1. ' SYED HAIDER ALI PIRZADA, J.--- In the above seven High Court Appeals the appellants are the same and the point arising for determination is identical. Hence they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. ' The respondents had filed separate suits under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 for recovery of damages in the various sums of money by and on behalf of the legal heirs of seven deceased persons, as plaintiffs. The common facts relating to the above appeals are that on 27-4-1983 at about 11-30 p.m. Driver Mumtaz Hussain, an employee of the appellants, while driving the appellant's Bus No,839-906 on Route No,16-E, going towards Quaidabad on National Highway, reached the centre of Malir Bridge in a rash and negligent manner and dashed the other bus coming from Steel Mills side and fell down in the dry bed of Malir river from the said bridge on its right side. Consequently eleven passengers travelling in the appellant's bus including deceased Hoor Jehan in H.C.A. No,105 of 1986 (Suit No,492 of 1984), Ulfat Hussain in H.C.A. No,106 of 1986 (Suit No,539 of 1984), Abdul Wahid in H.C.A. No,108 of 1986 (Suit No,542 of 1984), Muhammad Ishaque in H.C.A. No,109 of 1986 (Suit No,544 of 1984), Shaukat Ali in H.C.A. No,111 of 1986 (Suit No,547 of 1984) and two persons travelling in Steel Mills' bus, namely, Syed Lutuf All Shah in H.C.A. No,107 of 1986 (Suit No,541 of 1984) and Muhammad Irfan in H.C.A. No,110 of 1986 (Suit No,545 of 1984), died on the spot. The first information report was lodged on 28-4-1983 at 12-30 p.m. At Quaidabad Police Station by one Arif Ali. The case was registered against Mumtaz Hussain, the deceased driver of the appellant's bus but since both the drivers had died on the spot, no challan was submitted by the police to the Court. The respondents, without serving any notice on the appellants, straight away filed the above suits against the appellants. The appellants resisted the suits. The appellants filed separate written statements wherein the ownership of the bus has not been disputed by them. It is also not denied that the said bus was being driven by their employee Mumtaz Hussain at the time it met the accident. It was, however, alleged that the accident took place due to the negligence of the driver of Steel Mills bus' Lutuf Ali Shah.
3. ' On the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed separately in all the suits. However, at the time of arguments, the following issues were reframed:--
(1) Whether the suits are time-barred and bad for non-joinder or mis joinder of the parties?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to file the suits as guardian ad litem?
(3) Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action against defendant?
(4) Whether the death of deceased was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of defendant's Bus No,839-906 or due to rash and negligent driving of contract bus of Steel Mills?
(5) Whether the plaintiffs have suffered any pecuniary loss due to the death of the deceased?
(6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any compensation? If so, to what extent?
(7) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to interest?
(8) What should the decree be?
(9) Cost of the suits?
4. ' The respondents have produced Hashmat Ali in support of their case. The appellants have produced D.W. 1 Abdul Jamil, D.W.2 Noor Muhammad, D.W.3 Misbahur Rehman and D.W.4 Jehangir.
5. ' The learned Single Judge after recording evidence and hearing the learned counsel for the parties decreed the suits in the following terms:--
(1) Suit No,539 of 1984 for Rs,2,01,600.
(2) Suit No,541 of 1984 for Rs,64,500.
(3) Suit No,542 of 1984 for Rs,23,733.
(4) Suit No,544 of 1984 for Rs,1,35,000.
(5) Suit No,545 of 1984 for Rs,1,80,000.
(6) Suit No,547 of 1984 for Rs,2,60,097.
(7) Suit No,492 of 1984 for Rs,32,000.
6. ' In support of the above appeals, Mr. Muhammad Aslam Qureshi, learned counsel for the appellants, has urged as follows:--
(1) That there was no reliable evidence to prove negligence on the part of the employee of the appellants.
(2) That the amount of loss/damages is also not reasonable.
7. ' On the other hand Mr. Muhammad Maqsood, learned counsel for the respondents in the above appeals, has vehemently urged as under:--
(1) That the appellants being Government corporation should not have filed the above appeals against the decrees, as the Government is under obligation to protect and help its citizens and not to harass them.
(2) That there was sufficient evidence on record to prove negligence on the part of the employee of the appellants.
(3) That the amount of damages/loss is reasonable.
8. ' The first submission of Mr. Muhammad Maqsood has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment, dated 21-8-1989 in H.C.A. No,48 of 1989, Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation and another v. Nazir Hussain Shah in which the learned Judges of the Division Bench came to the conclusion, after giving cogent reasons, which are fully supported by various authorities discussed by them in the said judgment, that "a public functionary, particularly in Pakistan which is an Islamic State, is enjoined not only by our Constitution but also by the tenets of Islam that it should act in aid of advancing the cause of justice and not to frustrate or defeat it. It is indeed a deplorable act, when a public functionary in order to resist a genuine claim arising out of a fatal accident spends considerable amount on litigation instead of settling the matter with the heirs of the deceased persons". We are in respectful agreement with this decision of the Division Bench for the reasons given by it in its unreported judgment and as such we are of the opinion that a public functionary should act in aid of advancing the cause of justice and not to frustrate or defeat it and it is indeed a deplorable act when a public functionary in order to resist a genuine claim arising out of a fatal accident spends considerable amount on litigation instead of settling the matter with the heirs of the deceased persons.
9. ' Adverting to the first submission of Mr. Qureshi that there is no reliable material on record to prove negligence on the part of the employee/driver of the appellants, it is suffice to observe that the contention is devoid of force.
10. ' Respondent No,1 's P.W. Hashmat Ali who was travelling in the bus of the appellants has proved the factum of negligence on the part of the driver/ employee of the appellants. The evidence produced by the appellants in defence has not shaken that above evidence of the respondents/plaintiffs. We cannot overlook the fact that the driver of the appellants overtook the other bus going ahead of it and dashed against the Steel Mills bus. It appears that he was, at that moment, rash and negligent in his driving, with the result that he could not stop his bus, which ultimately fell down from the bridge to the dry river bed below.
11. ' This brings us to the question of quantum of damages vis-a-vis the claim of the respondents in each of the appeals.
12. ' As mentioned above, so far as the claim of the respondents in H.C.A. No,106 of 1986 is concerned, Suit No,539 of 1984 has been decreed for Rs,3,26,400 by the learned Single Judge. From the averment made in para. 7 of the plaint, it does appear that the damage claimed is Rs,2,10,000 only.
13. In para. 9 of the plaint, the suit is valued for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs,2,10,000.
14. Even in the prayer clause (a) the damages claimed are Rs,2,10,000. The learned Single Judge decreed the suit for Rs,3,26,400.
15. ' The only technical objection, therefore, would be as to whether the Court can award the amount larger than the one claimed. On this point, there may be some difficulty. When court-fees is required to be paid on any claim ad valorem, the fact that the claim is restricted to a smaller amount and the fact that the court-fee commensurates with the suit amount is paid would have telling effect and the Court would be helpless in granting to the plaintiff more than what was claimed by him. But, in the instant case, the suit amount claimed by the plaintiffs was in itself not nebulous or vague but a definite and specific amount of Rs,2,10,000. From the prayer clause, it is clear that Rs,2,10,000 are specified. It is not further stated that such other amount as the Court might find just proper, reasonable, should be decreed. This means that the suit amount is restricted to Rs,2;10,000 only. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to a sum of Rs,2,10,000.
16. ' The upshot of the above discussion is that the above appeal (H.C.A. No,106 of 1986) is allowed to the extent of Rs,2,10,000. Again after deducting Rs,16,000 paid by the appellants under section 67 of the Motor Vehicle Ordinance, 1965, the amount comes to Rs,1,94,000. The above modified amount will be payable to the respondent. H.C.A. No,106 of 1986 is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
17. 'For the reasons mentioned above, H.C.As. Nos. 105 of 1986, 107 of 1986, 108 of 1986, 109 of 1986, 110 of 1986 and 111 of 1986, fail and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
18. ' The appellants have already deposited with the Nazir of this Court the amounts and the Nazir has invested the amounts. The details are as follows:-- Case No. Amount deposited by appellantAmount invested Amount in hand
(1) H.C.A. No,105 Rs,32,000 of 1986Rs,32,000 Rs,16,000 Rs,16,000
(2) H.C.A. No,106 RI,2,01,600 of 1986Rs,2,01,600 Rs.1,00,800 Rs.1,00,800
(3) H.C.A. No,107 Rs,64,500 of 1986Rs,64,500 Rs,32,250 Rs,32,250
(4) H.C.A. No,108 Rs,23,733 of 1986Rs,23,733 Rs,11,865 Rs,11,865
(5) H.C.A. No,109 Rs,1,35,000 of 1986Rs,1,35,000 Rs,67,500 Rs,67,500
(6) H.C.A. No,110 Rs 1,80,000 of 1986Rs .1,80,000 Rs,90,000 Rs,90,000
(7) H.C.A. No,111 Rs,2,60,097 of 1986Rs,2,60,097 Rs 1,30,045 Rs 1,30,052 Total Rs,8,96,930 Rs,4,48,460 Rs,4,48,470 ' The appellants deposited Rs,2,01,600 in Suit No,539 of 1984 and H.C.A. No,106 of 1986. Out of Rs,20,01,600 an amount of Rs,1,94,600 with interest is to be paid to the respondents and the balance amount of Rs,7,600 is to be refunded to the appellants. In all other appeals the decretal amounts be paid to the respondents.