These two Second Appeals (Non. 572/75 and 19/76) under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 arise out of the same case between the same parties, Therefore, they ate being disposed of together.
2. Ch. Noor Muhammad, respondent in these appeals, moved the eviction application against Abdul Salam and Abdul Rashid (appellants in S. A O. No. 572/75). Muhammad Aslam Khan (appellant iv S. A. O. No. 19/76) had claimed interest in the property, as also, recovery of rent, as a mortgagee, His appeal is also directed against aforementioned Ch. Noor Muhammad who, according to Muhammad .Slam Khan, had mortgaged the property. For the purpose of convenience, Moor Muhammad would be mentioned as the "landlord" and/or "mortgagor", Muhammad :slam Khan as the "mortgagee". Abdul Salam as the "tenant" and Abdul Rashid as the "sub-tenant". It may be noted that the tenant and the nub-tenant are real brothers inter se-Abdul Rashid is younger of the two.
3. Learned Rent Controller dismissed the landlord's application for eviction of the tenant and the sub-tenant. Originally, the mortgagee was not impleaded as a party. Subsequently however, he was allowed to safeguard his interest as a respondent. Parties had submitted their amended pleadings after the question of mortgage had been introduced by the Mortgagee in the proceedings. The learned Controller decided the case ors preliminary issues only. The property being admittedly evacuee and having been subject-matter of transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation') Act, 1958, learned Controller held that a notice under section 30 of the Act was neither served on the tenant nor on the; sub-tenant. Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant on account of statutory provision contained in section 30, without a. Notice thereunder, the said tenants were not liable to ejectment. Learned lower appellate Court, on appeal by the respondent (landlord), reversed the decision and held that while notice under section 30 was duly served on the tenant, it was not necessary to be served on the sub-tenant and that he was not protected under section 30. With regard to the mortgage, it was hold that the possession was not transferred to the mortgagee and because a statutory tenancy had been created in favour of the landlord on account of the transfer of the property and issuance of P. T. O. And P. T. D., the mortgagee would not acquire any rights under the mortgage adverse to those of the statutory landlord. An ancillary argument that one Mst.
Zohra Khatun bad purchased 1/4th share of the disputed property from the landlord, therefore, she was a necessary party, was rightly repelled by the observation that it was not a suit for possession ire which it was necessary to implead all the owners and that the ejectment application, according to the learned Judge, could be prosecuted by one of the owners. Ors the above findings, as admittedly no rent had been paid to the landlord, his application was allowed and the ejectment was ordered.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants in both these appeals has advanced common arguments. He has laid considerable stress on the question of service of notice on the tenant as also the sub- tenant. This argument is directly linked with his other argument that the landlord has failed to prove the creation of sub-tenancy. According to him, the so-called sub-tenant was in possession of the premise; in dispute in his own right in 1947 as also on the target date in 1958, therefore, he was entitled to a notice in his own independent right. And for that very reason, he would be protected under section 30 of the Act in two ways : one, that without a notice he could not be ejected on ground of default in payment of rent ; and two, he would not fall within tire mischief of subsection (3)(ii) of section 30 which relates to sub-tenant because, as the learned counsel contented, it would not apply to a parson who was not introduced after the target date/transfer of the property.
5. The entire argument of the learned counsel would stand or fall on the question as to whether the sub-tenant was in possession of tire property or any part thereof as a household, independent of his cider brother, at any point of time relevant in this case. The learned lower appellate Court gave several convincing and strong reasons in para. 7 of the impugned Judgment for giving finding in this behalf against the sub-tenant. With tae help of the learned counsel, I have gone through the evidence. Although the reasons advanced by the learned lower appellate Court are unrx0eptiouable, I have carefully scrutinised the deposition of Rashid Ahmad P. W. 2 (sub-tenant) in order to ascertain whether his claim to independent tenancy could be upheld. In the very first sentence of his deposition, 'no claimed to be in possession of the building since 1947. Under cross- examination, he frankly admitted that be and his elder brother, namely, Abdul Salam were living 'Jointly" . Next, he had to admit that his age on the day when he made the deposition (24-4-1975) was 30 years. In other words, he was born in 1943 and thus he yeas tyro years old in 1947 g since when he claimed to be in independent possession of the property. Learned counsel for the appellants thought it impossible for him to get out of this damaging admission, therefore, he urged that the statement made by Rashid Ahmad about bin age should not be accepted as correct. One reason that he gave was that it is usually the estimate of age by the presiding Judge that is noted in the record. I do not ague with bins. The estimate of age can be assumed in connection with the particulars given by a witness before the examination starts. In this case, apart from those particulars which, as the record shows, were given by the witness on oath, ha made a categorical statement under cross-examination that his age was 30 years. Thus the claim that the sub-tenant was in possession in his own right since 1947. Therefore, he should be presumed to have continued in similar possession till the date of transfer, is rendered baseless.
6. Rashid Ahead (P. W. 2) also admitted that his older brother had left for Jeddah to join his wife and that he had returned only two months prior to his making the statement. He gave the age of his brother as 45 years and claimed that after giving up service he was not doing any busines3 and that his wife was a serving woman in Jeddah. The fact that the tenant bad returned from Jeddah during the pendency of the proceedings before cite learned Controller would not, in the above-noted circumstances, make any difference. The statement on oath of the landlord as P. W. 1 to the effect that "Abdul Salam had left for Jeddah after introducing Abdul Rashid as sub-tenant without the landlord's consent", which has been accepted by the learned lower appellate Court, stands fully corroborated by the afore-noted admissions made by Abdul Rashid its his deposition.
These is no reason why the impugned decision in this behalf should not be upheld. It would be presently discussed and shown that a notice was served by the landlord on the tenant---its legality or otherwise apart. The reply sent by the tenant in 1965 (Exh. P. 4) does not contain any mention of the claim subsequently made on behalf of Abdul Rashid (his brother) that he was also a tenant in the property in dispute in his own right. After carefully considering the question -of sub- tenancy, I agree with the learned lower appellate Court that the tenant introduced a sub-tenant who is his own real brother, after the transfer .Of the property to the landlord. Not only this, he also left Pakistan to join his wife in Jeddah. The mere fact that he sometimes returns to Pakistan to meet his other family members does not, in any way, dilute the effect -of above findings. Thus, it is held that not only the tenant introduced sub-tenant in the property without the consent of the landlord after the transfer of the property but also that the sub-tenant was not entitled t any notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation an Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. A direct consequence of" the above finding would be that the tenant, of course together with the sub- tenant, would lose protection under section 30 of the Act. Subsection (3) of section 30 clearly provides that nothing in proviso (b) to subsection (1) (regarding notice) shall ,apply to a tenant "3(ii) who after the transfer, has sublet or otherwise part with the possession of the house or shop or any part thereof . . . . ". On this ground alone, the tenant having lost protection under section 30, bit sub-tenant would also remain unprotected and that being so, the ejectment would be unexceptionable on ground of sub-tenancy ; and failure to observe the condition laid down in proviso (b) to subsection (1) of section 30 (with regard to notice) would not make any difference.
However, as the case so far has mainly proceeded on the basis of rent default, that aspect needs to be examined independently.
7. It is to be seen whether notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 was served on the tenant. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there is no evidence intrinsic or otherwise, to show that the notice (copy Exh. P. 3) was sent through registered post. E. A. Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf(PLD 1964 SC 536) has been relied upon in this behalf. Learned counsel has also pointed out that the copy of the notice Exh. P. 3 docs not, even on its face, show that the original notice was sent through registered post nor in the reply Exh. P. 4 it is mentioned that Kh. Sultan Ahmad, learned counsel for the tenant, had received the notice dated 27-2-1965 through registered post.
Learned counsel for the landlord, however, asserted that the notice was sent through registered post and it is through inadvertence that the word "registered post" was not mentioned in the copy Exh. P.
3. It is important to note that Mr. Kamal-ud-Din, who is now appearing for the landlord, had himself sent the notice, copy of which is Exit. P.
3. On a Court enquiry, he offered to withdraw from the case so as to make a statement on oath to the effect that the notice addressed by him to the tenant was posted/sent through registered post. After this confident offer, I did not consider it necessary nor there was any demand from the opposite side in this behalf, to put the learned counsel himself in the witness-box. I consider his statement at bar as enough to come to a conclusion that the notice was not sent otherwise than through registered post. This assumption is supported by the fact that the tenant (Abdul Salam) did not raise any objection in his reply Exh. P. 4 sent through a lawyer, with regard to the 'registered past'. The reply is at lengthy one and contains all possible objections. It is not for the first time that Nor. Kamal-ad-Din has made a statement at the bar that he sent the notice through registered post. In the amended application submitted long ago during the trial proceedings, which was signed by him as a counsel, it was assorted that notice was sent through registered post. Mr. Kamal-ud-Din appears to be a responsible lawyer. He had himself sent the notice. If it ware not a correct assertion that the notice was sent through A. D.
Registered post as mentioned in the amended application, learned counsel being himself author of the notice would not have signed the application. This is not all. Three other very important circumstances which support the finding by the learned lower appellate Court as also the claim of Mr. Kamal-ud-Din are : one, the tenant, according to his younger brother-the sub-tenant, had made himself available in Pakistan during the time that the evidence was being recorded. He did not appear in witness-box either to disown the receipt of and reply to the notice or that it was not through registered post ; two, Abdul-Rashid the sub-tenant appeared in witness-box and made a. Deposition with an attempt to protect hi3 oven rights as also those of his brother. He did not make even a bare assertion that his brother had not received a notice through registered post ; and three, above all, when the landlord appeared as his own witness (P. W.1), although he :vas questioned In respect of other matters, no was not put a singe question in cross-examination with regard to the notice sent to end received by the tenant qua which he had made a categorical assertion in his examiuation-in-chief that he had sent section 30notice to the tenant. It was not difficult to understand that when section 30 was being mentioned, its requirements were included in the assertion.
The receipt of the notice not having been denied at all in the repositions, the assertions of the landlord and his learned counsel in that behalf coupled with the copy Exh: P. 3 and the reply Exh. P.
4 wherein it is admitted that the notice had been received by the tenant, are enough to confirm the finding by the learned lower appellate Court that valid notice was sent to and received by the tenant. Before passing on to the other subject, it needs to be mentioned that the assertion made by the landlord in his deposition on oath regarding sending of the notice to and receipt of they reply from the tenant has not been denied on oath from the appellants side.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants read the contents of the mortgage steed in order to show that the learned lower appellate Court Misread the evidence when observing that tire mortgage was not with possession. He particularly relied on clause (i) wherein it is mentioned that the mortgage was "with possession to the mortgagees jointly" and further that the premises "shall remain In possession of the mortgagee as security". He also pressed m service the covenant that "notwithstanding redemption the mortgagees shall be entitled to realise all the legal, recoverable rents of the mortgaged property for any period covering the mortgage which remains unrealised of the date of redemption". According to him, it was abundantly clear that the possession was delivered to the mortgagees including Muhammad Aslam Khan appellant, the Mortgagee herein.
Learned counsel for the appellants also relied on an admission made by the respondent in his declaratory suit filed against the mortgagees claiming that on account of realisation of the rent by then:., they had recovered much more than the principal amount plus interest at the rate of 61 per cent. The precise argument is that the admission of the respondent with regard to realisation of the rent by the mortgagees from the tenants seas enough to show that the respondent had failed to prove his status as landlord. In this connection, learned counsel also relied on a rent note said to have been executed by the respondent in favour of the mortgagees to show that the latter had obtained the possession and thus, were to be treated as landlords, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagor remained the owner of the property. In this behalf he also relied on the definitions of 'landlord' and 'tenant' in sections 2(c) and 2(f) of the Ordinance whereunder the right to receive and liability to pay, the rent are enough to B establish relationship of landlord and tenant between the mortgagee and the tenants herein. It may be mentioned here that although the copies of the proceedings in the civil suit were not formally produced as evidence during the trial and first appeal, I permitted the learned counsel for the appellants to raise. This question and also directed the production of the copies. The suit was ultimately withdrawn with permission to refile. It is not critical whether another suit would not be filed. Therefore. The observations to be made in the discussion which follows, it is clarified, would be confined to this matter under the Rent Restriction Ordinance and would not prejudice the case of arty of the parties before the civil Court.
9. It is not uncommon for parties to mortgages to stipulate the covenants let such a manner as to avoid the rigours of certain restrictive laws. It is, therefore, necessary that before determining the controversy in this case, reference should be made to the guide-lines on this subject laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court In a similar case reported as Samandar Khan v. Mst. Maqbool and others (1974 SCMR 388), notwithstanding the fact that the parses had entered into a compromise, their Lordships were pleased to record note of caution for all Courts to guard against camouflage hinted above. The facts in that case were stated thus : "The mortgage purported to be with possession and there was no stipulation for payment of interest on the principal amount. The real intention of the parties however was that the appellant will charge interest on the sum advanced as loan to respondents at the rate of 80 % per annum. To secure this exorbitant rate of interest a device was adopted in the form of lease deed executed by the respondents simultaneously with the mortgage deed in favour of the appellant. The respondents undertook to pay rent of the house to the appellant at the rate of Rs. 90 per month.
One month's rent was deducted by the appellant from the principal amount which was to he accounted for at the termination of the tenancy.
It is in evidence that possession of the mortgaged house has remained all along with tire respondents."
Their Lordships upheld the interpretation of the deed on the view formed by a learned lower Court "that the so-called lease deed was in fact a device under which the appellant was enabled to recover interest on the loan advanced by him to the respondents at the unconscionable rate of 80 % per annum. As such relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the parties within purview of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. We further find that the agreement of lease was hit by section 3 of the West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance XV of 1960 (section 3 was quoted). The term 'debt' includes a loan secured by a mortgagor. Under the aforesaid provisions of section 3 the appellant could not recover from the respondents more than Rs. 2,820, i.e., twice the amount advanced by him as loan under the mortgage deed but he had in fact received more when he filed the application for eviction of the respondents on the basis of default in payment of another sum of Rs. 4,860." After declaring the above-noted legal position, their Lordships were pleas ed to record tire following caution : "We would have disposed of this appeal by short order in accordance with the terms of the compromise reached between the parties but it appeared expedient to set out the facts of the case in some detail so as to draw the attention of the Courts below to similar devices adopted by unscrupulous mortgagees to recover exorbitant rate of interest in the form of 'rent'. In dealing with the cases of this nature it should be kept in view that a leafs deed executed simultaneously with the mortgage deed in fact provides a machinery under which the mortgagee receives interest on the principal amount advanced as loan to the mortgagor. More than one legal incidents flow from this situation. For example relationship of landlord and tenant does not thereby come into force, in the sense In which there terms are ordinarily understood. Courts have therefore, to be vigilant that in decreeing suits for arrears of rent or giving effect to agreements of lease which .Are devised to defeat the provisions of law which provides maximum rate of interest which may be charged in secured loans."
10. Instances similar to the case before their Lordships can be multiplied. However, it would suffice to mention only two cited at the bar. Namely, Muhammad Abdullah v. Abdul Jabber (PLD 1967 Lah.
1000) and Syed jamal-ud-Din v. Sped Mobashir Hussain Shah (PLD 1976 Lah. 187). It is interesting to note that in majority 'of mortgage deeds containing agreements alluded to in the Supreme Court ruling, purported delivery of possession is mentioned as a necessary ingredient. But In most of the cases. It is found that notwithstanding such written acknowledgement, physical possession is not delivered. As the facts narrated above show, the case before the Supreme Court ways of this type.
11. In this case, there is no difficulty in resolving the factual controversy regarding possession. The mortgagee in his deposition as R. W. 1 did not even assert that he or any other mortgagee had obtained physical possession of the property or any part thereof. If at all, the possession mentioned in the mortgage deed could be considered as notional through attornment qua the tenancy. The so-called lease deed alleged to have been executed by the mortgagor to favour of the mortgagees was not proved during the trial. However, even if it be assumed chat a lease deed was executed, it would not advance the case of the mortgagee beyond what Is stated in tine mortgage deed itself that the mortgagees were to realise the income of the property. This covenant prima facie covered both the mortgagor who himself was in occupation of a part of the property and also the tenants already in occupation. In order to get such notional possession, what to talk of physical possession, it was necessary for the mortgagee to show that the tenants had attorned to him. That is why, an attempt was made in his deposition as R. W. 1 to claim that necessary formalities were gone through. But on proper analysis it would be found that he had come in the picture in collusion with the tenants only to support and help them in avoiding ejectment. The eviction application was moved on 14-9-1971. First written statement was submitted by the sub-tenant on I~-l1-1971 while the tenant submitted his written statement ors 28-6-1972. It was not even hinted in any of these pleadings that the tenants were paying rent to the mortgagee or that in any other way trey having attorned to him, a relationship of landlord and tenant tad developed between them and the mortgagee. In his deposition, the mortgagee specifically stated that he allegedly started receiving rent from the tenants from December, 1972. It appears that after the submission of the written statements by the tenants, they for the first time learnt about the mortgage and then the mortgagee obliged them by making an admission in their favour. Not only this, he also tried to support the claim of the sub-tenant regarding his so-called independent right to tenancy by admitting that he started receiving rent by dividing it-Rs. 30 from each of them. He shoved ignorance whether he had also claimed any arrears of rent from the tenants. This part of his conduct is very significant because, he would have been serious about possession/recovery of rent, he would certainly have claimed the same because the mortgage deed was executed in August, 1966. His silence for over six years till December, 1972 shows that his sudden emergence at the scene was for the purpose of only helping the tenants out of difficulty and not for the purpose of asserting his possession. The mortgagor in his deposition tried to shrew that the covenant with regard to recovery of rent in the mortgage deed did not apply to the tenants herein with the assumption that it applied to other tenants in the property which admittedly is composite having several units. The collusion between the mortgagee and the tenets in this case is highlighted by what is stated in para. 15(k) of the grounds of appeal submitted by the mortgagee in this Court. He has tried to make it as his case that "the finding of the lower appellate Court against appellant No. I (Abdul Salam, the tenant) that be is a defaulter. Is not only without evidence, illegal and harsh but is also against the covenants of the mortgage deed and the statement of tee appellant with regard to the factum of realization of rent and the rate of rent which is admittedly Rs. 30 per month of the disputed premises." It is not out of place to mention that the rate of rent being Rs. 60 was not denied even by Abdul Salam in his reply Exh. P. 4 nor was it asserted by any of the appellants in their written statements submitted in 1971 and 1972 that the rent was Rs.
30. The very fact that the mortgagee deposed that he was recovering Rs. 60 although by apportioning it at Rs. 30 each, also shows that the rent was Rs.
60. The above analysis of the conduct of the mortgagee and the tenants together with the mortgagee's deposition and the tenants' first written statements would, in ordinary circumstances, be considered as enough to corroborate the mortgagor's position. But for the same reason as mentioned earlier. Lest such a determinative finding prejudices any of the parties before the civil Count, I do not consider it necessary for the resolution of the controversy involved In this case to give the final decision that the tenants herein were not covered by the covenants in the mortgage deed. In the light of the above discussion, it is hold that till the filing of the ejectment application against the appellants (tenants) and for more than a year thereafter, there was absolutely no question of the tenants having attorned to the mortgagee or the latter having in any other way taken possession of the premises in dispute. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding possession accordingly has no force.
12. The next question requiring determination is whether the covenants in the mortgage deed deprive the mortgagor of his status as landlord This case is almost on all fours with the case before their Lordships in Samandar Khan v. Mst. Maqboal and others. Although delivery of possession is mentioned in this case as in the said case but there was neither transfer thereof nor attornment by the tenants at all the times relevant for the purpose of deciding the ejectment application.. The stipulation for the recovery of rent by the mortgagee in the present case as in tire cited case was only to provide a machinery for the realisation of interest qua which, if the ,mortgagor's plea is taken into account, the w,)rd "exorbitant" is no description. Accordingly to him, only Rs. 20,000 were paid at the time of the execution of the deed, the remaining Rs. 20,000 was not paid ; and subject to the above finding on the question of payment by the tenants to the mortgagee in this case, according to him, (in the civil suit) the mortgagees had realised Rs. 85,000. It is clear from covenant (i) of clause (ii) of the deed that the rent of the mortgaged property which was to be "collected" by the mortgagees will (after certain deductions) "be appropriated by the mortgagees in lieu of interest". The amount of interest was not mentioned as was the case before their Lordships. With the purported intention of avoidance of the restrictive provisions of section -4 of the West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Act. There is no distinguishing feature. In this case also, the recovery of rent was merely as a machinery for payment of interest by the mortgagor to the mortgagees. Therefore, the ruling of their Lordships would apply with full fore and the relationship of landlord and tenant would not be deemed to have one existed between the tenants and the mortgagee.
13. There is another aspect of the matter. It is provided in the definitions of 'landlord' and 'tenant' in section 2(C) and 2(i) of the Ordinance that the relationship gets established on the entitlement to receive "rent its respect of any building and correspondingly the liability to pay the "rent payable for a building". If the amount is not recoverable as rent and the too in respect of the building nor the liability to pay the same is, as rent payable for a building, then the person entitled to recover tie amount would not. Be landlord and the one liable to pay the same would not be, qua the former, a tenant. In cases like the present one, the recovery of rent is not as rent but as income or interest on a loan ; and the amount recovered, (keeping in view the agreement to recover the same contained in the Mortgage deed), is not payable in respect of any building. On the other hand, it is payable 1n respect of a loan. The two concepts are entirely different. The relationship of landlord and tenant in such circumstances would not develop between Ire mortgagee and the tenants in occupation of the building, prior to the execution of the mortgage deed. The fast that the mortgage deed contains the covenant that the mortgagee would be able to realise the so called rent till the date of redemption even after the event of redemption would "not change the above discussed position.
Thus, there was n relationship of landlord and tenant in this case between the mortgagee and the tenants.
14. Question arises whether the execution of the mortgage deed by the mortgagor (landlord) bad the effect of his losing the status of landlord. The answer would, on the foregoing reasoning, be in the negative The statutory or otherwise contractual relationship between the tenants and the mortgagor would continue because there is no interruption. The mortgagor shall continue to have the right to insist upon the recovery of the rent from the tenants although he aright permit the mortgagee to receive the amount. The landlord would, on the tenants committing default, be entitled to seek eviction. The present case is a vivid illustration of the above proposition. Till the filing of the ejectment application the tenants had not paid the rent to the mortgagee. There is no claim that they had paid the rent to the landlord either. Supposing, the mortgagee would not have come forward to help them and, if summoned by Court, would have taken the position that it was difficult for him to realise the rent from the tenants and that lie would realise the interest directly from the mortgagor. Would the tenants in that eventuality be entitled to say that they were not liable to pay the rent to the landlord simply because he had authorised the mortgagee to recover the rent for discharge of his liability to pay the interest ? The answer obviously cannot be in the affirmative. The tenants would continue to remain liable to pay rent to the landlord, although if any payments are made to the mortgagee they might claim their adjustment. In this case, this question does not arise because it is not even claimed that till the filing of the ejectment application and a year thereafter, any payment was made either to the mortgagor or to the mortgagee. In the light of the above discussion, I confirm the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that the statutory tenancy created by law between the appellant No. 1 (Abdul Salam-tenant) and the respondent did not cone to an end by the execution of the mortgage deed by the landlord in favour of the mortgagees. The relationship of landlord and tenant having been established and the default in payment of rent having not been denied, no justification has beau made out for setting aside the impugned order. Although no argument was raised with regard to exercise of discretion, I have not ignored this aspect of the case. The conduct of the appellants and the nature arid period of default are not such as to entitle them to any discretionary relief.
15. None of the arguments advanced from the side of the appellants bas any force. These appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The appellants (tenants) not only colluded with the mortgagee to defeat the rights of the landlord (mortgagor) but also, in a contumacious manner, denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. The tenant, i.e., appellant No. 1 in this case, while going abroad, inducted his brother so as not only to deprive the respondent of is rights but also to harass him. There is no justification for allowing any further time to the appellants to vacate the premises. It is, however, again clarified that they observations on various questions raised in these appeals are in the context of the arguments raised herein and are' not intended to decider the questions which might be raised before. a Court of general jurisdiction.