1. ' This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under section 104, C.P.C. Read with Order 43, Rule 1, C.P.C. Is directed against the order, dated 30-5-1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Malir Karachi whereby application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Read with section 151, C.P.C. In Suit No, 12 of 1998 was dismissed.
2. ' Briefly stated the case of the appellant is that in response to the tenders of taxi-cum-private cars at Jinnah Terminal Karachi Airport the contract was awarded to him for 5 years- as he was the successful bidder. However, after the lapse of few months the respondent started interfering illegally in the business affairs of the appellant, therefore, he filed Civil Petition No,1714 of 1993 and ultimately that was disposed of in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties. A copy of settlement dated 29-2-1993 has come on record as annexure A/3. It reads as under: "(1) Please refer to the meeting held in the Conference Room, HQ CAA on July 19, 1993 to discuss the problems faced by M/s. Limousine Services in implementing the directives of the former Prime Minister, wherein you were also present.
(2) The competent Authority has very kindly conceded the recommendations made during the said meeting and has decided to reduce the monthly license fee of M/s. Airport Limousine Services to Rs,121,570 w,e,f, March, 1993, as the Licensee was suffering heavy losses due to induction of Yellow Cab Services.
(3) It has been further decided that the licence may also be allowed to operate Porter Service at Jinnah Terminal Quaid-e-Azam International Airport in addition to M/s. Shaheen Airport Services under a separate licence agreement. In this respect M/s. Airport Limousine Services will pay 25% of their gross monthly sale to C.A.A. As licence fee."
3. ' Thereafter, in 1995 the respondents allegedly in violation of the above settlement invited fresh tenders for operating porter service at the Airport. Therefore, being aggrieved the appellant filed Suit No, 730 of 1995 against the respondents and that was decreed in favour of the appellant. The appellant also filed Suit No, 756 of 1996 regarding rent a car service which is still pending. However the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Was dismissed by the learned trial Court hence this appeal.
4. ' I heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
5. ' According to the learned counsel for the appellant the main grievance of the appellant is contained in paras. 6 and 7 of the memo. Of appeal which reads as under: "(6) That the main grievance of the appellant is that the contract for porter service is a facility provided to the appellant in lieu of waiver its right to exclusively operate taxi service in consideration of payment of 25% of the gross monthly sales accrued to the appellant, however, the respondents have tentatively collected Rs, 2 lacs per month and the same has to be ultimately adjusted after taking of the accounts.
(7) That the respondents failed to account for the amount they have received in this head and otherwise after the judgment of the abovesaid suit in which the issues were decided in favour of the appellant, threatened the appellant of dispossession and deprivation of the collection of porter fee as such, the appellant again filed a suit for accounts, declaration and injunction and had also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Restraining the respondents to dispossesses the appellant and the interim injunction was operating and counter-affidavit was also filed by the respondents, however, the learned Additional District Judge where the case is pending has been pleased to dismiss the same."
6. ' Learned counsel for the respondent in reply submitted that the appellant is only a licencee and he has no vested or legal right to continue the business after the expiry of licence. The agreement executed between the parties as the result of settlement after filing of C.P. No, 1714 of 1993 was binding on them and in that case according to the learned counsel for the respondent after the expiry of one year or even after the expiry of fresh agreement pertaining to taxi business the appellant has no vested right to continue business without getting a fresh agreement executed on mutually agreed terms. It would be relevant to note that vide agreement, dated 30-1-1998 the duration clause in the said licence agreement reads as under:--- "This licence in respect of the said premises shall remain in force for a period of 5 years commencing from 1-2-1993 to 30-1-1998 provided that the licencer reserves to himself the right to terminate it at any time without notice and without any cause being assigned and without any compensation."
7. ' In support of his submission learned counsel for the respondent cited M.A. Naser v. Chairman, Pakistan Eastern Railways and others PLD 1965 SC 83, Messrs Muhammad Ishaq & Sons v.
8. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Railways Federal Secretariate, Islamabad and another 1992 CLC 1515, Mian Muhammad Altaf v. The Secretary Health, Government of Punjab, Lahore and another PLD 1992 Lahore 199, M/S Kohinoor Trading (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mangrani Trading Co.
9. Etc. 1992 CLC 1559, Civil Aviation Authority Karachi v. M/s. Data International (Data Baggage House)
10. Karachi and others PLD 1993 Karachi 700 and Saeed Ahmed Malik v. Naval Estate Officer 1989 CLC 1056.
11. ' Keeping in view the pleadings as well as the agreements particularly the terms and conditions referred to hereinabove and the case law relied upon by the learned counsel it appears that the licence period has already expired as was rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent. The learned trial Court has kept in view the well-settled principles for grant or refusal of injunction. The appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case. The balance of convenience lies in favour of the respondent. Being only a licence he has no vested right to continue his taxi porter service etc. Under the cover of injunction and he would not suffer irreparable loss if his request for injunction is declined. Therefore, finding no merit in this appeal it is dismissed in limine.