' SAAD SA0013 JAN, J.-This order will dispose of four bail applications, namely, Criminal Miscellaneous No, 4555/B of 1976, Criminal Miscellaneous No, 2502/B of 1977, Criminal Miscellaneous No, 3597/B of 1977 and Criminal Miscellaneous No, 4774/B of 1977. These were heard together as same questions of law were canvassed in them. In Criminal Miscellaneous No, 4555/B of 1976 the petitioners were arrested along with seven others in a case registered under sections 148 and 302, read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code on the allegations that they had caused the death of two persons, namely, Akram and Liaqat. The F. I. R. Was registered on 21-10-74 and the petitioners were arrested shortly thereafter. In Criminal Miscellaneous No, 2502/B of 1977 the petitioner was arrested in a case registered under sections 148, 307 and 302, read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code on the allegation that he had caused the death of one Hussain. The F. I. R. Was registered on 27.8-1976 and the petition Ghulam was arrested on the same day. In Criminal Miscellaneous No, 3597/B of 1977 the petitioners were alleged to have caused the death of one Mansha. The matter was reported to the police on 3-4-1975. The petitioners were arrested on the same day. In Criminal Miscellaneous No, 4774/B of 1977 the petitioner was accused of causing the death of one Muhammad Isa. The F. I. R. Was registered on 10-11-1975. The petitioner's arrest followed a few days later.
2. In all these bail applications it was urged that the Courts of Sessions in which the cases of the petitioners are pending have fairly long lists and as such there is no likelihood of their trials commencing within a foreseeable future. It is also contended that the Judges presiding over the Courts have not passed any orders remanding them to custody and as such their detention is illegal.
3. Admittedly the petitioners in all the bail applications are accused of offences which are punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 4s7(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains a bar against the enlarging on bail of persons in respect to whom there appear reasonable grounds for believing that they have been guilty of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years. The first proviso to this subsection sets out certain exceptions to bar but those are not relevant here.
4. The learned Assistant Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the State has not disputed the assertion of the petitioners that the Courts in which their cases are pending have long lists and that their turns for trial are not likely to come within a reasonable period. Now, in our law an accused is deemed to be innocent till he has been convicted by a competent Court. The question for consideration is whether in view of the bar contained in section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioners in whose favour at this stage a presumption of innocence exists should be allowed to rot in jail for indefinite period till their turns for trial come. It may be mentioned that this very question was examined by the Supreme Court in Riasat All v. State (1) . In that case the accused {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1977 SC 480 {{FOOT NOTE}} had been arrested in first week of March 1975. Their bail application came up for consideration before the Supreme Court on 20-12-1976. There was no likelihood the accused being tried within the near future. On these facts their Lordships of the Supreme Court granted bail to the petitioners.
While allowing bail Anwarul Haque, I. (now C. J.) observed t "From the information given by the learned counsel for the State it becomes clear that even though the petitioners have already been in custody in connection with this case for one year and nine months, they are likely to remain so for another 2 or 2} years before their trial can be expected to commence, thus making a period of nearly four years in custody without trial. Although this Court has generally taken the view that delay per se is not a good ground for allowing bail but we have no doubt at all in our mind that a delay of four years in the likely commencement of the trial is indeed an inconscionable and inordinate delay, such as would entitle the petitioners to be enlarged on bail. In our jurisprudence an accused person is presumed to be innocent unless found guilty by a competent Court, and accordingly to hold a person in custody for nearly four years without any prospect of even commencing the trial strongly militates against this concept so as to amount to an abuse of the process of the Coutt."
The cases of the petitioners before us cannot be distinguished from the onek which was before their Lordships of the Supreme Court.
5. The learned Assistant Advocate-General pointed out that in Barkhurdar v. Liagat All another Bench of the Supreme Court did not accept the view expressed in Riasat Alt's case. We have gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Barkhurdar v. Liagat All. It is true that in this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court have reiterated the rule earlier laid down by them that the delay per se is not a su ii cient basis for enlarging a person accused of murder on bail, but a careful perusal of the judgment shows that they have not dissented from the view expressed in Rlasat All v.
State. Thus, Muhammad Afzal! Cheema, J., who wrote the leading judgment in Barkhurdar v. Liagat All observed t "We may, however, reiterate that the legal position admits of no equivocation or uncertainty inasmuch as it is not delay per se in all cases of murder regardless of its responsibility or other circumstances that would justify the grant of bail. It is only such inordinate delay as amounts to abuse of the process of the Court that would justify grant of bail."
' The words underlined* by me do show that his Lordship was admitting the possibility that where the delay in trial becomes inordinate bail could be granted. It may be mentioned that in Riasat All v. State it was held that when there are no prospects of a trial being held within a reasonable time the detention of the accused for an indefinite period would amount tc abuse of the process of the Court.
6. We think that the cases of the petitioners fall within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Riasat All v. State. This being so it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions of the petitioners that they *[Here in italics]
(I) PLD 1977 SC 434 are being detained without any valid order of remand. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioners be enlarged on bail on their executing bonds in the sum of Rs, 20,L00 with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Ilaqa Magistrate.