' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, is directed against an order passed by the High Court on 14-10-1999, whereby accepting the appeal of respondents, herein the stay order issued by trial Court was vacated.
2. The necessary facts giving rise to the present appeal, are that the appellant filed a declaratory suit in the Court of District Judge, Muzaffarabad alleging therein that he had cordial relations with Abdul Wahab, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, who appointed him as his attorney to get the allotment of the land in dispute. He claimed that an amount of Rs,30,00,000 was spent by him. The said Abdul Wahab and subsequently his legal heirs executed powers of attorneys with the terms that plaintiff was owner of land measuring 14 Kanals, 16 Marlas, comprising Survey Nos. 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 and 126 and land measuring 21 Kanals out of the land measuring 35 Kanals, 6 Marlas, comprising Survey No,132, situate in villages Khamdrang and Naluchi, Tehsil Muzaffarabad.
A declaration was also sought that defendants-respondents had no concern with the land as such were not entitled to transfer it in any manner. Alternatively a decree for Rs,40,00,000 was sought for.
Along with the suit an application for issuance of stay order was moved. The trial Court initially issued the stay order. However, after hearing the parties the application was dismissed. An appeal filed in the High Court was accepted and the case was remanded to the trial Court to decide the same afresh, after setting aside the order earlier passed by it. The learned Distract Judge after hearing the parties issued the stay order prayed for. On appeal taken to the High Court by the respondent, as said earlier, the same was accepted and the stay order issued by the District Judge was vacated. Hence this appeal by way of leave of the Court.
3. It was vehemently contended by Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi the learned counsel for the appellant, that the High Court fell in an error by accepting the appeal filed by the respondents and to vacate the stay order granted by the learned District Judge. The learned counsel pressed into service the submission that the High Court went deep into the appraisal of the power of attorneys initially executed by Abdul Wahab, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, and subsequently by his heirs in favour of appellant to get the allotment of land in dispute in favour of appellant and thereafter to prosecute the cases before various authorities and Courts of law for which the appellant spent a huge amount from his own pocket. The learned counsel contended that the documents executed by Abdul Wahab and his heirs supported the claim of appellant. Thus, the land in dispute in view of the aforesaid documents was in the ownership of appellant. Therefore, a stay order directing the respondents to refrain from transferring the suit land in any manner and maintaining the status quo order was sought for. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the trial Court after consideration of facts and law and the fundamental ingredients regarding the grant or refusal of stay order i,e, the prima facie case, the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, issued the stay order in favour of appellant and the same could not have been set at naught while probing deep into the merits of the case of the parties. The learned counsel contended that the High Court virtually decided that the power of attorneys executed in favour of appellant were tampered with and certain interpolation was made by the appellant.
Thus, the learned counsel maintained that in presence of these findings by the High Court, his case virtually has been decided by the High Court and it is bound to adversely affect the case of appellant in the trial Court.
4. Controverting the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, the learned counsel for respondents, maintained that the appellant was appointed as attorney to prosecute the cases on behalf of predecessor-in-interest of respondents and later on behalf of Khurshid, one of the heirs of Abdul Wahab, deceased. The power of attorneys were interpolated and certain additions were made to obtain ill-gotten gains which were neither the part of the contents of power of attorneys nor the same were executed. The learned counsel submitted that no agreements of any kind as alleged by the appellant were executed by the respondents. The land in dispute was held as belonging to the respondents finally by this Court and the possession of the same was handed over to the respondents. The appellant in order to grab the land indulged in tampering the documents. The learned counsel submitted that the observations made by the High Court with regard to the interpolation and tampering with the power of attorneys were purely for the purpose of grant or refusal of stay order and it had nothing to do with or to adversely affect the case of the appellant in the trial Court. However, the learned counsel pointed out that in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether a prima facie case is made out or balance of convenience or irreparable loss tilts in favour of a particular party, a Court of law has to probe into the essential ingredients and the same would not in any way prejudice the case of appellant. The learned counsel, thus, submitted that the High Court committed no illegality by passing the impugned order.
5. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it may be stated that the High Court after perusal of the special power of attorney Annexure the original power of attorney, dated 8-1-1989 registered on 23-2-1993, Annexure another power of attorney executed on behalf of Khurshid on 15-4-1995, Annexure an agreement attested on 4-11- 1996, Annexure an agreement, dated 15-9-1994, Annexure (URDU TEXT) and agreement Annexure reached a conclusion that general power of attorney executed on behalf of Abdul 'Wahab, son of Ghulam Hassan, Annexure prima facie has been tampered with after the end of it contends by making an addition on its back side which did not appear to be the part of the power of attorney executed by the executant. It was also observed by the High Court that power of attorney was allegedly executed on 8-1-1989, but the same was registered on 23-2-1993 nearly after about a period of 4 years. In the opinion of the High Court this document appeared to be doubtful and a fictitious one. The High Court also observed that the other document Annexure ( URDU TEXT ) was shown to have been executed on 27-9-1994 and the same appeared to have been registered on 15-4-1995. This power of attorney, according to the High Court, was also tampered with by making an addition of words at its first page and similarly addition of executants Sakeena, Shamim, Khusar, Kalsoom, Ayesha, Zubaida also appeared to have been made by adding their names and affixing their thumb-impressions, whereas the contents aforesaid power of attorney reveal that the same was executed by respondent Khurshid, son of Abdul Wahab, and it appeared to have been executed only on his behalf at the time of its registration. However, the names of other executants appeared to have been added afterwards. The same was also registered after nearly about 8 months. Therefore, in the opinion of the High Court the aforesaid power of attorney did not appear to be above doubt. The agreement Annexure (URDU TEXT ) did not appear to be free from any doubt as the stamp paper was secured for the purpose of an affidavit but an agreement was written on it. The High Court went on observing that the aforesaid agreement was executed on behalf of Khurshid and Arshad Iqbal but the words (URDU TEXT) appeared to have been added by way of tampering. The High Court also observed that Annexure (URDU TEXT) was also not free from doubt as the same was also tampered with. This document was attested by Notary Public on 18-2- 1995, whereas it showed its execution on 15-9-1994. Muhammad Fateh, the witness of the document, also denied to have signed the document through an affidavit filed in this regard.
Similarly the power of attorney executed on behalf of Abdul Wahab on 30-4-1972, was held by the High Court to be not supportive to the claim put forth in the suit as the same showed that executant shall take the possession after payment of amount spent by the attorney. The High Court, thus, reaching the conclusion that the land in dispute was held to be in the ownership of Khurshid and other respondents through the judgment of this Court passed on 19th June, 1996, and the possession of the same was also handed over to respondents on 20-4-1998, opined that the plaintiff-appellant had neither a prima facie case nor balance of convenience or irreparable loss in his favour. Therefore, it set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge by accepting the appeal of respondents.
6. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it may be stated that at the stage of grant or refusal of an ad-interim relief, the Court is not expected to examine closely the merits of the case of the parties. It is not the requirement of law that, the suit of the plaintiff must succeed in all respects in order to secure the interim relief in his favour. All that the Court has to see is whether the plaintiff applying for the interim relief has an arguable case and balance of convenience and irreparable loss in his favour. The plaintiff- appellant in support of his claim has relied on an agreement, dated 27-5-1959, executed by Abdul Wahab, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, a copy of special power of attorney executed by Abdul Wahab in favour of plaintiff-appellant on 30-4-1972, a general power of attorney executed by Abdul Wahab on 23-2-1993, general power of attorney executed by Khurshid in favour of plaintiff-appellant on 15-4-1995 an agreement, dated 4-11-1996 executed by Khurshid and Arshad qbal in favour of the plaintiff appellant. From the tentative perusal of aforesaid documents it transpired that not only Abdul Wahab, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, but also respondents Nos. 1 and 2 after the death of Abdul Wahab have admitted that the plaintiff- appellant had been prosecuting and defending the various cases with regard to the suit land in, different Courts right from the lifetime of Abdul Wahab and had been bearing their expenses which would be paid to him and half of the land will also be given to him. At stage, no definite finding could be given as to whether the aforesaid documents were tampered with or certain interpolation was made. Mere subsequent addition of words is not always tampering. The High Court, thus, in our view, travelled beyond the parameters of an application for stay order and the order recorded by it virtually amounts to dismissal of suit filed, by the appellant. Therefore, any such observation which adversely affects the rights of a particular party ought not to have been made at the stage of stay order.
7. The perusal of the documents shows that the claim put forth by the plaintiff-appellant has some substance and his case cannot be thrown out at the stage of issuance of ad-interim relief. Thus keeping in view the arguable case in favour of plaintiff and irreparable loss, which tilts in his favour if the suit land is transferred during the pendency of the suit the ends to law and justice demand that the status quo of the suit land should be maintained till decision of the suit by the trial Court.
Our aforesaid view finds support from the fact that during the pendency of the suit the respondents have transferred some portion of the land in favour of one Shafiq-ur-Rehman. If the status quo order is not issued the respondents are likely to transfer further the suit land which will occasion an irreparable loss to the plaintiff and the same will give rise to multiplicity of suits.
8. We are also conscious of the fact that the basic intent and object of an interim relief is always to maintain the status quo of the suit land and not to creak. a different situation than what it was existing at the time of filing the suit. Therefore, keeping in view the overall circumstances of the case, by setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, we order the status quo of the suit land to be maintained till the disposal of suit by the trial Court.
9. Before parting with the case, it may be observed that Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, the learned counsel of the respondents, offered that respondents were ready to furnish a bank guarantee to the tune of Rs,40,00,000 if the suit of the plaintiff is ultimately decreed in his favor. The offer made by the learned counsel for respondents seems to be just and reasonable. If the respondents execute a bank guarantee in the sum of Rs,40,00,000 in case the suit of plaintiff is ultimately decreed in his favor the stay order granted in the above para. Of this judgment shall stand vacated. In the circumstances of the case we pass no order as to costs.