' This first rent appeal under section 21 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as S.R.P.O., 1979) is directed against the judgment dated 30-5-1988 passed by the learned IIIrd Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi (West) in Rent Case No,I308 of 1984 (Renumbered as 583 of 1985) whereby ejectment of the appellant was allowed and he was directed to handover vacant possession of shop No,5 (hereinafter referred to as the demised premises).
2. The demised premises is in occupation of the appellant as tenant and the respondent sought his ejectment on the grounds of structual changes in the demised premises alleged to have been made by the appellant by demolishing some of its portion and requirement of the demised premises for re-construction.
3. The appellant filed written statement and contested the application. He denied the allegations and also stated that approval of the plan for reconstruction has not been got renewed.
4. The learned trial Court settled the following points for determination:
(1) Whether the opponents have committed such acts which have materially impaired the value and the utility of premises?
(2) Whether the applicant requires the premises bona fide for reconstruction?
5. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were cross-examined.
Ultimately, the learned Rent Controller answered both the points in favour of the respondent and passed the impugned order.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The burden to prove the two points was on the respondent which he has discharged successfully.
The allegation about material changes having been made in the demised premises by the appellant has been specifically pleaded by the respondent. But the appellant failed to challenge this point therefore, it stand proved inasmuch as the appellant himself in his affidavit-in-evidence did not deny the allegation of making material changes in the demised premises.
7. So far as the point of reconstruction is concerned, the only ground taken up by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the approved plan was not got renewed by the respondent from the competent authority, therefore, it has become ineffective and this falsifies the plea of the respondent regarding reconstruction. In this respect it may be stated that no specific period for reconstruction has been mentioned in the approved plan. Furthermore, it has come in evidence, in the cross-examination of respondents witness that they had applied for renewal but was asked by .The relevant authority to first obtain consent of the appellant but the latter refused to give such consent. Probably because he never wanted to vacate the demised premises for reconstruction.
Moreover, this being just a formality, it was not necessary for the landlord to get the sanction renewed every year during pendency of ejectment proceedings in view of the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rashid Brothers, Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar Khan 1981 SCMR 782. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent has no funds for reconstruction of the whole building as he did not mention this fact in the application or in the evidence and further that he rented out other shops to other tenants which also indicate mala fide on his part as he wanted to enhance rent of the demised premises. In this regard suffice to observe that disclosure about funds etc. Was not essential or its nondisclosure is not at all fatal for the point of reconstruction. The fact that he had obtained approved plan itself lends full support to his plea of reconstruction. It is further strengthened by the commitment of the respondent to let out the demised premises to the appellant according to law, after reconstruction.
' The upshot of the above discussion is that the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the two points being just and proper need no interference. Accordingly this appeal is dismissed and the appellant is directed to handover vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondent within 60(sixty) days subject to payment of rent.