The appellant tenant of the respondent in the let floor of House No. 278,. Sharafabad, on a monthly rent of Rs. 215 under a tenancy agreement --dated 27-6-1968, was asked to vacate the same through notice given by the respondent on 6-4-1974, on the ground that she required the premises for her personal use. An accusation of damaging the property and impairing its utility was also made by her. This being refuted, a regular application for ejectment was moved by the respondent before the Rent Controller, for ejectment of the appellant on the same grounds which was allowed.
But only on the ground of personal requirement. The other was rejected. An appeal against this order was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority, on 29-5-1976, and the appellant was directed to hand over the possession to the respondent. Aggrieved by this order the appellant has now filed this 2nd appeal.
2. As there was a concurrent finding in favour of the respondent, by both the Courts, on the question of the bona fide requirement to personal use. The learned counsel for the appellant had to initially overcome that difficulty and to show whether he could be allowed to re-open that question fn this 2nd appeal. The principle bad been laid down in the case of Muhammad Ikhlas v.
Ismail PLD 1963 SC 466 wherein also the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had concurrently found the need of the landlord to be bona fide, and it was observed that re-opening of that question even on examining additional evidence by the High Court was not proper as 'There was no suggestion that the subordinate Courts had committed any error of procedure as provided by law, or even that they had approached the question for decision from a fallacious point of view.
What the learned Single Judge did in this case is what is expressly forbidden by tire provision of section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code an! Consequently his order cannot be maintained."
3. The learned counsel therefore, relied upon the relevant prevision of law i.e. Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, and strenously argued that in appreciating the evidence on record the two Courts below had failed to see that the above provision of law and clause (c) in particular had not been kept in mind. In his submission if the evidence had been assessed in the light of the above provision of law the conclusion with regard to the bona fides of the landlord would have been contrary to what it has been. For this purpose he also took me through the evidence on record.
It would be convenient to reproduce the said provision of law for A, proper appreciation of the submission of the learned counsel :- "(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing: the tenant to put the landlord in possession-
(i) in the case of residential building, if-
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children ;
(b) he is not occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs at the time in the same urban area in which building is situated ; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area ; It was the contention of the appellant that respondent was at first occupying the ground floor of the building at the time when she let out first floor to him. She then vacated the ground floor also and given it on rent to P.
1. A. Corporation and herself occupied some premises which she shared with her relations, this she did because she desired to earn rent. Further she wanted to evict the appellant also with the view to get mere rent for the disputed premises. The learned counsel attempted to show that the premises presently occupied by the respondent though alleged to be on rent were sufficient for lee needs and further that the ground -floor of the building vacated by her was without sufficient cause and it was only to give it on rent to P. I. A. Corporation. The evidence in fact is contrary to the submission of the learned counsel, the respondent was occupying a rented house which she had to vacate as it was required by the owner for personal purposes. At the time of the filing of the proceed--ings before the Rent Controller she alongwith her family members was living in a house of bier widow sister and was paying rent for the same. This ass a small accommodation comprising of two incomplete rooms without any gap, water or electric facilities. The finding of the two Courts that this was riot sufficient cause, tie purposes for the family is therefore not incorrect. The argument of the learned counsel that clause (b) and clause (c) of section 13(3) were to be read together and therefore in fact would invalidate the claim of the respondent does not appear to be sound. The term such building in clause (c) according to the learned counsel should apply to the ground floor of the building which the respondent had originally vacated but if that were so then in the first place it should have been shown that the ground floor was in fact suitable for her needs because such a building to clause
(c) would be referable to the residential building mentioned in clause (b) that had not done and as there is evidence to that effect on record notwithstanding the interpretation made by the learned counsel of clauses (b) and (c). I am inclined to feel that the term such a building would not in this case necessarily be applicable to the ground. If a landlord has vacated any building without sufficient cause which could be considered as sufficient cause for his needs clause (c) would very much be attracted, but even that has not been shown by evidence in this case. The respondent continues to occupy premises which are established to be insufficient for her needs and the rented house last vacated was not so vacated on account of insufficient cause.