' This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution calling in question the order, dated 2-11-1998 passed by the Inspector-General of Police transferring the investigation of a case emanating from F.I.R. No,438 of Police Station Kuthiala Sheikhan to the Superintendent of Police of Range Crimes Branch of Gujranwala.
2. The said F.I.R. Was registered with respect to a double murder and accused 15 persons of having committed the said murder of Nawaz and Riaz deceased. Muhammad Arif complainant approached this Court through Writ Petition No,21406 of 1998 complaining, inter alia, that since four of the accused persons of the said case namely, Nawazish, Azhar, Iqbal and Javed were closely related to a sitting M.N.A. And another Ex-M.N.A., the said four accused persons were not being arrested despite their presence and availability in the area. Notice was issued by me in this petition on 20-10-1998 pursuant whereto the S.H.O. Of Police Station Kuthiala Sheikhan appeared before this Court on 28-10-1998 and confirmed that the said four accused persons were guilty in terms of the investigation conducted by him but they had not been arrested. I passed the following order on the said date i,e, on 28-10-1998:-- "If these absconders are not apprehended by the next date of hearing, which absconders according to the S.H.O. Are guilty and are required to be arrested then the S.P. Mandi Bahauddin shall appear before this Court on the next date of hearing. In case it is found that the M.N.A. Has been helping the aforesaid accused persons then the said M.N.A. Shall also enter appearance on the next date of hearing. To be relisted on 17-11-1998."
3. It is alleged through this petition that when my abovementioned order reached the respondent S.P. And respondent Muhammad Iqbal M.N.A., the said M.N.A. Started using his political clout to get the said absconders declared innocent and for the purpose approached the Inspector-General of Police to transfer the investigation of the case in question to an officer of the choice of the said M.N.A. It may be mentioned here that it is on record that the challan in the case in hand was finalized and submitted before the competent Magistrate under section 190 of the Cr.P.C. Which Magistrate took cognizance of the same on 25-8-1998 and sent up the case to the learned Court of Session the same day in terms of section 190(3) of the Cr. P. C .
4. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of the respondent Inspector-General dated 2-11-1998 which had been passed more than two months after the challan had reached the learned trial Court and which had been passed only four days after my above-quoted order, dated 28-10-1998, was a mala fide exercise of powers vesting in the said Inspector-General meant only to appease the above mentioned M.N.A. And consequently to help the absconding accused persons.
5. The purpose of investigation of a criminal case, as is evident from section 4(1) of the Cr.P.C. Is mere collection of evidence and nothing more. The duty of the officer investigating a criminal case is to collect all such evidence and then to submit the same before a Court of competent jurisdiction which Court alone then has the powers to determine the guilt or innocence of the person accused of the commission of such an offence. It is true that section 169 of the Cr.P.C.
Authorizes an Investigating Officer or the officer in-charge of the police station to release an accused person on his executing a bond, with or without surety, if in the opinion of such a Police Officer sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds of suspicion justifying the forwarding of an accused, to a Magistrate were not available. This, however, cannot be equated with a power of final determination of the guilt of innocence of the accused persons which power, as has been mentioned above, stands reserved exclusively for the Magistrates and the trial Courts. These very provisions of section 169 of the Cr.P.C. Are a clear indicator to the said effect because release of an accused person under this section is subject to the orders of a Magistrate, who may refuse to take cognizance of the case in terms of the report of the concerned Police Officer or may still take cognizance and try an accused person or send him for trial. It may be added that the provisions of section 63 of the Cr.P.C. Which provide that an accused person could be discharged only under the special order of a Magistrate and the provisions of Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934 which provides that an F.I.R. Can be cancelled only by a Magistrate, even if the Investigating Officer or the S.H.O.
Were of the opinion that such an F.I.R. Deserved to be cancelled, are further evidence of the fact that the final word in respect of the fate of an accused person is either of a Magistrate or of the learned trial Court and the S.H.O. Or the Investigating Officer were mere instruments to assist such Magistrate or Courts of law in reaching a final conclusion.
6. It will, therefore, be noticed that while the Investigating Officers have powers to investigate cases and while the officers Incharge of Police Stations including the superior Police Officers, who are also S.H.Os. By virtue of section 551 of the Cr.P.C. Have powers to withdraw investigations from one Police Officer and to entrust the same to another Police Officer and also to order further investigations in a matter, the sole purpose of such-like transfer of investigations and directing of further investigations is to be the collection of evidence and nothing more. These powers vesting in the S.H.Os. And the superior police officers can, therefore, be exercised only and only where it is found that the required evidence had either not been collected or that further evidence was required to be collected in a given case.
7. Of late, frequent situations have started coming to the notice of the Courts where repeated investigations are ordered and where investigations are repeatedly transferred from one Police Officer to another without disclosing any reason for such orders which leads to an inference that such-like orders were passed not for the purposes for which the requisite powers had been conferred on the police officers but for purposes other than legal and bona fide. Needless to add that such-like repeated investigations and such-like transfers of investigations do not only complicate issues making the task of the Courts of law more arduous but also result in wastage of time and inordinate delays towards the final conclusion of cases.
8. My Lords in the Supreme Court declared in Riaz Hussain and others v. The State 1986 SCM R 1934 at 1942 that system of re-investigation in criminal cases was a recent innovation which was always taken at the instance of influential people for favourable reports obtained and this was in no way assisting the Courts in coming to correct conclusions and rather created more complications for the Courts administering justice. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court went on to add that such a system was disapproved altogether.
9. This Court has also repeatedly deprecated 'the recent concept of reinvestigations of criminal cases. It was observed in the case of Muhammad Younas and others v. I.-G. Police and others 1999 PCr.LJ 163 at 165 that:-- ' The investigation was transferred from one agency to the other and from one officer to the other in a mechanical, arbitrarily, capriciously and above all without application of mind. It is interesting to note that it has not been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of query that did the high- ups including respondent No,1 take any action against any of the Investigating Officer for faulty investigation or for mixing up with either party or for failure to conclude the investigation efficiently.
There was none. This fact alone proved it beyond any shadow of doubt that there was no purpose to transfer the investigation except to please someone, may be the then Chief Minister."
' It was consequently, directed by this Court as under:-- "This evil can be, successfully, combated by making it incumbent upon the authority transferring the investigation or ordering reinvestigation should comment upon the quality of the investigation and pinpoint the shortcomings or lapses made by the Investigating Officer. The Authority if convinced after going through the record that either the Investigating Officer is inefficient, incapable or mixed up with one of the parties for any reason and only then investigation may be transferred that too after recording reasons in writing. It shall propose action against Investigating Officer for misconduct, inefficiency and corruption as the case may be. That would be effective measures to check the illegal tendency of transferring the investigation or ordering reinvestigation without any study of the Ziminis' and appreciating the efforts made by the Investigating Officer."
' Similar were the observations and directions of this Court in Haq Nawaz and others v.
Superintendent of Police and others 1999 PCr.LJ 1144 and Abdul Aziz v. S.P. (C.I.A.), Sargodha and 2 others PLD 1997 Lah.
24.
10. It may be added here that it had been noticed in Haq Nawaz case, above-referred, that even the I.-G. Of Police had passed orders to the same effect through his Memorandum No, 1544- 1614/Legal, dated 3-5-1990 wherein he had observed and ordered as under:- "(2) It has also been observed rather with regret that in some cases where the investigation were completed and challans sent to Court for judicial verdict, the D.-I.Gs. And S.S.P. Were entertaining applications for transfer of investigation and entrusting the same to one Police Officer or another.
No doubt there is no bar to the number of investigations to be carried out before the judgment is announced in a case, but re-investigation should only be allowed when new evidence comes in to prove the innocence or guilt of the accused and not on flimsy grounds to appease one party or the other. It is, therefore, directed that this practice of frequent transfer of investigations must cease forthwith and further it may please be noted that case once sent to Court the investigation of such cases shall. Not be entrusted to any Police Officer without the express orders of the Inspector- General of Police.
11. Now reverting to the case in hand, it may be noticed, as mentioned above, that the impugned order of the Inspector-General of Police had" been passed more than two months after the challan had reached the learned trial Court and only four days after this Court had passed orders for the arrest of the absconding accused persons and further that 'the impugned order disclosed no reason, why a fresh investigation had been directed at the above noticed stage and in the above- referred circumstances. This impugned order was thus, not only offensive to the observations made by the superior Courts which have been quoted above but was also violate of the directions passed by the Inspector-General of Police himself through the above mentioned memo dated 3- 5-1990.
12. Consequently, this petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 2-11-1998 passed by the respondent Inspector-General directing further investigation of case F.I.R. No,438, dated 1-7-1998 of Police Station Kuthial'a Sheikhan is declared to be a nullity in the eyes of law and resultantly of no legal effect.
13. Before I part with this judgment, it may once again be observed that repeated investigations and repeated transfer of investigations was a menace which was attaining alarming dimensions and unless this system was checked with an iron hand, the same might erode the very system of investigations and the administration of justice. It is, therefore, again directed that all officers in charge of police stations, including the superior Police Officers, shall strictly follow the above quoted observations of the Honorable Supreme Court and the above-referred directions of this Court especially the ones passed in Muhammad Younas case above-referred and above-quoted.
All the concerned officers are warned that in future if any case comes to the notice of an Court where an order is passed which is in violation of the observations and the directions aforesaid then the same will be treated as disobedience of the orders passed by the Superior Courts and will be dealt with accordingly.
14. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Home Secretary of Punjab and another copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Inspector-General of Punjab Police who shall then cause copies of this judgment to be sent to all the D . I. Gs., the S.S.Ps./S.Ps. And to all other supervisory Officers in the Province for their information, guidance and compliance.
15. Having done this, the Inspector-General of Punjab Police, shall send a report to the Registrar of this Court for the information of this Bench that copies of this judgment had been sent to all concerned in terms of the above order.
16. Copies of this judgment shall also be sent to all the learned Sessions Judges in the Province who shall then circulate them to the Presiding Officer of all the Criminal Courts within their respective jurisdiction who are directed to report any non-compliance of the above direction to this Court, when noticed by them.