, Planning and Development Division(1991 SCMR 2330) :-- "However, as a guidance, in this case, it would have been better if for reasons to be recorded the Tribunal had remanded it so as to leave it to the judgment of the departmental authority in the first instance. And it error committed the party concerned would approach the Tribunal for its correction. Such rule of procedure will have good effect for the development of a statutory practice in the departmental proceedings original, review, representational or appellate, for recording reasons in support of their orders.
35. ' In this case it cannot be said that no reason is mentioned in the rejection of respondent's representations in the orders dated 6/9-10-1988. But in many other cases we have been seen that the rejection is a simple ritualistic rejection. Even if it is not a mandate by any law that the officer concerned should be informed about the reasons which prevailed with the authority concerned, it would not be illegal either to give reasons; at least, from now onward. It being the judgment of this Court on this legal question, the same would be observed as declared law."
36. ' The disposal of appeals filed by the respondents, by the departmental authority, without application of mind and without giving any reason, cannot be treated as a proper disposal of appeals filed under the service regulations. We, therefore, hold that the appeals filed by respondents before Service Tribunal without exhausting the remedy of departmental appeal provided under the service regula tions were not competent However , as we have also reached the conclusion that the rejection of the departmental appeals of the respondents without application of mind and without disclosing any reason by the departmental authority was not a proper andlegal disposal of these appeals, the appeals filed by the respondents before the departmental authority , shall be deemed to be pending and will be heard and disposed of in accordance with law. Subject to these observations, the orders passed by the learned Service Tribunal in Civil Appeals Nos. 191 1 to 1914/98 are set aside.
37. ' We now turn to Civil Appeals Nos. 1901 to 1905, 1909 and 1910 of 1998. The services of the respondents in these appeals were terminated by the appellants on the ground that they were appointed in contravention ofthe service regulations of PIA and against the decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Jabbar Memon vs. Federation of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 1349). The termination of their services was challenged by the respondents before the Service Tribunal. The Hon'ble Service Tribunal allowed their service appeals and directed their reinstatement in service for the following reasons: ~ "3. It has been stated on behalf of the department that no vested rights of the appellants have been violated by the demotion or termination of services and it has also been alleged that the appellants either Workmen or have the relationship of master & servant with the department and hence their remedy by way of these appeals for reinstatement or restoration to the original jobs is not legally possible. The arguments of the department would have contained a lot of force prior to 6/97, when the Workmen and their remedy before the Labour Courts only and the officer of the autonomous bodies was placed in the category of master and servant and they would only seek damages for the wrong done to them in their services grievance. However, in June, 1997 the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 was amended and all the employees of the autonomous bodies and statutory corporations were declared to be in the service of Pakistan. In a number of cases this Tribunal had held the opinion that the category of "Workmen of the Employer" as also the "servants of masters" were not to be treated as civil servant for the precise reason that either independent for in the form of Labour Court and NLRC or in the shape of Civil Court was available, and it was also held that in the absence of any statutory rules the terms &conditions of such an employee would not be determined & adjudicated upon by this Tribunal. However, as a result of appeal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had held that every category of employees, working in the autonomous bodies, would be deemed to be a civil servants and that the Service Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction with regard to all such matters.
38. Thus in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court we have the opinion that all the categories of employees of the respondent department would be treated to be not only civil servants for the purpose of Service Tribunals but also to be in the service of Pakistan and in such a situation the Constitutional provision contained in Article 260, 240 & 212 of the Constitution will have their effect Consequently, the employees of the Corporation will be presumed to have the same terms & conditions provided for the service of the civil servants in the shape of Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the rules made thereunder shall fill in the vacuum. Hence the appellants will be entitled to the statutory guarantee to be treated in accordance with the provisions of Civil Servants Act, 1973 and thus the matter can be adjudicated upon merits."
39. ' The learned counsel for the appellant contended that despite the fact that the employees of PIA were treated as 'civil servants' for the purpose of availing the remedy of appeal against the order of departmental authority before the Service Tribunal, their terms and conditions of service continued to be governed under the service regulations prescribed by the PIA. It is, accordingly, argued that the conclusion of the Hon'ble Service Tribunal that respondents were entitled to the statutory guarantees and were to be treated in accordance with the provisions contained in the Civil Servants Act 1973, was wholly erroneous. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel that principle of 'master and servant' applicable to the employees of a statutory corporation as enunciated by this Court in Lt. Col Shujaauddin Ahmed vs.. OGDC (1971 SCMR 566), ShahidKhalil vs. PIAC (1971 SCMR 568), R.T.H. Janjua vs. NSC(PLD 1974 SC 146), Muhammad YusufShah vs. PIAC (PLD 1981 SC 224), Evacuee Trust Property Board vs. M. Nawaz (1983 SCMR 1275), Anwar Hussain vs. ADBP (PLD 1984 SC 170), Principal, Cadet College, Khohat vs. M. Shoab (PLD 1984 SC 170), Nisar Ahmad vs. Chilian Ghee Mills (1987 SCMR 1836), NBP vs. Manzoqrul Hasan(1989 SCMR 832), Mrs. M.N. Arshad vs. Naeema Khan (PLD 1990 SC 612), SRTC vs. M.A.O. Khokhar (1990 SCMR 1404), KDA vs. Wali Khan (1991 SCMR 2434), University of Punjab vs. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093), Anwar Hussain vs. ADBP (1992 SCMR 1112), Raziuddin vs. PIAC (PLD 1992 SC 531), PIAC vs. Shahabuddin (1993 SCMR 299), Chairman, WAPDA vs. Syed Jamil Ahmed (1993 SCMR 346), M*. Zeba Mumtaz vs. First Women Bank (Civil PetitionNo. 62-K of 1999), UBL vs. Shamim A. Khan & others (Civil Appeals Nos. 1487 to 1528 of 1998) and DE vs. Muhammad Shahid & others (Civil Appeals Nos. 1899 to 1910 of 1996) continued to hold the field and therefore, against a wrongful dismissal from the service, the only remedy available to the respondents was to claim damages. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the judgment of Service Tribunal.
40. ' In a recent decision of this Court, United Bank Limited vs. Shamim Ahmed Khan and others (CivO Appeals Nos. 1487 to 1528 of 1998) decided on 25.5.1999, this Court examined the status of the employees of a statutory organization after the incorporation of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act It was held as follows :-- "The preceding discussion leaves us in no doubt that the introduction of Section 2-A in the Act did not change the status of the employees of the Bank into civil servants in so far their terms and conditions of service were concerned. In spite of introduction of Section 2-A in the Act, they continue to be governed by the same terms and conditions of service which applied to them before introduction of Section 2-A ia the Act. The only effect of introductionof Section 2-A in the Act, was that instead of ordinary remedy available to an aggrieved employee of the Bank in respect of his terms and conditions of service, he became entitled to take his grievance before the Service Tribunal establil*ed under Article 212 of the Constitution which alone could determine it now."
41. ' Similarly, in another recent decision of this Court, Divisional Engineer Phones Vs. Muhammad Shahid & others (Civil Appeals Nos. 1899 to 1910 of 1996) decided on 28.5.1999, similar views have been expressed in respect of the status of the employees of statutory corporation after insertion of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act. The following were the observations in the above case :-- "It is quite clear from the definition of 'Civil Servant' given in Service Tribunals Act that a civil servant within the contemplation of Service Tribunals Act is a person, who has been or who is a civil servant within the meanings of Civil Servants Act 1973 or, as the section now stands after amendment of 1973, it also includes a person who is declared to be a civil servant under Section 2A of the Service Tribunals Act. It is, therefore, quite clear that in order toentitle a person to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal, relating to a grievance in respect of the terms and conditions of service, he must be either a 'Civil Servant' as defined in the Civil Servants Act, 1973, or has been declared to be a 'Civil Servant' for the purpose of maintaining his appeal under the Service Tribunals Act. Civil Servants Act, 1973, defines a "civil servant" as follows: (a). b) "civil servant" means a person who is a member of an .All- Pakistan Service or of a civil service of the Federation, or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Federation, including any such post connected with defence, but does not include
(i) a person who is on deputation to the Federation from any Province or other authority;
(ii) a person who is employed on contract, or on work-charged basis, or who is paid from contingencies; or
(iii) a person who is a "worker" as defined in the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934), or the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (Vffl of 1923)".
42. ' The respondents in the above appeals belong to the category of the persons who has been declared as 'civil servant' under Section 2A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, for the purposes of availing the remedy before the Service Tribunal. Such persons in the absence of a corresponding amendment in the Civil Servants Act 19^73, cannot automatically become a 'civil servant' within the meanings of Civil Servants Act, 1973."
43. ' In view of the above stated legal position, the view taken by the Hon"ble Service Tribunal that the service conditions of the respondents were governed in accordance with the provisions of Civil Servants Act 1973, or the rules of service applicable to civil servants, does not appear to be correct. The effect of incorporation of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act 1973, is limited. It only made available to the aggrieved employees of a statutory corporation, authority, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest, a right of appeal against the order of the departm ental authority , before the Service Tribunal. However, the terms and conditions of such employees continued to be governed by the rules or regulations which were applicable to them before incorporation of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act. Therefore, the service conditions of respondents with the PLA were governed under the Service Regulations framed by the PLA. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the principle of 'master and servant' was applicable in the cases, therefore, against a wrongful dismissal from service, the only remedy available to respondents was to sue for damages. We would not like to comment on this contention of the learned counsel as we propose to remit these case to the Service Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with law. Since the Hon'ble Service Tribunal had proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the services of respondents were governed under the provisions of Civil Servants Act, 1973 and service rules applicable to civil servants, Civil Appeals Nos. 1901 to 1905, 1909 & 1910 of 1998 are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. These cases are remanded to the Hon'ble Service Tribunal with the direction that the service appeals filed by the respondents before it will be decided a fresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. The learned counsel for the appellants will be entitled to raise the contentions not decided in these appeals before the Hon'ble Service Tribunal. In the circumstances of the cases, there will be no order as to costs.