' IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 25-9-1997 passed in Writ Petition No,503 of 1997 allowing the same against order of the Election Tribunal, dated 7-1-1997 by Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, Lahore.
2. Brief facts are that respondent. No,3 filed nomination form 1 for contesting election from PP-127 which was accompanied by a declaration of oath and statement of assets. As he allegedly did not pay income-tax or wealth tax as per assets shown in his nomination form, the petitioner herein as a voter of his constituency raised an objection in writing to his candidature before the Returning Officer, which was overruled in consequence, the petitioner approached the Election Tribunal, whereupon the order of the Returning Officer was set aside and nomination papers of respondent No,3 were rejected vide order, dated 7-1-1997. Being aggrieved the respondent No,3 filed a Constitution petition W.P. No,503 of 1997 before the Lahore High Court, Lahore which was allowed on the ground that the petitioner being not a candidate, could not file an appeal against the order of the Returning Officer in terms of section 14(3) of Representation of People Act, 1976.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned judgment we do not find any legal defect in the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court, warranting interference .
4. Resultantly the petition is dismissed and leave declined.
2000 C M R 713 [Supreme Court of Pakistan] Present: Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan and Munir A. Sheikh, JJ Mst. BAKHSHAI and others---Petitioners versus QUTUB-UD-DIN and others---Respondents Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No,616-L of 1998, decided on 14th December, 1999.
(On appeal from the judgment, dated 18-3-1998 of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench passed in RSA No,588 of 1977).
(a) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115)--- 25---Pre-emption suit---Plaintiff claimed his superior right in 1970 on the ground that he was collateral of the vendor, joint owner in the Khata and owner in the estate---Vendee on 23-10-1970, during the pendency of preemption suit, sold the land to a lady who was already tenant over the said land---First right of pre-emption was created in favour of the tenant qua the land comprising his tenancy on promulgation of para.25 of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 and on this basis subsequent vendee claimed that she having been conferred a superior right of pre-emption as compared to the plaintiff with effect from March, 1972, as such the pre-emptor having failed to keep and maintain his superior right of pre-emption up to the date of final judgment by the Trial Court, his suit was liable to be dismissed---Validity--- Sale by vendee in favour of subsequent vendee on 23-10-1970 was not in recognition of her superior right of pre- emption qua the plaintiff, for on the said date, she did not have right of pre-emption superior to the plaintiff as tenant under the relevant law---Subsequent sale by vendee being ordinary sale made during the pendency of the suit, on the purchase of land from the vendee by subsequent vendee, she had lost even her status of tenant, and status of tenant had merged into the superior status of full owner of the land---Subsequent vendee could not be the tenant in her own land after having become owner of the land through purchase---Subsequent vendee, on the promulgation of M.L.R.
115 in 1972 was not holding the land as tenant, therefore, the very basis that she had superior right of pre-emption as tenant over the land in dispute with effect from the said date was wholly misconceived---Contention of subsequent vendee to the effect that she had acquired right of pre-emption in 1972 as tenant of land in dispute by purchasing the land in 1970 was repelled, for, with the purchase of the land, even her status as tenant was lost. [pp. 715, 7161 A, B & D
(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913)--- ----S.21-A---Permissible improvement in the status of vendee to defeat the right of pre-emption of plaintiff during the pendency of suit. Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 provided that during the pendency of the suit, the only improvement permissible in the status by the vendee to defeat the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff was by way of inheritance and not otherwise. If the original vendee could not improve his status in any way other than the inheritance, he could not by sale of the land during the pendency of the suit confer on his transferee a better right as regards improvement of status. [p. 7161 C Shaukat Ali Mehr, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Mehdi Khan Mehtab, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.
Shahid Hussain Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court and M. Aslam Ch., Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 14th December, 1999.
' MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 18- 3-1998 of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench through which RSA No,588 of 1977 filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition briefly stated are that Muhammad Abbas and another sold land in dispute through Mutation No,83 sanctioned on 30-12-1969 to Dara, respondent No,2 for an amount of Rs,6,500 Respondent No,1 Qutub Din on 22-10-1970 filed a suit to preempt the said sale on the ground that he was collateral of the vendor, joint owner in the khata and owner in the estate.
During the pendency of the suit, Dara vendee sold the land to the present petitioner Mst. Bakhshai who was already tenant over the said land. On the promulgation of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR 115), under para. 25 thereof, the first right of preemption was created in favour of the tenant qua the land comprising his tenancy. On this basis, Mst. Bakhshai, the subsequent vendee claimed that she having been conferred superior right of pre-emption as compared to preemptor with effect from March, 1972, as such, the pre-emptor having failed to keep and maintain his superior right of pre-emption up to the date of final judgment by the trial Court, therefore, his suit was liable to be dismissed.
3. The trial Court repelled the contention and the suit of respondent No,1 was decreed through judgment, dated 3-11-1976 against which' appeal filed by petitioner No,1 and respondent No,2 was dismissed through judgment, dated 8-7-1977 by the learned Additional District Judge, against which second appeal (RSA (No,588 of 1977) filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed through the impugned judgment, dated 18-3-1998, against which leave to appeal has been sought.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated his argument as advanced before the Courts below that the pre-emptor was required to maintain his superiority as regards rights of pre- emption at three stages; i,e,, on the date of sale, on the date of institution of the suit and uptil the date of final judgment by the trial Court. The sale by vendee Dara made in favour of Mst.Bakhshai though was made much prior to the conferment of superior right of pre-emption under MLR 115 of 1972 on her but from the said date, she would be deemed to have superior right of pre-emption qua the plaintiff, therefore, the plaintiff could be non-suited as he could be held to have failed to continue holding superior right of pre-emption at the abovementioned three stages.
5. The contention in our considered view is not only wholly misconceived but also unsound. The sale by Dara, vendee in favour or Mst. Bakhshai on 23-10-1970 was rightly held to be not in recognition of her superior right of pre-emption qua the plaintiff, for on the said date, she did not have right of pre-emption superior to the plaintiff as tenant under the law. It was also rightly held that it was ordinary sale made during the pendency of the suit. Immediately on the purchase of the land from the vendee, she had lost her status of tenant even and it has been rightly so held by the Courts below, for the status of tenant Merged into the superior status of full owner of the land. She could not be the tenant in the land of herself after having become owner of the land through purchase, therefore, on the promulgation of MLR 115 of 1972, she was not holding the land as tenant, therefore, the very basis that she had superior right of pre-emption as tenant over the land in dispute with effect from the said date was wholly misconceived. Apart from this, section 21-A of the Pre-emption Act 1913 provided that during the pendency of the suit, the only improvement permissible in the status by the vendee to defeat the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff is by way of inheritance and not otherwise. If the original vendee Dara could not improve his status in any way other than the inheritance, he could not by sale of the land during the pendency of the suit confer on his transferee a better right as regards improvement of status.
6. The Courts below, therefore, have rightly repelled the claim of the petitioners that the petitioner had acquired right of pre-emption in 1972 as tenant of land in dispute by purchasing the land in 1970, for with the purchase of the land, her status as tenant even was lost.
7. For the foregoing reasons, this petition has no force which is accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.