' MUSHIR ALAM, J.---Through instant petition the petitioner has impugned decision of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'SLAT') in Appeal No, KAR 240 of 1997 dated 4- 3-1998 whereby, appeal filed by respondent No,4 Duria Aman, was allowed and case was remanded to the Labour Court No,II for proceeding on merits.
2. Brief facts leading to this petition are that the respondent No,4 filed a grievance petition under section 25-A of I.R.O. 1969, against the petitioner seeking reinstatement in service with back benefits.
3. Before the learned Labour Court, the respondent No,4 besides himself examined two witnesses in support of his case and closed his side on 18-9-1989 thereafter the petitioner filed the affidavits of three witnesses in rebuttal. But the respondent No,4 instead of cross-examining the petitioner's witnesses, sought adjournment on various pretexts and ultimately after his side was closed, filed an application dated 29-7-1997 before the learned Labour Court to decide the entire matter on special oath. Application reads as follows: "It is prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to administer the special oath to the above respondent as under: ' Was Mr. Abdul Karim Mongrio ever employer as Accountant in the respondent establishment.'
' In view of the above I give up my grievance petition if the answer is in the negative.
' In the interest of justice, above prayer may kindly be granted."
4. The petitioner herein accepted the said offer, consequently the special oath was administered to Syed Muhammad Iftikhar the. Managing Director of the petitioner as prayed by the respondent No,4 and the learned trial Court passed the orders dated 30-9-1997 which reads as follows: "Applicant's representative Mr. A.D. Cruze, respondents' M.D. Syed Muhammad Iftikhar Zaidi and his counsel present. Oath administered on Holy Qur'an and he stated on oath that Abdul Karim Magrani was our employee but he was not Accountant in respondent Company.
' Mr. A.D. Craze earlier submitted application that applicant was administered poison to prevent his attention in Court. M.C. Was submitted on last date and copy annexed from the Court is proceeding with the matter hence he withdraws his power and asks the Court to send notice to the applicant.
' Application for adjournment moved on 22-9-1997 was rejected by my order of that day and there was no mention of any poison in the said application and M.C. Of which copy if again produced today these are the two M.Cs. Of 19-9-1997 i,e, one produced on 20-9-1997 with adjournment application which was allowed and the one produced with adjournment application of 22-9-1997 and again today. Both certificates are different. As regards notice to the applicant withdrawal of Vakalatnama. The law is to the contrary that notice is to be served by the counsel himself and not by the Court and there is no provision in the I.R.O.
' In the result the main petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. Stands dismissed."
5. It appears that resopndent No,4 being aggrieved by above referred order filed appeal before the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal.
6. The learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal allowed the apeal and remanded the case to the Labour Court No,II, the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal held: "After hearing both the learned counsel. I have come to the conclusion that there was no provision that party should be compelled to take oath and if he declines to do so, adverse order be passed against him.
' Under the circumstances the present appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 30-9-1997 passed by the learned Lower Court is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Labour Court No,II for proceeding on merits."
7. The record shows that the respondent No,4 was served through publication effected in daily Jang dated 12-12-1998 but he chose to remain absent and did not contest the petition.
8. Mr. Farooq Hashim, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was administered special oath on the offer in writing made by the respondent No,4 to the Labour Court and matter was adjourned to 30-9-1997, 5-9-1997, 30-8-1997, 4-9-1997, 20-9-1997, 22-9-1997 and 30-9-1997 and on each date the respondent No,4, on one or the other pretext, chose to remain absent under the compelling circumstances the trial Court was justified to administer special oath to the petitioner in terms offered by the respondent No,4 in writing and decided the case vide order dated 3-9-1997, reproduced above.
' It was further urged that once the respondent No,4 offered oath to the petitioner which was accepted and oath was taken on Holy Qur'an and matter was decided accordingly. The learned SLAT erred both in law and facts reversing the orders of trial Court.
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, respondent No,4 though served as per record through publication in daily Jang dated 12-12-1998 but chose to remain absent. Mr. Ainuddin Khan, learned Additional Advocate-General on Court notice Perused the impugned order and record.
11. From the facts given above, it can be seen that the respondent No,4 voluntarily made an offer to the petitioner to take special oath which offer was readily accepted. Learned SLAT held that "there was no provision that party should be compelled to take oath and if he declines to do so adverse order be passed against him. Such finding cannot be sustained, firstly the respondent No,4 had voluntarily given in writing that if the petitioner answers the questions posed by him in negative, he would give up his grievance petition. It was on the basis of the oath taken by the petitioner who gave answer in negative, the grievance petition was dismissed vide order reproduced in para. 4 above, by the learned labour Court. Secondly, that Oath Act, 1873 does not prescribe any particular form or procedure for deciding the matter on oath against section 163 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Once an offer made by a party is accepted by the other, then the party making an offer cannot be allowed to resile from the offer as it amounts to binding contract and the trial Court was justified under the circumstance to decide the matter on oath, view find support from case cited as Atiquallh v, Kafayatullah (1981 SCM R 162) and Salim Ahmad v. Khushi Muhammad (1974 SCM R 224).
12. Once the respondent No,4 himself agreed to a mode of decision before the trial Court, the decision by the trial Court was unquestionable and the respondent No,4 was estopped to challenge the same'before the learned SLAT and the learned Appellate Tribunal erred in reverting the decision of learned trial Court, from the order of the learned Appellate Tribunal referred to in para. 6 above, it seems that learned Appellant Tribunal misdirected itself considering that the matter was to be decided in accordance with Article 163 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984, which lays down certain procedure, as against Oath Act 1873. Both set of provisions have their own sphere of operation and cannot be held to be derogatory or over lapping each other.
13. From the contents of application made by the respondent No,4 to decide the matter on special oath, it cannot be said that this was under Article 163 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 which provides claimant to first take oath in support of his claim and then call upon the defendant to deny the claim on oath. In the instant case, it was the respondent No,4 who offered to give up his grievance petition provided the petitioner answers a question in negative, which offer was accepted by the petitioner and took oath accordingly, and the decision was given by the learned trial Court Under the circumstances, it was not incumbent on the trial Court to first call upon the respondent No,4 to take oath' as the matter was decided in accordance with the Oath Act, 1873 and not under Article 163 of Qanoon-eShahadat Order, 1984; guided by the principle laid down in Saleem Ahmad Case by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that offer made by a party and accepted by the other is in the nature of binding contract and one of the contracting party could not be allowed to back out of it unless the contract was void or had been frustrated, admittedly this was not the case of the respondent No,4 before the Appellate Tribunal therefore the learned Tribunal was not justified to upset the decision of the learned Labour Court.
14. Consequently, the petition was allowed by us by short order and above are the reasons for the same, since the petition was allowed there was no necessity to pass any order in the listed application which also stands disposed of.