1. ' The facts giving . Rise to this Revisional Application under section 115 of C.P.C., are that respondent Manzoor Hussain Shah was serving with the applicant as Food Inspector. He was compulsorily retired from the service by order, dated 12-4-1995 as a result of an inquiry proceedings under the Efficiency & Disciplinary Rules applicable to the respondent. His departmental remedies in the shape of appeal and revision failed. He then filed a suit for declaring the order, dated 12-4-1995 to be illegal, void and ultra vires with other consequential reliefs. The suit was filed against the applicant in a Civil Court, Karachi, which was contested by the applicant. The said suit was ultimately decreed by the judgment, dated 10-9-1986 by the learned Ilnd Senior Civil Judge, Karachi South. An appeal was filed against the judgment and decree being Appeal No,190 of 1986, which came, by assignment, to the Court of IVth Additional District Judge, Karachi (South) for disposal according to law.
2. ' During the pendency of the abovesaid appeal, the Sindh Services Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1994, was enacted and gazetted on 16-1-1995, whereby new sections 3-E and 3-B were inserted to section 3-D of the Sindh Services Tribunal Act XV of 1973, whereunder any person holding a post in the corporation not being deputationist to the corporation was deemed to be a "civil servant" for the purpose of the said Act and all the suits, appeals and applications pending in any court touching the terms and conditions of service stand abated with right of appeal to a party aggrieved by abatement of the proceedings, before the Tribunal within 90 days of the abatement.
3. ' A statement on behalf of the respondent was filed on 4-5-1995 stating therein that in view of the Sindh Services Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1994, the appeal has been abated on 16-1-1995 (the date of gazette of the amending Act). The applicant opposed the statement by filing objections.
4. The learned Additional District Judge after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after considering the provisions of the amending Act, concluded that the appeal stands abated, by order, dated 21st September, 1995. This abatement order has been impugned by the present Revision Application: ' Learned counsel for the applicant, while arguing the application, has confined to the following points only, although numerous grounds were taken in the application. He also conceded that by the Sindh Services Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1994, employees of the Corporation are deemed to be "Civil Servants" for the purpose of the Act. His first contention was that the learned Additional District Judge, while passing the abatement order, has failed to exercise the jurisdiction by not passing an order regarding the abatement of the suit as well. He emphasised that the appeal is continuation of the proceedings of a suit. On account of the abatement, the appeal came to a close without any effective determination of the controversy. His second contention was that the Corporation cannot be termed to be "Civil Servants" for the purpose of the Act, as such no right of appeal before the Tribunal under section 6 of the Services Tribunal Act, is maintainable on behalf of the Corporation.
5. ' Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the appeal having been abated by operation of law will not wash out the decree in favour of the respondent. He further contended that the decree in favour of the respondent would be deemed to be past and closed transaction.
6. He further contended that in the proviso to new section 3-F as well as the proviso to section 6 of the Act the term "a party" has been used and not a civil servant. The term "a party" is of much significance and the same embraces both Corporation and the employee only to provide relief to the affected party by abatement, irrespective of the position i,e, "the Corporation" or "the employee". He further contended that the learned Additional District Judge has rightly concluded that the appeal stands abated. He further submitted that the revision has no merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.
7. ' Before reverting to the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant provisions of enacted new sections 3-E and 3-F and section 6 of the Act, which run thus:-- "(3-E) Employee of a Corporation to be deemed Civil Servnats:--- Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, service of Corporation is hereby declared to be the service of the Province and every person holding a post in the Corporation, not being a person who is on deputation to the corporation shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be a civil servant.
8. (3-F)Abatement of pending cases of an employee of the Corporation.--All suits, appeals or applications relating to the terms and conditions of service of a person holding a post in a Corporation pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the Sindh Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1994 shall abate.
9. Provided that a party to such suit, appeal or application may within ninety days of the commencement of the Amending Act prefer an appeal to the. Tribunal established under section 3."
6. Abatement of suits and other proceedings:----All suits, appeals or applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the law as may be enacted by the Parliament, extending clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to a Tribunal shall abate on the commencement of such law:-- ' Provided that a party to such a suit, appeal or application may, within ninety days of the commencement of such law, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Tribunal in respect of any such matter which is in issue in such suit, appeal or application."
10. (Note: Sindh Services Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (No,XXXI of 1994 was gazetted on 16-1-1995)
11. ' In the instant case, the appeal stands abated by operation of the law on the date when the amending Act was gazetted i,e, 16-1-1995. The appeal filed by the appellant was pending. No doubt, an appeal is continuity of the proceedings of the suit and on filing of an appeal the entire matter reopens and sub judice and has to be decided in accordance with law. The abatement terminates the proceedings without adjudication and final determination of rights of the parties. In the present case, by virtue of the Amending Act, 1994, the appeal abates without determination or adjudication of the rights of parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the suit will also abate is not a correct approach. The effect of decree will not be extinguished by virtue of filing of an appeal or its abatement.
12. ' On plain reading of the provisions to new section 3-F and section 6 of the Act, it would be clear that the relevant provisions do not leave any aggrieved party to remedyless on abatement of the proceedings. In the above provisions, the terms "a party" has been used, which term embraces an aggrieved party, who he may be, if the appeal filed by the Corporation stands abated by operation of law then the Corporation will be deemed to be an aggrieved party. Likewise, if appeal filed by the employee abates, he would be the aggrieved party. The right of appeal to Tribunal automatically accrues contemporaneously at the time when the abatement takes place.
13. ' In such-like situation, the underlined principles are well settled that when a statute is extended to a territory or a class of persons, who were originally not covered by it, regarding those territories and persons by amending Act, then the date of commencement given in the original statute is C synchronized with the date on which the said statute is extended to new territories and persons. In the present case Act XV of 1973, was enacted on 29-8-1974. The Sindh Services Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1994, was gazetted on 16-1-1995, therefore, the original Act (Sindh Services Tribunal Act) wouid apply mutatis mutandis to the Corporation employees on or after 16-1-1995 and the appeal filed by the applicant abated on the said date.
14. ' The case of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Industries Karachi v. S.M. Nafisul Hasan Shah PLD 1979 Karachi 117 can be referred to support the contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant that the Corporation has no right of appeal but the view expressed by the learned Single Judge was not approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v.
15. Muhammad Siddiq (PLD 1981 SC 249) in the words of Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah, who wrote for the Full Bench as follows:-- "It is not possible, we regret, to uphold the view taken by a learned Single Judge in the High Court in the case of S.M. Nafisul Hasan Shah to the effect that an appeal filed by the Government is not at all entertainable under the Act. It is true that in the proviso to section 6 of the Ordinance which preceded the Act, it was specified that a civil servant who was a party to suit, appeal or application which abated under the purview of section 6 could prefer an appeal to the appropriate Tribunal.
16. But in the Act itself a change was brought about in the language of the proviso. The phrase 'any civil servant who is a party to such a suit' was substituted by the phrase 'any party to such a suit'.
17. The Act was promulgated on the 29th September, 1973 while the appeal before the Service Tribunal in the said case was filed on to 24th of October, 1974. If this change would have been brought to the notice of the High Court, the observation that the Service. Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear appeal or to entertain any proceeding 'of any kind whatsoever at the instance of the Government', would not have been made."
18. ' Contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the suit also stands abated and the Corporation has no right of appeal is not based on the correct approach of law. The case of Federation of Pakistan (supra) can be referred wherein numerous appeals were disposed of by categorising in three categories (i) Civil Appeals Nos,49 and 50 of 1997 filed by WAPDA, (ii) Appeal No,55 of 1977 filed by civil servant, (iii) the remaining appeals filed by the Government, as common point relating to the interpretation of various provisions of the Services Tribunal Act was involved (similar to the provisions of Sindh Services Tribunal Act) and in particular the proviso relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain appeals after abatement of proceedings, which were pending in different Courts under ordinary law. The facts of WAPDA's case were similar to the facts of the present case. WAPDA after withdrawal of appeal from the Civil Court on account of application of the Service Tribunal Act, filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal, which was dismissed as incompetent on the assumption that the amending Ordinance having come into force on 30th September, 1975, appeals filed before the Tribunal could not be entertained because suits or appeals before the Civil Court out of which they arose were not pending at the time of the passing of the Act. The Appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merit, the relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:-- "As noted in the opening part of this judgment the Appeals Nos,49 and 50 fall into a separate category. Suits of WAPDA employees (respondents) were filed on 31st June, 1974. They were decreed on 30th of July, 1975. The WAPDA filed appeals, before the District Court which were withdrawn on 3rd February, 1976 the Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment)
19. Ordinance, 1975 came into force on 30th of September, 1975. It was declared that the service under the WAPDA would be the service of Pakistan (excepting few exclusions) for the purpose of the Act.
20. The service appeals filed by the WAPDA were dismissed by the Service Tribunal as incompetent on the assumption that the Amendment Ordinance having come into force on 30th of September, 1975, the appeals filed before the Tribunal could not be entertained because the suits or appeals before the Civil Courts out of which they arose were not pending at the time of the passing of the Act. In such-like situation the underlining principle appears to be that when a statute is extended to a territory or class of persons who were originally not covered by it, regarding those territories and persons when a new statute is enacted by reference to the original statute, the date of commencement given in the original statute is synchronized with the date on which the said statute is extended to the new territories and or persons. In these cases, the original statute, i,e, the Act was enacted on 29th September, 1973. The Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 whereby the Act was extended to the WAPDA employees came into force on 30th of September, 1975. Therefore, the Act would apply mutatis mutandis to the WAPDA employees on and after 30th of September, 1975. The civil appeals by the WAPDA filed before the District Court against the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge were pending before the District Court on 30th of September, 1975. Therefore, they abated on the said date. That being so, the WAPDA had the right to file appeals before the Tribunal under the proviso to section 6 of the Act. Of course, the said provision on account of natural barrier of time would apply mutatis mutandis, meaning thereby that the period of limitation would commence from the date of the abatement; namely 30th of September, 1975. The view of the Tribunal that the appeals were not competent because the matter was not pending before the original Court before the 29th September, 1973, was ex facie erroneous. The relevant date in these cases was the 30th of September, 1975 when the Act was extended to the employees of the WAPDA. These two appeals are accordingly allowed and the cases are remanded to the Service Tribunal for decision on merits."
21. This Court may interfere in the Revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Whereby the subordinate Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it or has acted in exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The applicant has failed to point out that the learned Additional District Judge has passed the impugned order in disregard of the above provisions to make out a case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court.
22. ' In view of the above discussion, no case has been made out for interference in the exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction. The revision application has no merit and the same is liable to be dismissed, which is accordingly dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.