' Ghulam Muhammad deceased respondent filed a suit for possession by way of pre-emption of some lend sold by Muhammad Afzal Khan in favour of the petitioner side Mutation No, 978 dated 5th March 1968. On 1st July 1971, the parties compromised and a consent decree for possession was passed in favour of the respondent on payment of a sum of Rs, 16,000.
2. On 27th July 1971, the petitioners filed an application before the trial Court praying for review of the consent decree en the ground that the suit was barred by time and should have been dismissed as such. Notice was issued to the respondent who, on 2nd November, 1971, made an application that as the review petition had not been properly stamped and bore only Re. 1 stamp, the same should be dismissed. The petitioners also made an application under section 149, C. P. C.
On 27th November, 1971, praying for extension of time in making up the court-fee. The reason given was that as the review application was only a miscellaneous petition, it did not require the court- fee requisite for a review petition. The Administrative Civil Judge who took up the case for consideration, dismissed the application under section 149, C. P. C. Vide his order dated 30th November 1971. Alongwith it he also dismissed the application for review.
3. In this revision petition the learned counsel for the petitioners challenges the order of the learned Administrative Civil Judge on the ground that as the petitioners were enitled to an opportunity to make up the court-fee under Order VII, rule 11, the omission in doing so was unlawful. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other band submitted that the case of the petitioners did not fall under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. In his view that provision is only meant for the plaints. The case of the petitioners was covered by section 149, C. P. C. And their application had been validly rejected. He also referred to sections 4 and 6 of the Stamp Act in support. The learned counsel also assailed the plea of the petitioners in their application under section 149, C. P. C. That the deficiency in court-fee was because of the ignorance of law.
4. After bearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record as well as the case-law cited by them I have come to the conclusion that this petition has no merit and, therefore, must fail. It may be seen firstly that the suit had been decreed on the consent of the parties and the decree holders have also paid the price of the land. The petitioners could have , raised all their objections before they compromised and consented, to the decree being passed against them but once they consented, they could not have reopened the case.
5. Further, if they wanted to make an application for review these bought to have paid the requisite court-fee as provided in Article 5 to Schedule I to the Court Fees Apt. Ignorance of law is no excuse and they cannot even raise such a plea as they were represented by a counsel. Proper court-fee for a review application filed within 90 days from t date of decree is half of the fee leviable on the plaint. The extension of time for making up deficiency in court-fee is also discretionary. Under section 149, C. P. C. The Court has to exercise its jurisdiction judicial! For sufficient reasons. In any case extension of time under section 149. C. P. C. Could be granted for a good cause shown and not as a matter of course to cover negligent conduct or wilful default, particularly in pre-emption cases as held in Ahmad Yar v. Hajran (1). The plea of the petitioners that only Re. 1 court-fee was paid as it was a miscellaneous application, shows that it was not intended to be a review application. It is further supported from the fact that the application was not drawn up in the form it was required under Order XLVII, rule 3, C. P. C. There was thus no review application which required the making up of court-fee under section 149 or Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. The miscellaneous application could be converted in a review petition only with the order cf the Court. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or material irregularity.
6. The order of the trial Court was confined to its discretionary power. It was held by the Supreme Court in Hadayat Ullah v. Murad All Khan (2) that to interfere under section 115, C. P. C. The High Court must be satisfied D that the Court below acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction but should not disturb the order where the lower Court exercised its discretion properly.
' For the reasons given above, this civil revision is rejected with costs.
Petition rejected.
(1) PLD 1966 B J 1
(2) PLD 1972 SC 69