' This judgment shall dispose of R.S.A. No, 76 of 1977, Civil Revision No,459 of 1990 and Civil Revision No, 460 of 1990 because all the three matters involved a common point.
2. The facts relevant to the R.S.A. No,76 of 1977 are that the appellants purchased land measuring 50 kanals on 30-6-1963. Three suits were filed for possession of the said land by pre-emption by Siddique (respondent No,3), Hassan Bakhsh (respondent No,1) and Haji. All the three suits were tried together and they were decreed on 28-7-1966 by consent. According to the said judgment, the first decree was passed in favour of Siddique subject to payment of pre-emption money up to 28-9- 1966. In case of default by Siddique second decree was passed in favour of Hassan Bakhsh subject to the said deposit up to 28-10-1966 and in default of Hassan Bakhsh third decree was passed in favour of Haji subject to said deposit upto 28-11-1966. It is an admitted fact on record that Siddique deposited the requisite amount before 28-9-1966.
3. After making the said deposit Siddique filed execution petition. While the execution petition was pending, the next friend of Siddique gave a statement in Court that he has received the decrial amount of Rs,5,500 from the appellants out of Court and as also received an amount of Rs, 3,000 as Lungi' (according to the learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh this term means consideration for withdrawal of suit). It was further stated that the execution application be filed.
Accordingly the execution application was filed on 1-10-1968.
4. On 23-2-1973 Hassan Bakhsh respondent filed a suit for session against the appellants alleging collusion between Siddique and appellants and seeking possession of the suit land. Issues were framed in the suit. Evidence was recorded. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide a judgment and decree, dated 31-5-1976. Feeling aggrieved Hassan Bakhsh and Habib Bakhsh respondents filed an appeal which was heard by a learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh who allowed the same and decreed the suit on 15-1-1977. In the Civil Revision No, 459 of 1990, the respondents 1 and 2 purchased 71 kanals, 16 marlas of land while in Civil Revision No, 460 of 1990 the said respondents (in the Civil Revision) purchased 25 kanals of land. These sales were affected by means of mutations attested on 16-4-1981. The petitioner and the respondent 'No,3 in both the Civil Revisions filed rival suits for possession of the said land by preemption. The suits were consolidated and tried together. The respondent No,3 was granted first decree subject to deposit of preemption money on or before 16-9-1985 and in default the second decree was passed in favour of the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the respondent No,3 did make the requisite deposit within the stipulated time. The respondent No,3, however, on 10-4-1986 withdrew the pre-emption money deposited by him. Meanwhile the time fixed for deposit of pre-emption money by the petitioner had expired. The petitioner then filed an application praying for extension of time to deposit, which application was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 21-6-1988 while an appeal filed by the petitioner was heard by a learned Additional District Judge, D.G. Khan who dismissed the same on 14-2-1990.
5. Mr. Shamsul Haq Ansari, Advocate leading the arguments for the vendees in all the three matters, argues that by virtue of Order XX, Rule 14, C.P.C., title accrues to the successful pre-emptor when he deposits the amount in accordance with the directions of the Court contained in the pre- emption decree. Once the title accrues the land goes to vest in him and thereafter he is free to deal with the land in any manner, he deems proper. Further argues that there are no particulars of collusion on record what to speak of any evidence in support thereof. Mr. Khalid Alvi, Advocate led the arguments for the rival pre-emptors in the matter and argues that such a malicious attempt on the part of pre-emptor in collusion with the vendees to defeat the suit of the rival pre-emptor cannot be allowed.
6. I have gone through the records that were summoned and also those which are appended with the Civil Revisions, with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties.
' The facts narrated above are born-out from the same. The point that needs to be determined in these proceedings is as to whether after compliance of the terms of first decree, in case the successful first decree-holder withdraws the amount or receives the same from the vendee, can the second decree-holder be allowed to deposit the amount and get the land notwithstanding the fact that he failed to make the deposit in terms of his own second decree. Mr. Shamsul Haq Ansari, Advocate relies on the cases of "Molvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and others" 1992 SCMR 241 and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of "Lachhman Singh v. Natha Singh and another AIR 1930 Lah.273 in support of his argument that upon compliance of the terms of the first decree, the land comes to vest in the first decree-holder. Particularly relies on the following observations of Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone, J. (as his lordship then was) in the case of Molvi Abdul Qayyum appearing at page 249 and 250 of the report and para.10 thereof.
"It will be material to bear in mind that a decree in a pre-emption suit is of a peculiar nature. Under Order 20, Rule 14, C.P.C., the title of the property accrues to the decree-holder on payment in the Court of purchase money together with costs, if any. Once this is done then irrespective of the fact whether the possession is delivered to him or not, title in the property comes to vest in the appellant (pre-emptor) and he is the owner of the land in dispute."
' Mr. Khalid Alvi, Advocate on the other hand, relies on the case of "Sultan and 2 others v.
Muhammad Nawaz and another" 1996 SCMR 65. Chaudhry Muhammad Afzal, Advocate also came to the aid of Mr. Khalid Alvi, Advocate relying upon the case of Haji Muhammad Suleman v.
Muhammad Akram Khan and others PLD 1956 FC 97.
7. I have perused the judgments 'relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions. I find that in the case of Haji Muhammad Suleman (supra), the trial Court refused to decree the one-half of the suit house which had been decreed in favor of the rival pre-emptor who had sold the same, in favour of the other preemptor. This judgment was affirmed in the first appeal. In the second appeal this Court held that doctrine of lis pendent would be applicable. The other pre-emptor having sold the share of the house decreed in his favor, his vendees were not clothed with the right to defeat the other pre-emptor and since the matter was in progress, in first and second appeal, the said alienation by the other preemptor would not affect the right of any other pre-emptor. Consequently, the whole house was decreed in favour of the second preemptor and the said judgment of this Court was upheld by the Federal Court. In the case of Sultan and 2 others (supra), one of the preemptors relinquished the right while the appeal was pending in the High Court and as such it was held that since the successful exercise of right was subject to the decision of an appeal provided by law, the said relinquishment would entitle the other pre-emptor to claim the entire property. It will thus, be seen that both the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the second decree-holders, pertained to a period of time before the lis was finally over and were primarily decided on the premises that till such time that the remedy by way of appeal is exhausted, the matter remains sub judice and is subject to the ultimate decision.
8. In the present case, however, the lis was over by the passing of the alternative decrees and one Siddique had deposited the amount, he became vested with the title in the suit land. Once he acquired the title in the suit land, it was his sweet-will to deal with the property in any manner, he considers proper. Siddique who had been a party to the suit as well as to the first appeal and the present second appeal, has not opposed the vendees. At this stage I may also point-out that the view relied upon by Mr. Shamsul Haq Ansari, Advocate in the case of Molvi Abdul Qayyum, (supra) was concurred with by their lordships while deciding the case of Sultan and 2 others (supra). The only rider attached was that if an appeal is filed against such a decree, wherein deposit has been made, then the title acquired by the decree-holder becomes subject to the result of the appeal. It is an admitted position that no appeal was filed against the decrees in all the Jhree cases.
9. Mr. Khalid Alvi, Advocate then contended that since the decrees were not put into execution that should be treated as same. I am afraid this contention has no force. It is by now settled law that a pre-emption decree, even if not put into execution, does create title and the Revenue Authorities are bound to incorporate the same in the Revenue Records, if so insisted upon by the decree- holder. Reference may be made to the case of "Ali Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Fazal and another " (PLD 1973 Lahore 207), which judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of "Ali Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Fazal and another" (1972 SCMR 322). I, therefore, hold that Siddique as well as the respondent No,3 in the Civil Revisions had acquired title in the suit land having made the deposit within the time prescribed by the Court and any withdrawal or adjustment made thereafter can accrue only to the benefit of the vendee.
10. This now leaves us with the question of the collusion alleged by the second decree-holder. No gain-saying the fact that particulars of such an allegation have to be stated in detail as per Law of pleadings contained in Order VI and Order VII, C.P.C. In all the three cases, I find that no particulars of collusion or fraud are available. It could not have been presumed by the learned Courts below that there was a collusion between the vendee and the first decree-holder. In this behalf, Mr. Shamsul Haq Ansari, Advocate relies upon the case of "Mst. Sahib Noor v. Haji Ahmad" (1988 SCMR 1703) wherein the apex Court observed that:--- "In pleadings general allegations, however, strong may be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice."
' As a result of the above discussion, I allow R.S.A. No, 76 of 1977, set aside the judgment and decree, dated 15-1-1977 of learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh and restored that of dated 31-5- 1976 of learned trial Court. Civil Revisions Nos. 459 of 1990 and 460 of 1990 are dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.