1. ' This first rent appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1979) is directed against the order dated 20-11998 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Malir, Karachi in Rent Case No, 15 of 1997 whereby she struck off the defence of the present appellant and directed her to hand over vacant possession of the premises bearing House No,18, Fateh Chand, Sangeet Cinema Compound, Malir City, Karachi (hereinafter referred to as the demised premises) which is in occupation of the appellant as tenant at the monthly rent of Rs .600.
2. ' Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent sought ejectment of the appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent from January, 1997 to June, 1997 as well as the bona fide requirement being a widow to dispose of the said property to meet expenses of her daughter's marriage. Notice of this application was served on the appellant and she filed her written statement. The learned Rent Controller passed tentative rent order on 20.1-1998 on the application under section 16(1) of the S.R.P.O., 1979 by taking into consideration the objections which were filed by the appellant denying the alleged default as well as the arrears of rent. Since she was satisfied that the appellant had deposited rent in M.R.C. No,25 from July 1997 to Jannary, 1998. Therefore, she granted the application to the extent that the respondent was allowed to withdraw rent lying deposited in Court. It was further ordered as follows:--- "The opponent is directed to deposit future monthly rent from February, 1998 at the rate of Rs,600 per month on or before 10th of each calendar month, and the disputed amount of remaining period will be decided after the evidence led by the parties."
3. ' The record shows that the rent was not deposited in the ejectment case therefore the respondent filed application under section 16(2) of S.R.P.O., 1979. Notice of this application was given to the appellant. She filed her objections wherein she stated, inter alia, that she had been depositing monthly rent in M.R.C. No,25 of 1997. Report was also obtained from the Nazir which shows that Rs,5,500 were deposited in M.R.C. No, 25 of 1997. However, the learned Rent Controller passed the impugned order and struck off the defence of the appellant by holding that she failed to comply with the tentative rent order.
4. ' I have learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
5. ' At the very outset learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that this appeal is time-barred as the impugned order was passed on 20-1-1998 but the appeal was filed on 11-1-1999. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had applied for certified copy of the order on 24-11-1997 which was received on 7-12-1998 and copy was delivered on 11-1-1999 being the opening working day of this Court after winter holidays. Therefore, on this date the appeal was filed.
6. In my humble view this appeal is not time-barred. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that there were no clear directions from the learned trial Court that instead of depositing the future rent in M.R.C. It should have been deposited in the rent case, therefore under bona fide mistake the appellant continued depositing the rent in M.R.C. And even otherwise according to him it may be treated as a technical default. In support of his submissions he cited Abdullah Ghanghre and another v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others 1988 SCM R 970, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a somewhat identical situation held as follows:--- "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties in the light of the record before us we are impressed with the plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the non-compliance of the order of the Rent Controller, dated 20-4-1982, if any, was just a technical one, rather than real, for as a matter of fact petitioners were depositing rent regularly in Court; only mistake they committed was that they continued to deposit rent in the connected miscellaneous proceedings between the parties, and not under the number of the particular cases in which the orders dated 20-4-1984 were passed. Since petitioners were out of pocket of the amount of rent payable by them which they actually deposited in Court with the intention that the landlord may withdraw the amount, if he so desires, and there is no complaint that the landlord could not do so, petitioner cannot be condemned as guilty of not depositing rent in Court. They had actually deposited the rent in Court but made the mistake of depositing in one case and not the other and this amounts to an irregularity rather than penal non-compliance of the order of the Rent Controller, dated 20-4- 1982 . "
7. ' Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that after having heard the learned counsel for the parties tentative rent order was passed which was clear and unambiguous and within the knowledge of the appellant, therefore, the deposit of rent in M.R.C. Is a clear and willful violation of the said order. It cannot be termed as technical default. He placed reliance on Muhammad Naeem and another v. M/s. Karimi Bidi Works through Partners 1992 CLC 2499 and Muhammad Hanif v.
8. Muhammad Muslim 1997 CLC 1491.
9. ' Admittedly the applicant is tenant of the respondent since 1982 and she has been paying rent regularly. The learned Rent Controller ought to have given clear directions to the appellant to deposit the future rent in Rent Case instead of doing so in M.RC. And this has created confusion. It is needless to emphasize that the tentative order should be specific and clear without having room for any vagueness or doubt. The rule of the interpretation favorable to the incumbent interpretation in applying penal clauses is that should be taken into consideration where the question of imposing the penalties arises. Following this principle and dictum led down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdullah and another (supra) this appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
10. The matter is remanded to the learned trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law from the stage when the proceedings were terminated with the impugned order. The parties are left to bear their own costs.