IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J. - This petition has been filed for leave to appeal against the order dated 2nd March, 1999 passed by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby Revision Petition under Section 115. CPC instituted by respondent No. 1 Saee Muhammad against the judgment and decree dated 5th August, 1996 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin filed by Ghulam Rasool son of Murad Bux. Respondent No. 2 and petitioner Muhammad Azam son of Mirza Khan has been accepted setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court allowing thereby the order and decree dated 14th March, 1993 passed by Civil Judge, Mandi Bahauddin decreeing the suit of respondent No. I was permitted to remain in existence.
2. Briefly stating the facts of the case are that respondent No. I Saee Muhammad son of Khawaja filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, Mandi Bahauddin against respondent No. 2 Ghulam Rasool son of Murad Bux, petitioner Muhammad Azam son of Mirza Khan as well as against his own son Munawar Hussain on the averments that he is the owner of house which was inherited by him from his ancestors and continued in its possession till 13/14 months prior to the filing of the suit. It was averred in the plaint that respondent Ghulam Rasool got executed a receipt and an agreement dated 6th February, 1990 purported to be documents in his favour from his son Munawar Hussain that the house in dispute has been purchased by him. The documents were executed by his son due to wrong persuasion of respondent No. 2. The case of the plaintiff/respondent No. I was that these documents are void, thus have no legal strength to effect his rights. It was further mentioned in the plaint that respondent No. 2 to get himself recognized as owner of the house filed a suit on the basis of these documents but his suit was dismissed on 29th of January, 1991.
3. In the meanwhile respondent No. 2 executed an agreement dated June 14, 1990 in favour of petitioner transferring the disputed house to him, as such under these circumstances to seek nullification of these documents i.e. The receipt and agreement executed by his son Munawar Hussain in favour of respondent No. 2 dated 6th February, 1990 suit was filed by him on 19.3.1991 which has given rise to instant proceedings.
4. The respondent No. 2 and petitioner resisted the suit.
5. The Trial Court alter observing codal procedure ultimately decreed the suit on 14th March, 1993.
6. As the petitioner has also acquired interest in the disputed house, therefore, he alongwith respondent No. 2 filed appeal District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin which came up for hearing before Additional District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin. Accordingly vide judgment and decree dated 5th August, 1996 appeal was accepted dismissing the suit filed by ! Respondent No. 1.
7. In these circumstances the respondent No. 1 Saee Muhammad aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court preferred a revision petition, which has been allowed vide impugned order dated 2nd j March, 1999.
8. We have heard learned counsel for petitioner and carefully examined the statement of PW-2 Munawar Hussain son of Saee Muhammad who though was defendant in the suit but had appeared as witness on behalf of his father i.e. Respondent No. I Saee Muhammad.
9. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioner that PW-2 Munawar Hussain (defendant in the plaint) who had executed agreement and receipt in favour of respondent No. 2 Ghulam Rasool on 6th February, 1990 in his statement had not stated that he was instigated by respondent No. 2 or on account of his wrong persuasion he had executed the document, rather on the other hand it was admitted by him in his statement that he entered into transaction for selling the house to respondent No. 2 at a sale consideration of Rs. 45,000/- out of which Rs. 5,000/- was received k by him. He further argued that in view of such admission by Munawar Hussain son of Saee Muhammad there remains no question to challenge the validity of the receipt and agreement dated 6th February, 1990 produced I before the Trial Court as Ex.D/1/2 and D/2/2. It was also argued by him that the principle of law discussed by the revisional Court in the impugned is not attracted in the circumstances of the case.
10. It is to be observed that the learned Judge in the High Court has disbelieved the execution of Iqrarnama/sale-deed dated 6th February, 1990 being unregistered and also suffering from other discrepancies and ultimately declared Iqrarnama as well as receipt to be forged and fabricated but he lost sight of the fact that Munawar Hussain son of respondent No. 1 Saee Muhammad had not uttered a single word in his examination-in-chief in respect of invalid execution of both these documents, rather he admits the transaction to the extent that out of Rs. 45,000/- he received only Rs. 5,000/-. Therefore, in view of his such admission it was incumbent upon the learned Judge to have examined that the statement given by him would prevail over the contents of Iqrarnama and receipt Ex.D/1/2 and D/2/2. It may be noted that initial burden of proof was upon respondent No. 1 to have established that both these documents are forged but he did not get produce these documents; contrary to it he has chosen to produce his own son as witness in order to prove that he was wrongly persuaded by respondent No. 2 to execute the documents. But in the witness-box he has not supported the contents of the plaint. Thus, in our opinion the questions for consideration are whether in such like cases evidence furnished by witness orally can preferably be accepted comparing to documentary evidence in pursuance of Article 103 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and the revisional Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC had jurisdiction to reverse the finding recorded by the Appellate Court while considering oral and documentary evidence in its true perspective. Thus, to examine the above questions leave to appeal is granted. Interim stay granted vide order dated 5.5.1999 shall continue.