DECISION ' These are 9 appeals against the orders passed by the various Labour Courts ordering re- instatement of the respondents with full back benefits on applications made under section 25-A, I.
R.
0.
2. The respondents were in the permanent employment of different organizations. They were dismissed from service. They served grievance notices and approached the Labour Court under section 25-A, I. R. O. The applications were resisted on various grounds. In some cases one of the grounds taken was that the applications were time-barred in view of the provisions of subsection
(6) to section 25-A, I. R.
0. As those applications were made beyond a period of 2 months after dismissal in contravention of the aforesaid subsection.
3. Evidence was tendered by the parties. On the assessment of the evidence the Labour Courts dismissed the applications filed by the appellants and ordered reinstatements. In cases in which the objection regarding limitation was taken, it was held that the operation of subsection (6) was limited to the period between 13th April, 1972 and 9th February, 1973 and, therefore, grievance notice was necessary before approaching the Labour Court and since that procedure was followed the applications were within time. It was also held that subsection (6) was not applicable after 9th February, 1973.
4. A preliminary objection with regard to limitation based on subsection (6) of section 25-A, I. R.
0. Was raised before me on behalf of the employers in all these appeals and, therefore, these appeals were consolidated. Since there was conflict of views with regard to the interpretation of subsection (6) to section 25-A, I. R. O. I called some Advocates as arnica(' curiae. In one of my judgments I had held that in view of later part of subsection (6) the grievance notice was not necessary and the aggrieved person had to approach Labour Court directly within a period of 2 months of his dismissal. Whereas the view expressed by the Single Bench of the Karachi High Court was to the contrary. There were also conflicting judgments of Single Judges of Lahore High Court.
Although, there was a decision of the Division Bench of the Karachi High Court, but it was not referred to in any of those decisions. So the important question which has to be determined is as to whether the aggrieved workers were required to follow the procedure as laid down by subsections
(1) to (4) of section 25-A, I. R.
0. Or it was not necessary and was dispensed with by virtue of the provisions of subsection (6) of the same section.
5. Tracing the history of legislation, there was no provision of law for redress of individual grievance except as provided in sections 30 and 31 of Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1959 in respect of the matters enumerated therein under certain circumstances. In 1968 a change had taken place by the enactment of West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 whereby Standing Order No, 18 was introduced and it laid down the procedure for approaching the Labour Court subject to time limit and certain conditions.
6. In 1968, West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance was passed repelling Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. This effected a change and the right to approach the Labour Court was confined in certain cases as per section 39. This was substituted by section 34 in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. But in the same year section 34 was also substituted by an amendment allowing employer, workman and Collective Bargaining Agent to approach the Labour Court.
7. On 13th of April, 1972 Standing Order was repealed and instead section 25-A was introduced in I.
R. 0 1969. It contained five subsections only. Time limit was prescribed and procedure was laid down for approaching the Labour Court. Till then section 34 as amendrd in 1969 remained intact.
This gave rise to controversy as no time limit or procedure was prescribed by section 34. It was, however, held by the High Courts that with regard to individual grievance the procedure and time limit prescribed by section 25-A, I. R.
0. Was still to be followed even though the application was made under section 34, I. R.
0. In this view of the matter the word "workmen" became redundant. So there was amendment on 9th February, 1973 and the word "workmen" was deleted. Simultaneously section 25-A, I. R.
0. Was amended by adding subsections (6) and (7).
8. In subsection (6), the Amendment Act of 1972 and Amendment Act of 1913 have been referred to.
The date of the former Act is 10th November, 1972 while the date of the latter is 9th February, 1972.
The subsections (6) and (7) were subsequently omitted by Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 dated 20th February, 1977,
9. Turning to the submission with regard to the force of the enunciation of the principle of law by the High Court, this depends upon the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court. There can be no manner of dispute that the jurisdiction of the High Court is three-fold, viz, under the Criminal Procedure Code, under the Civil Procedure Code and under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. There can be no manner of doubt that the High Court has not been invested with any power under the Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code to entertain any appeal or revision against the decision of the Labour Courts. In fact under either of the Codes the High Court has no control or any supervisory power over the Labour Courts. It, therefore, follows that the Labour Courts are not sub-ordinate to the High Court, in so far as the aforesaid two Codes are concerned.
10. Taking up the Constitution there are two Articles dealing with the power of the High Court. These are Article 199 and Article 201. I would first take up Article 201. It lays down that, subject to Article 189, any decision of a High Court, shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law, or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all Courts subordinate to it. The expression subordinate Courts has not been defined by the Constitution. So in the absence of any such definition in the Constitution it mnst be presumed that this expression refers to the Courts constituted under Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code or under any other law specifically providing or making that Court or Tribunal subordinate to the High Court. There is nothing in the Labour Laws to indicate that this Tribunal or the Labour Courts are subordinate to the High Court. Evidently Article 201 does not apply to the Labour Courts The learned Presiding Officer extended the status of subordination on the analogy of Article 189 but this refers to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and is differently worded. The jurisdiction conferred under Article 189 cannot be extended to the High Court otherwise there is no reason for using different phraseology.
11. Thus there remains Article 199. The jurisdiction under this Article is extraordinary and special. I am prepared to concede that under this Article High Court exercises superior jurisdiction. This superiority cannot be abridged or controlled by any enactment. Under this Article the High Court is competent to issue any direction to any Court or Authority and the B question of subordination is irrelevant. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to entertain the view that the exposition or enunciation of the principle of law is binding on this Tribunal as well as the Labour Courts.
12. Despite the aforesaid view, this does not really conclude the matter which is under consideration in these oases. The question which is still agitating my mind is whether I should endorse the view taken by the Labour Courts on the basis of the decisions of the High Court, reported in 1977 PLC 489, PLD 1975 Kar. 716, PLD 1975 Kar. 719, 1976 L L C 264 and PLD 1977 Kar.
166.
13. Having given my anxious consideration, and thought I am of the view that I must confirm my own view taken in the case of Nisar Ahmed v Nisamuddin, Appeal No, KAR 495 of 1976, decided on 28th February, 1977, to the effect that workman whose service has been terminated must approach the Court directly within two months in view of the latter expres- C sion "whichever is later" incorporated in subsection (6) of section 25-A, I. R.
0. And it is not necessary to adopt the procedure laid down by subsections (1) to (4). To hold to the contrary would render the aforesaid expression meaningless and redundant. No redundancy can be attributed to the Legislature. The view that I had taken earlier and I am still inclined to follow is supported by the Division Bench of the same High Court in the case of Messrs International Laboratories Employees' Union v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal. The relevant observation reads as under :- "Two remedies are provided by the statute for re-instatement, one is by way of individual grievance under subsection (6) of section 25-A and the other by way of industrial dispute under section 34.
The former remedy was not available earlier as Standing Order No, 18 only provided for the re- instatement of the office-bearers of the Union unless the question was raised as an industrial dispute. It was therefore that the Legislature and its wisdom added subsection (6) and gave this remedy to the workers but this did not affect the remedy available earlier in case an industrial dispute was raised."
14. In the above reported case the termination of service has taken place on 9th May, 1973, 1. e.
Much after the Amendment Act of 1973. Thus the aforesaid observation of the High Court dispels the view of the Labour Court that the operation of subsection (6) was limited and confined to the period between 13th April, 1972 and 9th February, 1973. Indeed, detailed reasons were not given but the aforesaid observation leaves no room for doubt that their Lordships were conscious of the legal implication and effect of subsection (6) of section 25-A, I. R. O. When considered as a whole. It seems that this authority of the Division Bench was not brought to the notice of their Lordships as well as the Labour Court when subsection (6) to section 25-A, I. R.
0. Was considered.
15. To probe further into this question I asked the learned counsel canvassing the aforesaid view to produce a single illustration in support of what was stated but they could not, despite the fact that I quoted several instances to elaborate and press my own view. For the sake of brevity I may quote here a few of them. There is no dispute that termination of service not earlier than two months of the passing of Amendment Act, 1972 could directly approach the Court within two months of the passing of the Amendment Act, 1972 and thereby procedure laid down by subsections (1) to (4) was dispensed with. Then comes the period between the passing of the Amendment Act of 1972 and Amendment Act of 1973. The rule laid down by subsection (6) will be equally applicable to it and period of two months will commence from the passing of Amendment Act, 1973, otherwise the period of two months would have either elapsed or reduced. To clarify further it may be stated that if the termination of service takes place a week before the passing of the Amendment Act, 1973 then counting the period from the date of termination of service, the period available to the aggrieved employee to approach the Court would be one month and three weeks and not two months. This makes the expression "whichever is later" meaningless and redundant. It is an established rule of law, as already indicated, that redundancy cannot be attributed to the Legislature nor any word or expression can be treated to be superfluous. Every word and expression has to be given effect to unless the text does not permit this. There is nothing in section 25-A, I. R.
0. To resort to that kind of exception. It is also a rule of interpretation that effort be made to reconcile the various provisions of law and inconsistency be avoided. The rule further says that if two interpretations are possible, the Court should lean against construction which renders legislation futile.
16. It was also pointed out by the learned Presiding Officer that his view was also supported by the fact that subsection (6) was subsequently deleted. Even this argument has no force as it is an admitted position that the subsection was deleted in 1977 whereas prior to it there had been three amendments in the Ordinance in 1974, 1975 and 1976. In case this subsection had become dormant on 8th April, 1973 and was limited to a certain period why it was not deleted earlier and why it was allowed to remain in the Statute. In my view the subsection was introduced not only to cover the period as has been pleaded but was also intended to do away with the dilatory procedure prescribed by the earlier subsections for the purpose of the expeditious disposal of the individual grievance.
17. In order to remove any misunderstanding or misgiving I would like to make it clear that in my previous order I did not express my disagreement but I proceeded to express my view on the basis of the distinction that I bad drawn and stated in unambiguous terms that the authorities were distinguishable on the ground that High Court had not considered the effect of the latter expression and the decisions were based on the first part. To be more clear, I bad stated that subsection (6) consisted of two parts. This was intended to meet the situation arising before and after the passing of Amendment Acts of 1971 and 1973. It was to apply to cases arising after the Amendment Act, 1973 that the expression, "or the termination of employment whichever is later", was introduced. I would also like to emphasize that I have highest regard for the learned Judges of the High Court and hold their Lordships in great esteem. In no case I would like to express my disagreement with the view expressed by the High Court. I repeat that my view was not based on disagreement but was the result of the distinction that I had drawn. It is an undeniable rule that a distinction, if it exists, can be drawn and this in no way would show disregard to the High Court.
Even otherwise the rule of law laid by the Division Bench has not only to be followed in preference to the view expressed by a Single Bench but is binding. I have already pointed out that there is an authority of the Division Bench which supports my view. This I must follow.
18. In the circumstances the view expressed by the Labour Courts cannot be upheld. As a matter of fact this Tribunal being the appellate authority, its decision is binding on the Labour Courts and cannot be disregarded. Indeed, the decision of a High Court or Supreme Court has to be preferred and acted upon but the Labour Court did not appreciate that my decision was based on the distinction which I had drawn and this aspect of the case was completely ignored and disregarded by the Labour Courts.
19. The second important question that arises for consideration is with regard to the condonation of delay in making the application to the Labour Court. I have already pointed out that in some cases this plea was raised in the Labour Courts. After appeals had been filed in this Court, applications in some cases were made for condonation of delay in making the applications under section 25-A, J.
R.
0. And in some cases the condonation was orally pleaded. I do not wish to deal with this question as primarily it is the function of the Labour Court to decide it in the first instance. So for the determination of that question the, cases will have to be remanded without dealing with the other questions which have been raised in the various appeals by the parties.
20. In the circumstances I allow the appeals and set aside the impugned orders passed by the Labour Courts and remand the cases to the Labour Courts concerned for disposal of the cases on the basis of their finding with regard to the question of the condonation of delay. The aggrieved parties shall be entitled to file appeals raising all the questions on facts as well as law including the question of the condonation of delay.