1. ' This revision application has been filed against the judgment and decree, dated 24-7-1991 passed in Suit No,1131 of 1986 and judgment passed in Appeal No,130 of 1991, dated 8-9-1992 passed by the 5th Senior Civil Judge, South Karachi and II Additional Sessions Judge, South Karachi, respectively.
2. ' The brief facts are that the respondent, who was working with the applicant alongwith another employee; namely, Abid Hussain, was charged with misappropriation of a sum of Rs,20,000.
3. Accordingly, he was charge-sheeted and Departmental Inquiry was held by the applicant herein and thereafter an order, dated 26-9-1984 was passed dismissing the respondent's service under Regulation No,28 of sub-clause (1) of (Staff Service) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "Regulation"). The said order was communicated to the respondent under the signatures of the Secretary.
4. ' The respondent filed a Suit for declaration being No,1131 of 1986 against the applicant which was contested and was decreed vide judgment, dated 25-1-1989. Appeal was filed by the applicant against the said judgment which was heard and dismissed by the appellate Court vide judgment, dated 10-12-1989. The applicant preferred revision against the said judgment of the appellate Court which was accepted by the High Court and by consent the case was remanded back to the trial Court with two additional issues framed by the Court directing the trial Court to record evidence on the said two issues and decide the case. The learned trial Court after adducing further evidence and hearing the parties on the said two issues passed its judgment, dated 24-7-1991.
5. Applicant again filed an Appeal being No,130 of 1991 against the said judgment, which was dismissed vide judgment and decree, dated 8-9-1992 which has been impugned herein and the present revision application was filed on 12-10-1992. The revision was admitted on 5-11-1992 and was fixed for the first time for regular hearing on 7-2-1993 and since then it was being fixed but was mostly adjourned on the request of the counsel for the applicant.
6. ' The contention of Mr. Mahmoodul Hassan, the learned counsel for the applicant is that the order of dismissal was passed under Regulation 28(1) of the (Staff Regulation) by the competent Authority as specified under Regulation 28(2) of the (Staff Regulation) and specified in Appendix "II" and further, that the Regulation of the applicant are not statutory as neither they were gazetted nor were placed before the Assembly but are only to regulate the service and the relationship of the applicant and its employees as such is governed by the principle of master and servant yet the learned trial Court and the appellate Court failed to appreciate the same and passed the impugned judgments.
7. ' On the other hand Mr. Abid Zuberi, the learned counsel for the respondent stated that there' are concurrent findings of the two Courts and that, too, in two rounds of litigation and as such the same cannot be disturbed and relied on the case of Haji Muhammad Din v. Malik Muhammad Abdullah PLD 1994 SC 291. His next contention was that the order dismissing the service of the respondent was issued by the Secretary and not by the competent Authority i,e, the Chairman and as such the trial Court as well as the appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit and dismissing the appeal.
8. ' I have heard both the counsel and have gone through the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and the record.
9. ' Section 115, C.P.C. Is as under:-- "115. Revision--- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court ,subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears--
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested., or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity."
10. The language of the above section clearly indicates that revision under this provision is filed only for the purposes of correction of any jurisdiction error which might crept in the orders/judgments of the lower Courts wherein the Courts have assumed jurisdiction not so vested in it by law or have failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or if any material irregularity has been committed in exercise of its jurisdiction.
11. ' Mr. Mahmoodul Hassan, the learned counsel for the applicant could not point out any such jurisdictional error except that although the letter dismissing the service of the respondent was passed by the competent Authority but the trial Court as well as the appellate Court failed to take cognizance of the fact and as such the findings are not based on correct appreciation of evidence.
12. The relevant part of the said letter is as under:- "... The management is, therefore, constrained to dispense with your service as measure of punishment in the abovesaid aggravating circumstances. Hence, you are dismissed from service of the National Insurance Corporation with effect from (sic) within sub-clause (1)(vii) of the Regulation .28 of the aforesaid (Staff Service) Regulations, 1976 under the order of the competent Authority."
13. ' The word "Management" has been defined in the National Insurance Corporation Act of 1976 as under:- " ' Management' .--- The general direction and administration of the affairs and business of the Corporation shall be vested in the Board of Directors which shall consist of---
(a) a Chairman be appointed by the Federal Government, who shall also be the Chief Executive of the Corporation; and
(b) such number of Directors as the Federal Government may, from time to time, appoint."
14. ' This indicates that the management consists of Chairman plus the Directors so appointed by the Federal Government. However, section 28(2) of Regulation provides that "the Authorities which may award punishment specified in sub-Regulation (1) and the Authorities to whom appeals may be preferred against the orders imposing such punishment are specified in Appendix "II" and Appendix "II" provides authority empowered to impose penalty in respect of officer holding designation of Class-I and Class -II will be the Chairman and the appellate authority will be Board of Directors.
15. ' Admittedly the respondent was holding a post of Class-II at the relevant time and as such for the purpose of passing the order of dismissal it was the Chairman who was the competent Authority.
16. However, I have seen photo copy of the order allegedly passed by the Chairman and the original of the same produced by Mr. Mahmoodul Hassan. The letter/order has been signed by two persons Secretary and Deputy Manager (D.M.). The learned counsel for the applicant stated that there is a third signature which is on the body of the said letter and that is of the Chairman. There definitely seems to be some signature in the middle of the page which is illegal and does not indicate the name of the signatory nor there is a seal as such it causes doubts and in my opinion the learned trial Court have rightly held that dismissal order was not passed by the competent Authority.
17. During the arguments Mr. Abid Zuberi, the learned counsel for the respondent also stated that the misappropriation was committed by Abid Hussain who admitted his guilt during proceedings and refunded the said amount. This fact is confirmed from evidence and was not denied by Mr. Mahmoodul Hassan, the learned counsel for the applicant. Admittedly, neither this person was examined nor the Inquiry Officer. The learned trial Court has dealt with the evidence in detail and have given very sound reasons in support of their findings which have been upheld by the appellate Court. In the case of Haji Muhammad Din v. Malik Muhammad Abdullah PLD 1994 SC 291 it was held that "it is well-settled law that concurrent findings of fact of two Courts below cannot be disturbed by the High Court in second civil appeal muchless in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Unless the two Courts below while recording the finding of fact have either misread the evidence or have ignored any material piece of evidence on record or the finding of fact recorded by the two Courts below is perverse. The jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact in revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Is still narrower.
18. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Can only interfere with the order of the subordinate Courts on the grounds, that the Court below has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law or that the Court below has acted with material irregularity effecting its jurisdiction in the case". In the case of Kanwal Mian and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53, wherein the High Court had allowed revision and the orders of the Courts below were set aside. The learned Court relied on the judgment of Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj v. Khetter Moni Dassi wherein it was observed as under:-- "... The scope of revisional powers vesting in the High Court clearly shows that, no interference was called for in this case and in upsetting the conclusion of the Court below on the question of fact by means of re-examination of the evidence in revision, the High Court unfortunately overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction and the appeal was allowed."
19. ' This judgment was followed in the case of Haji Muhammad Zaman v. Zafar Ali Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 88, wherein the High Court under its revisional jurisdiction had set aside the order of the trial Court and remanded the case for further proceedings and leave was granted to consider the question whether the High Court could have decided the revision under section 115, C.P.C. So as to reverse the judgment impugned in revision on recording/admission of fresh evidence in the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction with a view to determine the scope of revisional jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed and revisional judgment was set aside.
20. As I have already stated that the learned counsel for the applicant could not point out any jurisdictional defect or material irregularity in the order passed by the trial Court as well as appellate Court as such the findings given by the trial Court which were affirmed by the appellate Court are neither perverse nor the result of any misreading of evidence on record. On the contrary oral as well as documentary evidence has been fully discussed by the trial Court.
21. ' In view of law and the principle laid down in the judgment mentioned hereinabove and the very fact that the learned counsel for the applicant could not pin-point any jurisdictional defect in the judgment impugned herein, the revisional application having no merits is dismissed.