' Nawab Khan, the petitioner, stood surety for Amir Hamza Ali Shah accused charged in case F.I.R.
No,1416, dated 9-12-1993, Police Station Saddar, Haripur, under section 17(3), Haraba, Hudood Ordinance, 1979. The said accused applied for his release on bail. The learned Sessions Judge, Haripur accepted his application vide order, dated 25-6-1997 and directed that the accused be released on bail provided he furnishes bail bond in the sum of Rs,50,000 with two sureties in the like amount. After release on bail, the accused failed to attend the Court when summoned, as a result of which the learned trial Court summoned the sureties and ordered that the bonds be forfeited to State and both the sureties were directed to deposit amount of Rs,25,000 each on or before 2-7- 1997. The petitioner filed Revision Petition No,35 of 1999 in this Court which was dismissed in limine on 21-1-2000. The petitioner now wants to review of the said order, dated 21-1-2000 through petition in hand.
2. Syed Altaf Hussain Shah, Advocate, the learned counsel represented the petitioner mainly argued that one Assaar Khan had preferred revision petition in this Court which was accepted vide order, dated 30-6-1999 and another Bench of this Court comprising Honourable Mr. Justice Qazi Muhammad Farooq Pasha, J. Had reduced the penalty of co-surety from Rs,25,000 to Rs,10,000.
Moreover, no period for filing revision petition has been prescribed in the statute, therefore, the order, dated 21-1-2000 be reviewed and the amount of bail bond penalty be reduced to Rs,10,000.
3. Qazi Muhammad Ghazanfar the learned A.A.-G. Argued that section 369, Cr.P.C. Places a bar to review the order passed by Criminal Court. He, however, did not contest the application.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The plain reading of section 369, Cr.P.C. Shows that no Court when it has signed the judgment shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical error. After deciding the revision petition, this Court in absence of a statutory provision has become functus officio and cannot entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless and until the previous order of final disposal has been set aside. The judgment is, therefore, final so far as this Court is concerned.
6. The argument of the learned counsel that order, dated 21=1=2000 cannot be called A "judgment" because the main revision petition was dismissed in limine. This argument of the learned counsel has no force; firstly, that notice was given to the State for 21-1-2000 and the learned Assistant Advocate-General represented the State and contested the revision petition; secondly, the revision petition was dismissed after hearing the learned counsel for the parties; thirdly, the word "judgment" includes decisions and orders passed. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Samiullah Khan and another v. The State PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 227 wherein it was held:-- "The expression 'judgment' as used in section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 obviously includes decisions and orders passed in criminal matters on the merits of the case. If, therefore, a party has agitated a matter by means of an application under section 561-A of the Code and the application is dismissed by High Court after considering the merits of the case then second application by the same party in respect of the same matter cannot be entertained under section 439 of the Code notwithstanding the difference of language employed in the two sections."
' Likewise in Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq v. Khurshid Ali and another 1996 PCr.LJ 119 it was held:-- "The expression 'judgment' as used in section 369 of the Cr.P.C. Obviously includes decisions and orders passed by criminal Courts on the merits of the case and the High Court has no jurisdiction to amend its judgment by deleting passages from it."
' The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for review. I, therefore, do not find myself pursuaded to c review order, dated 21-1-2000. Consequently, the review petition in hand is dismissed.