' This appeal under section 21 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as S.R.P.O., 1979) is directed against the judgment, dated 9-10-1997 passed by the learned Rent Controller in R.C. No,677 of 1996 against the appellant.
2. Briefly stated the appellant filed ejectment application under section 14 of S.R.P.O., 1979 seeking ejectment of respondent from one portion of second floor of house No,49/N, Block-2 P.E.C.H.S., Karachi, on the ground of default in payment of rent from March, 1996 as well as electricity charges, and personal bona fide requirement for the use of his son who wants to settle in Pakistan with his wife and three children.
3. The respondent filed his written statement wherein his case is that he is tenant of only one room with attached bath room and kitchen and not half portion of the demised premises as alleged by the appellant. He also denied that he has committed any default in payment of rent and other charges.
4. Learned Rent Controller on the basis of pleadings of the parties settled the following points:
(1) Whether the application is not maintainable?
(2) Whether the applicant served the opponent with mandatory notice required under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
(3) Whether the applicant have not owned or is in occupation of any building in any locality?
(4) ..
5. The appellant filed his affidavit in evidence and other documents (Exhs.A-1 to A-6). The respondent also filed his affidavitin-evidence. Both these witnesses were also cross-examined by the respective learned counsel. Ultimately the learned Rent Controller dismissed the rent application.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. Learned counsel for the respondent mainly contended that the appellant filed ejectment application at the age of 75 years, therefore, he was not entitled to avail the benefit of section 14 of S.R.P.O., 1979. He referred to the following paragraph of the impugned judgment.
' In the instant case admittedly at present the applicant is of 75 years of age and in the year 1980 he was near about 58 years when he let out the premises to the opponent. Admittedly the opponent remained silent for a period of 13 years from the date when right was accrued to him to obtain possession of the rented premises. In my humble view since the applicant remained silent for a period of 13 years, as such, now he cannot invoke summary procedure provided under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 as he has waived his right accrued to him under the law by the passage of time and now his claim became time-barred. Furthermore, under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 the service of two months' notice upon opponent is compulsory and mandatory and two months will be counted from the date of service of the notice. Admittedly the applicant has served legal notice on 21-10-1996 and has filed the instant ejectment application under summary procedure on 7-11-1997 i,e,, within 15 days from the date of notice as such has not complied with the Mandatory Provisions of law provided under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Furthermore, I have gone through the copy of said notice, dated 2 1 - 10-1997 produced by the applicant and it appears that in the said notice the applicant has not mentioned that he has attained the age of 60 years or he requires the premises on the ground of age of 60 years, as such, the notice does not contain the mandatory requirements as provided under section 4 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 as such in my humble view the notice is not in accordance with law as such the instant application is premature and not maintainable on this ground alone."
7. Now the question is whether provisions contained in section 14 of S.R.P.O., 1979 are attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case. In my humble view the appellant was not entitled to get the benefit of section 14 of S.R.P.O., 1979 on the ground of personal, bona tide requirement after the passage of 15 years of attaining the age of 60 years. (See Hafiz Abdul Malik v. Muhammad Ilyas 1987 CLC 419). In Baksh Illahi v. Qazi Wasif Ali, 1985 SCM R 291, leave was granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to determine whether the landlord will be entitled to avail benefit of section 14(1) of S.R.P.O., 1979 notwithstanding the fact that he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality, if such other buildings is not suitable for his needs it was held: "The clear intendment of the law as it stood before the amendment was that the landlord was required to invoke the benefits of subsection (1) of section 14 within a period of six months from the date of retirement or attaining the age of sixty years or becoming a widow or orphan. Apparently there could be no ambiguity regarding the interpretation of subsection (2) as construed in the foregoing part of this judgment at that time. The disqualification contained therein clearly referred to the date then the contingencies mentioned in subsection (1) in its main enacting part happened, with the result that if at the time the landlord was in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality, the special privilege conferred by subsection (1) (ibid.) not accrue to him and the purpose of the proviso to subsection (1) only was to provide a time limit for the subsistence of the privilege i,e,, for a period of six months if the privilege did accrue. In this context of the legislative background, the only change brought about by the amendment was to remove the time limit originally stipulated and exclude the application of subsection (1) in case the landlord rents out a building after the accrual of the right and forfeit the same. In fact subsection (2) visualizes the situation where a landlord is already in occupation of a building of his own when the rights conferred by subsection (1) accrue or continue to vest and the proviso to subsection (1) as amended deals with the situation after the accrual of the rights where the landlord rents out a building after the happening of the contingencies mentioned above."
8. In view of the above preposition of law, I find the impugned order of the learned Trial Courts well- reasoned and it does not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.