SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.--The above entitled appeals have been directed against the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 13-11-1998, whereby the appeals filed by the appellants, herein, were dismissed. As the above entitled appeals arise out of single judgment of the High Court, we propose to dispose of the same through this consolidated judgment.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the land was acquired by the Government and initially the Collector, Land Acquisition fixed the price of the land as Rs,48,000 per Kanal plus 15% "Jabrana". The appellants, herein, and the respondents initiated cross references before the District Judge who dismissed the one initiated by the appellants, herein, for reduction of compensation amount while that of respondents was accepted and the compensation amount was increased from 48,000 to Rs,80,000 per Kanal. The appellants, herein, filed appeals to the High Court. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that the appeals did not accompany the copy of the decree sheet of the District Judge and as such were incompetent. The High Court upheld the objection and dismissed the appeals observing that as the copies of the decree sheet of the District Judge did not accompany the memorandum of appeals as envisaged under rule 1, Order XLI, C.P.C. The same were not properly constituted and that even otherwise the impugned award did not suffer from any legal infirmity.
3. It has been contended by Mr. Riaz Tabassum, the learned counsel for the appellants, that as the memorandums of appeals duly accompanied the copy of the award made by the District Judge, which would be deemed to be a decree under section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the appeals were properly constituted. He has contended that after the amendment in the aforesaid section, an award would be deemed to be a 'decree' therefore it was not necessary to file the copies of the decree sheet drawn by the District Judge. He has further argued that the High Court dismissed the appeals even on merits without resolving the points raised in that regard.
4. In reply the learned counsel for the respondents, Ch. Liaquat Ali Khan, has controverted the arguments. He has argued that under section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to all the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus he contended that subsection (2) of section 26 does not dispense with the requirement of filing of copy of the decree-sheet drawn by the Court of District Judge.
5. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the bar. It may be observed that there was no definition of word "decree" in the Land Acquisition Act prior to the amendment in section 26 in form of subsection (2) of the same. Thus, to avoid the difficulty regarding the forum of an appeal to higher Courts, the aforesaid amendment was brought in section 26. For convenience, subsection (2) of section 26 is reproduced below: "(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of section 2, clause (2), and section 2; clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
It is evident from the above provision of law that the award under the Land Acquisition Act would be deemed to be a "decree" and, thus, there is no need of drawing formal decree by the Collector or the District Judge in cases under Land Acquisition Act. It may also be pointed out that section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act stipulates that the provisions of the C.P.C. Would be applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act subject to the provisions of the said Act. Obviously, after the amendment in section 26 of the Act, the definition of the 'decree' given in the C.P.C. Would not make it obligatory to draw a decree sheet in the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, because by virtue of the said amendment the award would be deemed to be a decree. A reference may be made to the following authorities in support of the view: In case reported as Narsingh v. Secretary of State AIR 1928 Lah. 263, the appellant was allowed to file the copy of the award with the memorandum of appeal after expiry of limitation observing that it was incumbent upon the appellant to file a copy of award alongwith memorandum of appeal, which would be deemed to be a copy of the 'decree' as stipulated under rule 1, Order XLI, C.P.C. In case reported as Nur Din v. Secretary of State AIR 1927 Lah. 49 it was observed that after the amendment in section 26, the award of a District Judge would be "deemed to be a decree" and it was incumbent upon the appellant to file the copy of the same alongwith the memorandum of appeal under Order XLI, Rule 1, C.P.C. In case reported as M. Dodla Malliah and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 Andh. Pra.
216, it has been held that an award would be deemed to be a formal expression of the decision of a Civil Court and is, therefore, a decree within the meaning of relevant provisions of the C.P.C. For all purposes. It was observed that after amendment in section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, any doubt with regard to an 'award' being a 'decree' within the meaning of C.P.C. Stands removed. In case reported as Dilawar Hussain v. The Province of Sindh PLD 1953 Kar. 578 it was held that as an 'award' is a 'decree' as envisaged under section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the executing Court should determine all the questions arising between the parties as has been laid down in the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is evident from the provisions contained in subsection (2) of section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act and the cases referred to above that an award would be deemed to be a decree; the copy of the same duly accompanied the appeals in the present case. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that a formal decree sheet was drawn by the District Judge, the filing of the copy with the memorandums of appeals was not necessary. Thus, there was no violation of Order XLI, Rule 1, C.P.C. And the order of the High Court in dismissing the appeals as being incompetent due to the non-filing of the decree-sheet is not sustainable.
7. It may be pointed out that while dismissing the appeals, the observation of the High Court that on merits, the learned counsel for the appellants could not point out any illegality in the findings of the District Judge, is a casual observation and cannot be regarded to be the disposal of appeals filed before the High Court on merits. The points raised by the appellants in the memo. Of appeals before the High Court need due consideration and that can only be done by appreciating the evidence produced by the contending parties in support of their respective contentions.
In light of what has been stated above we accept both the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court with the direction that after giving notices to the parties, it shall re-hear the arguments in the appeals and decide the same according to law.