DECISION ' These are seven appeals against the order of the Labour Court dismissing the applications filed by the appellants under section 25-A,1. R.
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2. The appellants were in the permanent employment of the respondent. On 25th June, 1975 lay-off was ordered by the respondent on account of certain reasons including the shortage in the electric supply. This lay-off continued for 14 days but there was no improvement and, therefore, by letter dated 9th July, 1975 the services of all the workmen were terminated on the ground that the mill was permanently closed.
3. Aggrieved by this the appellants served grievance notice dated 15th. July, 1975 alleging that the termination of their service was illegal. Since the respondent did not take them back on service the appellants filed cases under sections 34, 45, 53 and 60 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. They also raised industrial dispute and filed applications under section 32(1) (a). All the applications were dismissed. An appeal against the order passed under section 32 was also dismissed. They made no application under section 25-A,
1. R.
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4. The mill was re-opened on 28th December, 1975 but the appellants were not re-employed and instead new persons were engaged. Consequently, the appellants served another notice dated 6th March, 1976 and thereafter made applications to the Labour Court under section 25-A, I. R.
0. On 12th May, 1976.
5. The applications were resisted. A preliminary objection was taken that the applications were time-barred. This ground found favour with the learned Presiding Officer and the applications were dismissed. It was held that the cause of grievance arose on 9th July, 1975 when the services of the appellants were terminated and, therefore, the applications which were filed on 6th May, 1976 were time barred. He did not accept the contention that the cause of action arose on the date when the mill was re-opened. He also rejected the contention that the second notice dated 6th March, 1976 could be treated to be a grievance notice as required by section 25-A, I. R.
0. Aggrieved by this, the present appeals had been filed.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and I fully endorse the view taken by the learned Presiding Officer. It was contended before me on behalf of the appellants that the phrase "termination of service" was very ride and it included retenchment and, therefore, the termination of the service of the appellant amounted to retrenchment as required under Standing Order No, 13 of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, and, therefore, the appellants had to be re- employed as required by Standin Order No 14 of the same Ordinance. There is no substance in this contention. It may be true that the termination may include retrenchment but in the present case the action by the respondent was taken under section 11 (A) and the mill was completely closed. It is not a case failing under A Standing Order No, 13 and, therefore, the question of re-employment under Standing Order No, 14 did not arise. Admittedly, initially there was lay-off for 14 days and thereafter the mill was closed, with the result that the services of the appellants were no longer required. This was fully understood by the appellants and, therefore, they filed several cases which were dismissed. The cause of action had arisen when the mill was closed and their services were terminated and not when the mill was re-opened. The second notice could not be treated to be a grievance notice.
7. The view which I have taken is supported by two authorities, viz., Hari Parsad Shivashanker v. A. E.
Divalkar and Murugesa Nakker do. v. Labour Court, wherein it has been ruled that the word "retrenchment" means a dishcharge of surplus labour staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of discipinary action and it has no application where the service of all the workmen have been terminated by the employer on a real and a bona fide closure of business. These authorities are complete answer to the contention raised on behalf of the appellants.
8. In the result the appeal are dismissed. 1960 PLC 1284 1963 PLC 46