' KAMAL MANSUR ALAM, J.---This petition is directed against the order dated 12-10-1998 of a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, dismissing petitioner's application for condonation of delay in the filing ' of the restoration application and consequently dismissing the restoration application as well for being time-barred.
2. The respondent .No.1 filed Suit No.304 of 1983 in the High Court of Sindh, inter alia, seeking declaration to the effect that she was the owner and sub-lessee of the disputed plot. The suit was decreed in favour of the respondent No.1 by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by judgment dated 19-5-1993, against which the petitioner filed High Court Appeal No.159 of 1993 which came to be dismissed for non-prosecution by order dated 17-3-1998, which reads as under:--- "Mr. Farrukh Zia Sheikh, Advocate for the appellant is not present. On 27-1-1998 none was present fOr the appellant. On 4-3-1998, Mr. Farukh Zia Shaikh, Advocate submitted adjournment application on the ground of illness which was granted and matter was adjourned in his presence for 17-3- 1998.
' It is now 10-00 a.m. None is present on behalf of the appellant. Moreover, there is no intimation from the learned counsel for the appellant. Probably appellant has lost the interest in the matter which is dismissed for non-prosecution along with listed applications."
' After a lapse of three months and twelve days an application for restoration of the 'appeal was filed on 25-6-1998 and alongwith this application another application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed seeking condonation of delay in filing of the restoration application.
The application for the condonation of delay as also the restoration application came up for hearing before the learned Bench and both these applications along with a third application were dismissed by the following short order dated 12-10-1998: "After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel and going through the record we are of the view that there is no substance in the application for restoration of this appeal as no cogent reasons are available for condoning the delay in filing of the restoration application. Consequently we dismiss the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and consequently holding that application for restoration is 'time-barred; the same is also dismissed. The third Miscellaneous Application for interim relief is also dismissed as a result of the dismissal of the two other Miscellaneous Applications at Serial Nos.1 and 2. This is a short order, to be followed by the detailed reasons."
' The detailed reasons were given in order dated 26-10-1998, a portion of which reads as follows:-- "The limitation creates certain rights in favour of the parties and in this case the respondent is well within his right to claim such rights and, therefore, it necessary for the appellants to explain each day's delay in filing the application for restoration and the time. The delay, according to us, has not been expressly explained and pleaded and, therefore, we do not find that the grounds taken for condonation of delay in filing of the restoration application and the grounds for restoration of the High Court Appeals are not genuine and plausible. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted for the mement that the appellant has been vigilant in following the case and that on account of incorrect information given by the Reader of the Court he believed that the case has been adjourned to a date in office, ordinarily. After a period of three weeks he should have expected the case to have been fixed by the Court and thereafter, he should have worried that the case has not been listed and it would have made the appellants to enquire from the office as to what order had been passed on 17-3-1998. The application for condonation of delay for the first time was filed on 25-6-1998 well after a period of 3 months. Such delay has not been cogently explained. Consequently, we find no reason to recall the order dated 17-3-1998 to restore this appeal."
3. Admittedly, the present petition was filed twelve days after the expiry of the period of limitation.
Condonation of delay is sought on the ground that the petitioner is a lady and there being no male member in the family could not engage a counsel in time. It is submitted that the delay was not intentional but for reason beyond the control of the petitioner. Support is sought from the case of Alauddin Akhtar v. Government of the Punjab and another (1982 CLC 515). In that case it would appear that the rent appeal when fixed for regular hearing for the first time after about five years of its admission was dismissed for non-prosecution. The application for its restoration was filed after the expiry of the limitation period provided under Article 168 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. The Advocate appearing for the appellant in that case in his personal affidavit stated that he had missed the case in the cause list and that within two days of coming to know of the dismissal of the appeal, application for restoration was filed. These statements were not challenged by the other side. It was in these circumstances that the restoration application was allowed.
4. The case relied upon by the learned counsel is of no assistance to him. Here, the petitioner had ample time at her disposal for filing the petition in time. She has been litigating for years and should have been careful in looking after her interest and pursuing her remedies. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, it is not possible to condone the delay in the filing of the petition merely for the reason that the petitioner happens to be a lady. No ground for condonation of delay having been made out, the application for condonation of delay is rejected and resultantly the petition is dismissed and leave is refused.