' Through this petition the petitioner has sought quashment of F.I.R. No,16 registered at Police Station Naseerabad, Lahore on 14-1-1997 for offences under section 420/468/471, P.P.C. The allegation against the petitioner is that on 16-10-1995 she had got a forged document prepared and subsequently on 25-1-1996 she had -got the said document registered whereby a house was shown to have been conveyed in favour of the petitioner.
2. In support of this petition it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the matter in issue was essentially of civil nature and as a matter of fact a civil suit filed by the complainant, respondent No,3 herein, was already pending in respect of the same document at the time of registration of this F.I.R. According to -the learned counsel for the petitioner an F.I.R.
Could not be registered when the matter was essentially of civil nature and the same was already sub judice before a learned Civil Court. Reliance in this respect has been placed on the case of Muhammad Siddiq v. Rashid Ahmad Ch. And another (1998 M LD 686). It has also been maintained by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the F.I.R. In question was based upon distorted facts, fabricated evidence and sheer mala fide on the part of the complainant party. With these submissions it has been canvassed that the F.I.R. In question should be quashed so as to save the petitioner from undue and unnecessary harassment and humiliation.
3. The learned Additional Advocate-General who has entered appearance at the motion stage of this case has informed the Court that the investigation of the criminal case in question has already been completed and the necessary challan has already been prepared. According to the learned Additional Advocate-General the challan is about to be submitted before the Court of competent jurisdiction and, therefore, it is not a proper stage for this Court to interfere in the matter and to quash the impugned F.I.R.
4. Before appreciating the center of learned counsel for the petitioner it appears to be of significance to mention that respondent No,3 had filed a suit for cancellation of the document in issue before the learned Civil Court at Lahore on 2-4-1996 but the said suit had been dismissed by the learned trial Court on 20-2-1998 for non-prosecution. This fact is relevant because at the present stage of the matter no civil litigation is pending before any Court in respect of the document in issue.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate- General, I have remained unable to subscribe to the view of the learned counsel for the petitioner that an F.I.R. Cannot be registered when a civil suit is pending or that investigation of a criminal offence cannot be conducted or continued during the pendency of a civil suit. It is a statutory duty of the police under section 154, Cr.P.C. To register a criminal case whenever commission of a cognizable offence is reported to it. This duty of the police cannot be circumscribed by the fact that civil suit may also be pending in respect of the same matter at the relevant time. By virtue of the provisions of section 56(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 an injunction cannot be granted to stay proceedings in any criminal matter. Writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be utilized for restraining a person from doing something which he is statutorily required to do. Apart from that writ jurisdiction of this Court is essentially civil in nature and, therefore, an injunction is generally not granted by this Court in writ jurisdiction staying proceedings of a criminal investigation. It is only in appropriate cases that proceedings pending before a Criminal Court are stayed during the pendency of the same matter before a Civil Court but the same principle cannot be applied regarding stay of criminal investigations. It is a statutory duty of the police to investigate a crime reported to it and this Court is generally slow in scuttling or stifling the said statutory duty of the police. In the abovementioned reported case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner it had been held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that an F.I.R. Cannot be registered during the pendency of a civil case. With great respect to the learned Judge deciding the said case, I have remained unable to subscribe to the said view. Even otherwise the considerations mentioned above in the present order were never brought to the notice of the Court in the abovementioned reported case.
6. Apart from whatever has been observed above the matter of registration of the F.I.R. And pendency of the suit hive become irrelevant at this stage as the investigation of the case has already been completed, the necessary challan is about to be submitted before the Court of competent jurisdiction and the civil suit filed by respondent No,3 has already been dismissed for non-prosecution about two years ago. It goes without saying that if a challan is finally received by the" learned trial Court in the present case then it shall be open to the petitioner to seek her premature acquittal with an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., if so advised.
7. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner's criminal prosecution had been launched with ulterior motives because pendency of the civil suit at the relevant time had never been disclosed in the F.I.R.; the complainant was related to a Magistrate and it was because of that Magistrate's personal interest that the present criminal case had been registered; the challan in this case had been prepared long ago but the same had not been submitted before the Court so far; and the complainant's civil suit had been dismissed for non-prosecution after providing him innumerable opportunities for producing his evidence and prosecuting the same diligently. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner all these factors unmistakably pointed towards mala fide of the complainant party in prosecuting the petitioner through the present criminal case. It may suffice to observe in this context that mala fide is a question of fact and sufficient material is not available on the present record to hold that the present criminal case was an outcome of nothing but mala fide on the part of the complainant.
Whether Mian Arshad Mahmood had in fact signed the document in question or not and whether the same had been done by him voluntarily or not are questions which need factual inquiry and the same can best be decided on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties before the learned trial Court. The question of criminal intent on the part of the petitioner in that regard is also to be decided on the basis of evidence which is yet to be led before a Court.
8. For what has been discussed above I have failed to find any merit in this petition and at the same time I have felt that this is not a proper stage for this Court to interfere in the matter. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.