1. ABDULLAH JABIR, J. - Appellant Afseruddin Chowkidar alias riser Ali Chowkidar was tried and convicted under sections 314 and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code but was sentenced to suffer vigorous imprisonment for five years under section 314, P. P. C. b; an Additional Sessions Judge of Bakerganj, No separate sentence was, however, passed under section 201, P. P. C.
2. The prosecution case is that deceased Alimunnessa alias Kunti Bibi was widow of Humid Ali of Latimshar within P. S. Nalchity in the district, of Barisal. She became intimate with her neighbour appellant Afseruddin Chowkidar and towards the beginning of Baisakh, 1370 B. S. It transpired that she was carrying 5/6 months as a result of her illicit connection with him. About 6 or 7 days prior to the 17th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. She was taken away by the appellant from the house of her late husband and on the 7th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. Her dead body was found floating on the Latimshar-Manpasha WAPDA Khal. P. W. 1 Ofazuddin, son of a step-brother of late Hamid Ali lodged First Information Report. P. W. II Dr. Serajul Huq held post--mortem examination on the dead body and found, among others, that part of the placenta was attached to the uterine wall and death, in his opinion, was due to uterine haemorrhage resulting possibly from induced abortion.
3. The Police investigated into the case and submitted charge--sheet against the appellant who was tried under sections 314 and 210, P. P. C. To which he pleaded not guilty. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty under both the charges and convicted and sentenced him as stated.
4. Mr. Abdur' Rasheed, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant contended at the very outset that the trial was vitiated by misjoinder of the two charges. According to him, section 201, P.
5. P. C. Does not relate to the principal offender but to persons other than the principal or actual offender, and in this connection he referred to the decisions in the cases of Tarap Ali and another v.
6. Queen-Empress (I L R 22 Cal. 638), Ahmad v. Emperor (AIR 1926 Lah. 209), Mohadeo Nath Khetri and others v. Emperor (AIR 1941 Pat. 550), Kalawati and another v. State of Himachal (AIR 1953 SC 131), Farid Muhammad v. The State (PLD 1959 Pesh. 12), Gulzar Khan v. The State (PLD 1963 Pesh.
7. 178), Hakim Ali and others yr The Crown (6 D L R 171). Ushan alias Hasen All alias Hossain Ali and others v. The Crown (7 D L R 523) and Begu and others v. The King-Emperor (52 I A 191). According to the learned Advocate, the controversy on the question as to whether section 201, P. P. C. Applies only to persons other than the principal offender or to the principal offender also has not yet been set at rest. He has particularly relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 6 D L R 171 (mentioned above) in support of his contention that the trial in this case has been vitiated by the combination of the two charges. It is, therefore, to be seen if the controversy referred to by the learned Advocate for the appellant still persists and, if so, what is the nature and scope of such controversy.
8. The view that section 201, P. P. C. Does not relate to the principal offender but to persons other than the principal offender was expressed as early as in 1867 in the case of Queen v. Ramsundar Shootar (7 W R (Cr.) 52). In that case Ramsundar was convicted of causing hurt and also of concealing evidence of the commission of that offence and he was awarded separate and consecutive sentences for the two offences. It was held that the conviction under section 201 was illegal and it was observed that the section refers to prisoners other than the actual criminals who by causing evidence to disappear, assist the principals to escape the consequences of their offence; but the person who commits an offence and afterwards conceals the evidence of it, cannot be punished on both heads of the charge. This view was subsequently adopted in the year 1871 in the case of Reg v. Kashinath Dhinkar (8 Bom. H C R (Cr.) 126), where it was held that section 201 was intended to apply exclusively to "another" and the conviction of the accused as accessories to an offence known or believed to have been committed by themselves is illegal. Although subsequently in the year 1895 the High Court of Bombay gave a second thought on this question. As it appears from the unreported criminal case of Queen v. Limbya (Bom. H C R 799), wherein it was held that "where it is impossible to say definitely however strongly it might be suspected that an accused was guilty of murder, mere suspicion is not bar to a conviction under section 201" the earlier view originating from the case of Ramsundar continued to hold ground till as late as' 1924 as will appear from the decisions in the following cases :-
(1) Empress of India v. Kishna I L R 2 All. 713,
(2) Empress v. Behala Bihi I L R 6 Cal. 789.
(3) Queen-Empress v. Lalll I L R 7 All. 749.
(4) Queen-Empress v. Dungar I L R 8 All. 252.
(5) Torap Ali v. Queen-Empress I L R 22 Cal. 638.
(6) Sumanta Dupi and others v. King-Emperor 20 C W N 166. ,
(7) Ahmad v. Emperor AIR 1926 Lah. 209.
9. In all the aforesaid cases, the view that continued to be asserted was that section 201 applied merely to the person who screens the principal offender and it did not apply to the principal or actual offender himself and consequently where the principal offender was charged both for the substantive offence as well as for the offence under section 201. P. P. C. And convicted under the later section such conviction was illegal.
10. The turning point came in 1925 when their Lordships of the Privy Council decided the case of Begu and others v. The King --Emperor. In that case the five appellants were charged under section 302, I. P. C. And the learned Sessions Judge convicted appellants 2 and 3 of murder and sentenced them to death and convicted appellants 1, 4 and 5 of the offence tinder section 201 and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. In the High Court the conviction of appellants 1, 4 and 5 was challenged on the ground that no charge under section 201 was framed against them, but the High Court dismissed the appeal holding that having regard to section 237, Cr. P. C. The conviction under section 201 of the Penal Code was valid, although no charge had been formally made under that section. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, on appeal against this decision, referred to the provision of section 236 as well as section 237, Cr. P. C. And held that even without a further charge (201) the conviction of persons, acquitted under section 301, of an offence tinder section 201 was warranted by section 237, Cr. P. C. The view taken in this case has since then been followed by almost all the High Courts and although thereafter the old controversy as to whether section 201 relates to another person and not to the principal offender, was now and then put forward, the controversy was merely academic.
11. In 1926 the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor v. Har Piari and others (I L R 49 All. 57), overruled the earlier views of that Court taken in the cases of Empress v. Kishna and Queen- Empress v. Dungar, already referred to above. Their Lordships were "unable to agree with the view that a person who has actually committed a crime himself-whether murder or any other crime is any the less guilty of removing traces thereof, if it is proved against him that he has done so, because he was tile person who actually committed the - offence. If the Legislature intended to provide such an exception, they would undoubtedly have said so in express language".
12. In the same year i.e. 1926, before the Calcutta High Court the legality of alternative charge under sections 302 and 201 was challenged in the case of Umed Sheikh v. Emperor (30 C W N 816), but in view of the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Begu v. Emperor, the charge was held to be legal and the earlier decisions of the said Court in the case of Torab Ali and Sumanta Dhupi (20 C W N 166) were not followed.
13. In the year 1930 the Patna High Court considered the question of applicability of section 201, in the case of Rup Narain Kurmi v. King-Emperor (I L R 10 Pat. 140). The appellants were tried in this case by the learned Sessions Judge under section 302 and other charges. They wire found guilty under section 201 only. In this case the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court reported to 30 C W N 816 and of the Allahabad High Court reported in I L R 49 All. 57 and of the Privy Council reported in 52 1 A 191 were considered. Fazl Ali, J., although found himself unable to agree with the view expressed in I L R 49 All. 57 observed as follows:- "At the same time I am inclined to accept the restricted interpretation of section 201 which has been adopted in some of the recent decisions and according to which a person cannot escape conviction under this section merely because he has beer, charged also with the principal offence or because there are some grounds for suspicion that he might be the principal culprit."
14. In the same case Scroope, J., while overruling the contention that section 201 cannot be applied to the actual murderer observed that "the contention would bring us to this illogical position, a Court may find it proved that a person is guilty under section 201 but because it was not proved that he was not also the murderer it could not convict him under section 201." The conviction and sentence of the principal offender who had been acquitted of the charge under section 302 and convicted under section 201 were affirmed.
15. In the year 1930, the Madras High Court in the case of Re:Chinna Gangappa (I L R 54 Mad. 68), observed that "there is no law preventing the main offender being convicted under sections 201 to 203, but in practice no Court will convict an accused both of the main offence and under these sections"
16. In 1931 the Calcutta High Court in the case of Durlav Namasudra v, Emperor (I L R 59 Cal. 1040) again adopted the view taken in the case of Begu and others v. King-Emperor and agreeing with the earlier view of the said Court in the case of Umed Sheikh v. Emperor overruled the contention that the appellants having been acquitted of the charge under section 302 could not be convicted under section 201 of the Penal Code.
17. In 1932 the Madras High Court in the case of the Public Prosecutor v. Mitta Venkatamma and another (1 L R 56 Mad. 63) considered the question of joinder of charges under sec--tions 302 and 201 of the Penal Code and held that where two persons charged with murder and with causing the disappearance of evidence with intention of screening the offender from legal punishment under sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, are acquitted under section 302 on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient to establish that both of them took such part in causing the death as would justify the conviction of each of them of the offence of murder, they can be convicted under section 201, even though the Court is of opinion that one or other of them, if not both, must have committed the murder. Neither the circumstance that neither of them has been convicted of the main offence nor the fact that the Court is not satisfied that they are innocent of the main offence is a bar to their conviction under section 201.
18. In the year 1940 the Patna High Court again considered the question of joinder of charges under sections 302 and 201 of the Penal Code in the case of Mohadeo Nath Khetry and others v. Emperor (A I R1941 Pat. 550). In this case the appellants were convicted and sentenced by the trial Court under section 302/34 as well as section 201/34 of the Penal Cede, but the sentences were. Directed to run concurrently. Rowland, J., considered all the earlier decisions of almost all the High Courts from the year 186? Onwards and agreed. With the views of the Allahabad High Court (I L R 49 All. 57) and of the Mardras High Court (I L R 54 Mad. 68) saying that he was impressed by the reasoning in the aforesaid two cases but having regard to the fact that in an earlier decision of the said Court in the case of Rup Narain Kurmi (already referred to) Fazl Ali, J., had not concurred with the view of the Allahabad High Court, no definite view was put forward by the learned Judge on this controversial question. He, however, justified the conviction in this case of the appellants under section 201 on the ground that "the intention of each of the appellants was to screen his companion as well as himself from legal punishment". In the same case Shearer, J., was unable to concur with the view which Rowland, J., took of the meaning and scope of section 201 of the Penal Code. According to Shearer, J., "a person, who having committed an offence,subsequently cases, evidence of commission of that offence to disappear, does not in so doing commit another separate and distinct offence for which the Courts should have in strict law jurisdiction to impose a separate punishment." He also referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Begu and others v. The King-Emperor and according to him, there was nothing in that decision to support the view that section 201 punishes the principal offender as well as the accessory after the fact. He further observed that the law in India does not ordinarily visits the act of an offender in endeavouring to remove the trace of the crime with a punishment separate and distinct from any punishment to which he mayhave rendered himself liable by committing the offence. He however, concurred with the view of Rowland, J., that the intention of each of the appellants in removing the dead body was to screen his companion as well as himself from punishment and on that groundthe conviction under both the sections was upheld.
19. We have come across only five cases dealing with this question since Independence in our country. Three of these decisions are of this Court and two are of the Peshawar Bench of the West Pakistan High Court. The earliest case is that of Hakim Ali and others v. The Crown (6 D L R 171).The judgment in this case was delivered by Ellis, J., sitting with Zaman, J., in September 1953. This appears to be the only case in which a view was expressed that the joinder of charges under sections 302 and 201, P. P. C. Is very embarrassing to the accused and must be held to prejudice him". This view was put forward on the authority of a case of the Madras High Court of the year 1938 to which attention of their Lordships was drawn. That case was of Uppara Dodda Narasa (40 Cr. L J 211). In this case the accused was convicted of murder and was sentenced to death. He was also convicted under section 211 of the Penal Code for wilfully preferring a false complaint and was sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. In that case, Burn, J., observed that "it cannot be said that strictly speaking a joint trial held for the two offences under sections 302 and 211, was illegal. It can be fairly contended that the two acts were connected together and formed part of the same transaction. But offences of this nature ought not to be tried together. It is obviously very embarrassing to the accused to have to answer a charge of murderat the same time as a charge of wilfully preferring a false complaint of murder".
20. It, therefore, appears that the view expressed in the case of Hakim Ali that the joinder of charges under sections 302 and 201 is embarrassing to the accused is based upon a case in which the joinder of charges was under sections 302 and 211 of the Penal Code. Subsequently in the year 1955 a Division Bench of this Court constituted by Ibrahim and Chowdhury, JJ. Had an opportunity to consider the question of joinder of charges under sections 302 and 201, P. P. C. In thec case of Ushan alias Hasen Ali alias Hossain All and others v. The Crown. In this case, all the appellants, five in number, were charged under section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code and two of them, namely, Ushan Ali and Araj Ali', were also charged under section 302/34, P. P. C. Appellants Ushan Ali and Araj Ali were acquitted of the charge under section 302/34, P. P. C. But they along with others were convicted and sentenced under section 201, P. P. C. It was contended on behalf of the appellants on the authority of the case of Hakim All decided earlier by this Court, that the joint trial of the accused under sections 302 and 201, P. P. C. Was prejudicial to the accused but this contention was not accepted and it was held that "there was divergence of opinion on the question as to whether an accused could be convicted both for the substantive offence and for the offence under section 201," but there cannot be any objection in charging the accused both under section 302/34 and under section 210 and convicting them under the latter section if they are found guilty of the same when substantive offence is not proved, against them. There is no doubt that the two acts were connected together and formed part of the same transaction. Under section 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code, "if single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences of the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once, or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences".
21. Subsequently the same Bench of this High Court considered the question of joinder of charges under sections 302/149 and 201, P. P. C. In the case of Rahman Sardar and another v. The Crown (7 D L R 572), and on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Begu and others v.
22. The King-Emperor held that joinder of such charges was permissible in cases coming under section 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
23. It will, therefore, appear on a survey of all the relevant cases of all the High Courts which have been deal, with in chronological order, as far as possible, that since after the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Begu and others v. The King-Emperor, there is no longer any live controversy on the question whether section 201 of the Penal Code applies only to the person or persons other than the actual offender or to the actual offender also, and even if there be any, it is merely academic.
24. Although in Begu's case this question was not specifically raised or con--sidered, yet it was the first time when the provisions of sections 236 and 237, Cr. P. C. Which relate to the joinder of charges, were brought to bear on the question of offence under section 302 vis-a-vis 201 and on the authority of this decision of the Privy Council, it was aptly observed in the case of Umed Sheikh by the Calcutta High Court that, "if an accused person charged under section 302, I. P. C. Can be legally convicted under section 201, I.P.C. There can be no illegality in charging him under both the section alternatively." It may be stated that the Supreme Court of India also in the case of Kalaovati and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh (AIR 1953 SC 131), held the view that "section 201 is not restricted to the case of a person who screens the actual offender, it can be applied even to a person guilty of the main offence, though as a matter of practice a Court will not convict a person both of the main offence and under section 201".
25. It, therefore, appears that there is no longer authority for the view that joinder of charges under sections 302 and 201 is illegal. The view expressed to this effect in the case of Hakim Ali by this Court in the year 1953 was based upon a decision of the Madras High Court, which does not appear to be an authority on the question of joinder of charges under sections 302 and 201. Moreover, this Court subsequently overruled that view relying upon the decision in the case of Begu v. Emperor, which was not referred to in the case of Hakim Ali. Accordingly there is no illegality in charging the accused both for the principal offence as well as for that under section 201. If the two acts namely; one constituting the principal offence and the other arising from causing the disappearance of evidence, are connected together and form part of the same transaction, such joinder is permissible under section 236, Cr. P. C. But in such a case the person concerned cannot be convicted and sentenced for both the offences. When, therefore, a principal offender is to be charged under section 201 also, the charge should be in the alternative form. But where the disposal of the body is a separate transaction from the actual murder, the conviction of the principal offender under section 201 in addition to the conviction under section 302 will be legal. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Ghulam Mohammad and others v. Emperor (AIR 1942 Lah. 271). In this case the principal offender was convicted under sections 302 and 201 of the Penal Code and sentenced under both the sections. It was found that the murderers subsequently assisted in the disposal of the bodies of their victims and their Lordships held that the question, so far as the principal offenders in this case are concerned, is obviously academic. But as the disposal of the bodies was in this case obviously a separate transaction from the actual murders, we are not disposed to think that the conviction of the principal offenders under section 201 in addition to the conviction under section 302 is illegal."
26. In the circumstances stated above, we are unable to agree with the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant that the joinder of charges in this case under sections 314 and 201, P. P. C. In respect of the appellant Afseruddin Chowkidar alias Afser Ali Chowkidar was illegal. But since the learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the accused-appellant hadcaused disappearance of evidence of the offence under section 314, P. P. C. Committed by himself, he: should not have convicted the appellant under both the sections.
27. As regards the merits of this case, the appellant was firstly charged under section 314, P. P. C. For causing miscarriage of Kunti Bibi by administering poisonous drug to cause her death. There is practically no evidence in this case to sustain the conviction under section 314, P: P. C. As none of the witnesses saw the appellant administering poisonous drug to Kunti Bibi, though it appears from the medical evidence of P. W. 11 Dr. Sardar Serajul Huq that the death of Kunti Bibi was due to uterine haemorrhage resulting possibly from induced abortion. Mr. A. T. Saddi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State conceded that since the two witnesses, namely, P. W. 8 Ismail Howladar and P. W. 9 Meseruddin Laskar, whom the prosecution produced to support their case under section 314, P. P. C. Had to be declared hostile, it is not safe to sustain the conviction under that charge.
28. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 314, P. P. C.
29. The other charge under section 201, P. P. C. Against the appellant was that knowing that certain offence, to wit, the offence of causing miscarriage with consequential death had been committed, he had caused disappearance of the evidence of the said offence by throwing the dead body of Kunti Bibi into the khal with the intention of screening himself from legal punishment.
30. P. W. 13 Khairunnessa is the wife of P. W. 1 Ofazuddin Laskar. Kunti Bibi used to live in the same house with them. According to P. W. 13, the accused-appellant, who was their neighbour, took Kunti Bibi away 5/6 days before her death and she was not found in her but from the afternoon of one Wednesday (which will be 10th Baisakh, 1370 B. S.). There is nothing to contradict her on this point.
31. The evidences of P. W. 1 Ofazuddin Laskar, the complainant, P. W. 6 Moslehuddin and P. W. 12 Nowab Ali show that Kunti Bibi'sbody was found floating in the Latimshar WAPDA Khal on the 17th Baisakh,, 1370 B. S. P. W. 4 Hossain Ali Howlader stated that he saw Kunti Bibi alive for the last time on the 13th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. When she was walking along with appellant Afser, his niece's husband Md. Chowkidar and his Bhagina Shahed and on enquiry the appellant said that they were going towards the appellant's sister's house at Manpasha.
32. P. W. 5 Idris Ali Sardar has got a grocery and stationery shop at Manpasha Hat. He stated that on "the 16th Baisakh, 1370 B.~ S. At 6 a.m. While he was washing his face in the khal he saw the appellant along with Raham Ali and Shahed carrying Kunti Bibi in their arms from the house of Raham Ali to the boat of Raihanuddin alias Afser of Manpasha. He could not be contradicted on the point in cross-examination.
33. P. W. 12 Nowab Ali stated that at about 12 noon or 1 o'clock on the 16th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. He met his sister Kunti Bibi ,for the last time about half a mile off from his house in the boat of P. W.
34. Raihanuddin in the khal. He had been called by appellant Afser and his sister's husband Raham Ali to the boat stating that his sister was ill. At that time P. W. 16 Erfanuddin was with him. The witness saw blood in the saree of Kunti Bibi and on his enquiry she said that appellant Afser had impregnated her and then administered medicine as a result of which her condition had become precarious. The witness expressed his inability to keep her in his house and advised her removal to her hus--band's house at Latimshar and also advised her to report the matter to the Chairman. He went to Latimshar on the following day at 11 o'clock and saw the dead body of his sister floating in Latimshar Khal.
35. P. W. 14 is Raihanuddin Map alias At se I-His evidence is that the appellant had hired his boat about 3 years ago on one Monday (15th Baisakh, 1370 B. S.) from Manpasha Hat for going to Swarupkathi and on the following day, i.e. Tuesday, the 16th Baisakh, appellant Afser, Raham Ali and Shahed left with Kunti Bibi in his boat to go to her father's house and at about noon appellant Afser asked Raham Ali to call Nowab Ali who came but he did not hear their conversation and under the direction of Afser he started back for Latimshar and on the way Kunti Bibi died and on reaching Latimshar Khal, Afser went away and called two other persons and five of them removed the dead body from his boat and kept it on the bank at about midnight. Lastly he stated that he met one person in the khal and gave his name as Ashraf Ali of Manpasha. He was sought to be contradicted in cross-examination with reference to his statement made under section 164, Cr. P. C. In which he stated that the woman had been taken to her husband's house. We do not think that this piece of statement recorded under section 164, Cr. P. C. Contradicts the witness on any material point for, after the dead body was taken out of the boat he did not see anything else nor did he accompany the dead body to the house of the woman. Evidently the dead body was never carried to the house of the woman at Latimshar but was found floating in the khal on the following morning.
36. P. W. 16 Erfanuddin corroborates P. W. 12 Nowab Ali that he saw the accused in the khal along with Nowab Ali, in a boat P. W, 7 Ashraf Ali Khan has got his house to the west of Manpasha Hat and his evidence is that at about 11 o'clock on the night of 16th Baisakh, , 370 B. S. When he was catching fish in' the Latimshar Manpusha WAPDA Khal he saw the boat of Raihanuddin Majhi and on his query the Majhi said that he had come there with the wife of Hamid Ali who had died. The witness with the help of a hurricane saw the dead body of Kunti Bibi and also found appellant Afseruddin, Raham Ali and Shahed Ali. There is nothing to contradict this witness.
37. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses clearly prove the facts that the appellant had taken away Kunti Bibi on or about 10th Baisakh, 1370 B. S'. From her husband's house at Latimshar, that Kunti Bibi was found going in the company of the appellant on the 13th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. Towards the house of Raham Ali, that on the morning of 16th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. Kunti Bibi was found being carried by appellant Afseruddin, Raham Ali and Sahed Ali to the boat of P. W. 14 Raihanuddin, that at about noon of the 16 Baisakh, 1370 B. S., Kunti Bibi was found in a precarious condition in the boat of P. W.
38. 14 in a khal near the house of P. W. 12, that on that very day under the direction of the appellant. P.
39. W. 14 plied his boat towards Latimshar but on the way Kunti Bibi died, that at about 11 o'clock on that night the dead body of Kunti Bibi was seen in the boat of P. W. 14 in Latimshar Khal and the appellant was there and that on the follow--ing morning the dead body of Kunti Bibi was found floating in the khal. All these facts prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the dead body of Kunti Bibi, was thrown in the khal to be carried away to an unknown destination. It has further been proved that the appellant was with the deceased from 10th Baisakh until the midnight of the 16th Balsakh. It is, therefore, evident that the appellant knowing that Kunti, Bibi had died as a result of the offence of miscarriage had caused the disappearance of the evidence of miscarriage by throwing the dead body in the khal. The question that arises is whether the disposal of the dead body in the aforesaid manner brings the offender within the ambit of section 201, P. P. C.
40. We are aware of the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Upendra Chandra Poddar v. Emperor (42 Cr. L J 796) and Nagendra Bhakta and another v. Emperor (35 Cr. L J 535). In the aforesaid two cases dead bodies were removed from the place of occurrence and left elsewhere and it was held that mere removal of the dead body of the deceased does not constitute offence under section 201 of the Penal Code. The facts of those cases do not clearly applythe facts of this case. In this case the appellant at dead of night threw the dead body in a khal to be carried away, with the intention of causing disappearance of the evidence of the offence C of miscarriage of the woman. Hence we find that the appellant committed the offence punishable under section 201, P. P.
41. C.
42. As regards the sentence, we think that the appropriate sentence in this case will be the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years.
43. The result, therefore, is that the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 314, P. P. C.
44. Are set aside but his conviction under section 201, P. P. C. Is maintained and the sentence is altered to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years. Subject to this modification, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant shall surrender forthwith to his bail bond and serve out the remainder of sentence now imposed upon him.
45. SIDDIKY, C. J.-I agree.