SYED JAMSHED ALI, J. - This is vendee's second appeal in a preemption matter. Khuda Bakhsh son of Karim Bakhsh was owner of the disputed land measuring 4 Kanals situated in Chak No. 52/TDA Tehsil Bhakkar, District Mianwali. He sold it to the appellants for a consideration of Rs.2500/- through a decree of Civil Court dated 5.3.1973. The plaintiff- respondent, claiming to be the collateral of the vendor, filed a suit for preemption which was dismissed on 8.3.1976, on the basis of the finding that the suit was barred by time, although the superior right of the plaintiff- respondent was conceded.
2. The respondent filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Mianwali. The judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court was reversed and the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent was decreed on 10.9.1976, hence this appeal.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has contended that the finding of the learned Appellate Court -on issue No. 2 (limitation) is wholly unsustainable for the reason that the vendee- appellant entered possession of the disputed land under the oral sale on 11.7.1972 as borne out by Ext. P-3, the decree passed in the suit of the appellant-vendee. The pre-emption suit having been filed on 4.3.1974 was patently beyond time and thus, the appellant-pre-emptor had no cause of action. The learned counsel for the respondent has controverted the arguments of ther learned counsel for the appellant.
4. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel. The learned first Appellate Court, on the basis of evidence on the record found that the vendees had not imposed possession of the disputed land under the sale prior to 5.3.1973. This is a finding of fact not liable to interference in second appeal.
5. While arriving at this finding the learned first Appellate Court took into consideration Ext. P-1, copy of khasra girdawari from Kharif 1972, to Kharif 1974, wherein the names of the appellant do not occur.
6. The learned Trial Court was unduly impressed by the proceedings of the suit between the vendor and vendee. He relied on Ex.D- I the plaint in the said suit in which the appellants-vendees had taken up the position that land was orally sold on 11.7.1972 and that the vendor had delivered possession to the vendee-appellant, Ex.D-5, the statement of appellant Muhammad Siddiq in that suit and Ext. D-3 the order in that suit. Judgment was confessed by the vendor in the said suit culminating into the decree dated 5.3.1973. Reliance of the learned Trial Court on Ex.D-1, Ext. D-3 and D-5 was totally misplaced. The pre-emptor-respondent was not party to the proceedings of the said suit and therefore, was not bound either by the pleadings or evidence recorded in the said suit or the decree rendered therein. A consent decree is an agreement between the parties super- added to it is the command of the Judge and nothing beyond. It does not bind a stranger to the suit. The oral evidence relied upon by the learned Trial Court at best establishes a bargain or sale by vendor to the appellants before the decree but not that the vendees had also entered possession of the disputed land. The decree of the Court Ext. P-3 and statement of DW-1 is the basis of the judgment of the learned Trial Court to say that vendees entered possession of the suit land before the date of the decree. While Ex.P-3 was irrelevant, the testimony of DW-1 could not be accepted in view of the entries of khasra girdawari Ext. P-1.
7. In view of what has been stated above the appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.