' Brief facts of the instant Writ petition are that Shams-ud-Din respondent filed a suit for possession through pre-emption in respect of 20 Kanals situated in Mauza Peero Tehsil and District Jhang. This suit was contested by the present petitioner by filing a written statement. The suit was decreed on the basis of a compromise vide judgment and decree, dated 21-6-1986 on a statement made by Malik Haqnawaz Khokhar, learned counsel for the respondents. This judgment was assailed in appeal before the learned District Judge, Jhang. The appeal was accepted on 10-11-1986 and the case was remanded for decision afresh by Rao Muhammad Hayat Khan, learned Additional District Judge, Jhang. The judgment of the learned Additional District Judge was assailed in Civil Revision No,85-D of 1987 which was accepted by my learned brother Gul Zarin Kiani, J. Vide judgment, dated 18-4-1993. The case was remanded to the learned Appellate Court to make an enquiry whether any power of attorney was given to Malik Haqnawaz Khokhar, Advocate to enter into a compromise on behalf of the respondents in that case. The learned District Judge, Jhang vide judgment and decree, dated 10-7-1995 set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court holding that the compromise decree, dated 21-6-1986 was not binding upon the defendant and remanded the case to the learned trial Court to decide afresh according to law. On 26-10-1995 the present petitioner gave an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. And prayed for rejection of the plaint on the basis that the judgment and decree, dated 21-6-1986 stands set aside being null and void. The learned trial Court vide order, dated 26-10-1995 rejected the application and appeal was filed before the learned Additional District Judge, Jhang. The same was dismissed vide order, dated 7-12-1995. Both the Courts below unanimously held that once a decree was passed in favour of the pre-emptor prior to crucial date of 31-7-1986 the case will be dealt by the old Pre-emption Act (I of 1913). A Both these judgments and decrees are under challenge in the instant writ petition.
2. The contention of the learned counsel for the, petitioner is that the findings of both the Courts below are nullity in the eye of law and those are liable to be set aside, as it is proved by the remand order passed by Mr. Justice Gul Zarin Kiani and the order of the learned District Judge, dated 10-7- 1995 that the learned counsel Malik Haqnawaz Khokhar had no power of attorney to enter into a compromise. The judgment based on the compromise was set aside by the learned Appellate Court after an enquiry as directed by the. High Court. Therefore, the compromise decree, dated 21- 6-1986 was a nullity in the eye of law and since no decree can be passed after the target date of 31-7-1986, therefore, the learned Courts below lacked jurisdiction.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that section 34(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 now protects the cases of pre-emption in which a decree is passed. He relied on Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Sharif 1992 SCM R 1129 where it is held that the plaint in pre- emption suit having been rejected, his suit would revive under provision of section 34(b), Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 -- Plea of being a co-sharer in Khata, however, was yet to be determined as neither the Appellate Court nor the High Court had decided the same --- Such plea would, therefore, be open for decision at the appropriate level --- Order of High Court was set aside and the case remanded to High Court for fresh decision, in accordance with law.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record and the law.
5. The suit for pre-emption was filed on 5-3-1985. It was decreed on the statement of one Malik Haqnawaz Khokhar, Advocate on 21-6-1986, who appeared only on that day. The appeal was preferred against the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and was accepted on 10-11-1986 by Rao Muhammad Hayat Khan, the then learned District Judge, Jhang. The case was remanded to the learned trial Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with the law. The respondent preferred a revision petition which was decided by Mr. Justice Gul Zarin Kiani and the same was accepted and the judgment of the learned District Judge was set aside with the direction to the learned District Judge to rehear the appeal after enquiry as to whether the appellant gave power of attorney to Malik Haqnawaz Khokhar, Advocate to enter into the compromise in the preemption suit and the consent decision was binding upon him. The learned District Judge vide judgment and decree, dated 10-7-1995 held that the appellant had never given any power of attorney to Malik Haqnawaz Khokhar, Advocate to enter into a compromise in the pre-emption suit and the consent decision is not binding upon him. He accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree and remanded the case to the learned trial Court for fresh decision, where the application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Was given which was rejected vide order, dated 26-10-1995 passed by the learned trial Court and in revision vide order, dated 7- 12-1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhang. The provisions of section 34(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 are reproduced below:-- "34(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in the cases and appeals filed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (I of 1913), in which judgments and decrees had been passed before the 1st day of August, 1986, further proceedings if any relating to such cases and appeals shall notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act be governed and continued in accordance with the provisions thereof."
6. Now it is quite clear that this section deals with two cases in which decree passed before the target date and decree not passed before the target date of 31-7-1986 and the provisions of this section make clear that in the cases where the judgment and decree was passed before 1-8-1986 notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, further proceedings, if any, relating to such cases and appeals shall notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act be governed and continued in accordance with the provisions thereof. Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Sharif 1992 SCM R 1129 does support the provisions of section 34(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 that the further proceedings could still be continued under the old Act notwithstanding its repeal. The Honourable Supreme Court has, further substantiated the words "judgments and decrees" and held that the word "judgment and decree" used in section 34(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is not qualified to imply judgment and decree passed only in favour of plaintiff/pre-emptor. The new provision of law override the rule laid down by a number of judgments of this Court. The impugned judgment and decree thus, cover both the cases i,e, those passed for and against the plaintiff preemptor.
7. Moreover, section 34(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is also clear that all the cases and appeals filed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (I of 1913) in which judgments and decrees had been passed before the 1st day of August, 1986, further proceedings if any relating to such cases and appeals shall notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act be governed and continued in accordance, with the provisions thereof. The respondent's case is fully covered by section 34(2) of the Act. Proceedings in the case shall' continue according to the old law notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act.
8. In view of what has been stated above, no interference in the concurrent findings of both the Courts below is called for. Finding no substance in the instant writ petition the same is dismissed.
9. No order as to costs.