' This civil revision is filed by the petitioner to challenge the order dated 14-5-1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge-III, D.I. Khan, vie.: which the suit of the plaintiff/respondents was dismissed as withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit subject to payment of most of Rs,200. In the alternative, the petitioner has also challenged the order dated 27-2-1999 of the learned District Judge on question of pecuniary jurisdiction with a further request by way of a note in the memorandum of the revision petition that if this revision petition is not competent, then it may be converted into a writ petition.
2. The short background of the instant case is that the respondent filed a civil suit against the petitioners and pro forma defendant in respect of land measuring 26 Kanals situated in Mouza Dera Ismail Khan.
3. During pendency of the suit, the counsel for the respondents made a request for the withdrawal of the suit with a permission to file a fresh one. The statement of the learned counsel was recorded and the suit was dismissed as withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit vide order dated 14-5- 1997.
4. Feeling aggrieved of such an order of the trial Court, the petitioners filed a Civil Revision No,13 of 1997 on 21-6-1997 before the learned District Judge, D.I. Khan who, however, returned the same for want of jurisdiction to be presented before the competent forum.
5. The significant feature of this case is that the present petitioners filed an application before the Civil Judge-IV, D.I. Khan whereby the jurisdiction of the said Court was challenged. The said application was decided on 13-2-1996 by the said Court vide order-sheet No,7 of the even date and the objection so raised by the petitioners was found correct in the following words:-- "'The contentions made by the petitioners bring credence to the fact that the suit does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court, as a consequential relief of specific performance of the contract has been sought and in that case, the value of the suit land exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, as the value of the property has been evaluated Rs, Thirteen Lacs. I, therefore, send this file to the learned District Judge to entrust the same to a Court of competent jurisdiction with the request that the same should be withdrawn from the diary of this Court."
6. In view of the above order passed on the application of the petitioners, the learned District Judge, D.I. Khan, accepting the point of pecuniary jurisdiction, withdrew the file from the diary of Civil Judge-IV and entrusted the same to the Senior Civil Judge, Tank at D.I. Khan, vide his order dated 15-2-1996. This shows that Rs,13,00,000 as value of the suit was an established fact and quite within the knowledge of the petitioners.
7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended firstly, that the learned trial Court was not right to allow the withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action without giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and, secondly, that the learned District Judge was also incorrect in returning the revision petition to the petitioners on the point of pecuniary jurisdiction. He was adamant in his view that the learned District Judge had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition, but could not substantiate his view by producing any law on the point.
7-A. The existing position of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge is governed by Act No, IV of 1994 for the N.-W.F.P, which has raised the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge from Rs,50,000 to Rs,5,00,000, and in this view of the matter, the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge does not exceed Rs, five lacs. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel in this behalf has no force.
8. Here, the basic order which was challenged is that of the learned trial Court dated 14-5-1997. The learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with the question of limitation prescribed for a revision petition. He submitted that for this purpose, he has filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 151, C.P.C. And contended that since the revision petition was filed before the learned District Judge under a bona fide belief that he had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition was, as such, the period consumed during pendency of the matter before the learned District Judge is condonable.
8-A. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has strongly resisted the contention of the petitioner's counsel and stated that the circumstances of the case do not attract the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, or for that matter section 151 of the C.P.C. For the purpose of condensation of delay. He contended that this was not a bona fide mistake in choosing a wrong forum, as the learned counsel for the petitioner was still stressing his view that the revision petition before the learned District Judge was rightly filed, which, in fact was wrong. The learned counsel has relied on the judgments reported as Raja Kiramatullah and 3 others v. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukera 1999 SCMR page 1892 and Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Mst. Farrakh Naz PLD 1999 Lah. Page 238. In the former case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar proposition in paragraph No,13 of the judgment observed as follows:-- "In the presence of section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, there could be no doubt or complication to determine the forum of appeal. Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act would come into play only if the delay appears to be condonable because of the appellants prosecuting their case with due diligence. The time consumed in pursuing the appeal in wrong forum could not be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor and another PLD 1991 SC page 957 may be cited in this behalf. In Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Mussarat Rehana 1985 CLC 2529 it was observed that for bringing the case within the ambit of principles governing section 14, the appellant has to show that he prosecuted his remedy before the wrong forum in good faith. In Government of Pakistan v. Rafi Associate Limited 1985 CLC 2234 (Kar.), choosing wrong forum lacking due care and attention were not considered as acts done in good faith. The principle that the act of Court shall prejudice nobody is not attracted in the present case, as the delay was on account of the appellant's own negligence and not due to the act of Court. The exclusion of time for filing appeal in wrong Court was considered in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 Supreme Court 102, at page 107 and it was observed that:- "Now if an appellant proves that he filed his appeal in the wrong Court despite due care and attention it means that the presentation of the appeal in the wrong Court was on account of circumstances beyond his control. No doubt, what such circumstances are must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh's case, Sir George Rankin set aside the finding of the Chief Court that the appellant's Advocate had been very negligent in filing the appeal in the wrong Court because the facts relevant to the question of the Court in which the appeal was to be filed were very complicated. 'Similarly, an appellant can bring his case under section 5 if he can show that there is some ambiguity in the law governing the forum in which the appeal is to be filed, or, to take another example, an appellant can rely on section 5, if he can show that he was misguided by the practice of the Court, or by any erroneous judgment of the Court but, in the instant case, the provisions of section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance are plain beyond any doubt and as there is also no complication whatsoever about the facts relevant to the question of the proper forum for filing the appeal, it is clear that the presentation of the appeal in the District Court was an act of gross negligence."
9. In the instant case, the petitioners were well conscious that the value of the subject-matter of the suit is Rs, thirteen lacs and, as such, the, filing of a revision petition in the wrong forum cannot be termed as a boar fide mistake. For the purpose of the delay, it is essentially required of the petitioners to establish the fact that the delay had occurred due to bona fide mistake, or under the circumstances which were beyond their control. Thus, in the case in hand, such qualifying conditions are badly lacking. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim the protection of section 5 of the Limitation Act, or section 151 of the C.P.C. Moreover, it is evident from the record that the revision petition was returned to the petitioners on 27-2-1999, but the present revision petition was filed by the petitioners on 10-4-1999, meaning thereby that the filing of the instant revision after its return by the learned District Judge is irther delayed by one month and 13 days, for which no explanation has been offered by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the case of Raja Kiramatullah and 3 others v.' Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukera 1999 SCMR page 1892, referred above, there was a delay of only 18 days in filing the appeal after receiving the same from the High Court and, therefore, the application for condemnation of delay was dismissed, which dismissal order was upheld by the High Court and was consequently maintained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
10. Drawing wisdom from the above-mentioned judgment of the Humble Supreme Court, I am clear in my mind that the petitioners have failed to make out a case to the effect that they have been actively and in good faith pursuing their case and, as 'such, are not entitled to the condemnation of delay so caused.
11. Consequently, this revision petition is dismissed on the sole ground of limitation.