' As a common law point is involved, by this judgment I propose to dispose of Writ Petitions Nos.
268/R, 147,R, 269/R, 270/R, 271/R, 212/R, 213/R, 214/R, 215/R, 216/R, 217/R, 218/R, 219/R, 220/R. And 221/R of 1977.
2. The facts in W. P. No, 268/R of 1977 are that the petitioner is a displaced person from Ambala. He filed claim form for the land abandoned by him, which was verified and his entitlement worked out assigning the Banjar land 83 P. I. Us. Per acre. However, it was later discovered that the Banjar land should have been calculated at the rate of 32 P. I. Us. Per acre. His entitlement was, therefore, reduced by 263 P. I. Us. The allotment against these units was ordered to be withdrawn. He filed Writ Petition No, 32/R of 1961 questioning the reduction in the produce value of the Banjar land but the writ petition was dismissed. L. P. A. Against the order of the learned Single Judge was similarly dismissed on 28-10-1974. The determination of the excess land by the Settlement authorities against 263 P. I. Us. Became final. On the promulgation of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, a letter in pursuance of proviso to section 3 of the Ordinance was issued. It was decided that all un-allotted rural agricultural evacuee land shall be offered for sale to the persons, who have been in actual cultivating possession thereof for a period of at least four harvests immediately preceding Kharif 1973 up to the extent of subsisting holding within the meaning of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 i,e, 12/i acres, unit in case any other land is held by such occupant on the basis of an independent right, such holding shall be taken into account for determining the maximum limit. It was further decided that the price of the land shall be determined at the rate of Rs, 10 per P. L U. Of the land to be purchased. The petitioner, it is stated, had already applied for the purchase of the excess land on 8-2-1974. The matter was not finalised by the authorities until 1975. Vide Memo. No, 3804-75/ 1206-R(L), dated 27-5-1975 the matter as to the disposal of all unallotted land was reconsidered and it was decided that "the land will 'henceforth' be disposed of at the rate of Rs, 100 per P. I U. Instead of Rs, 10 P. I. U. As decided by letter No, 915-Po1/74, dated 20-11-1974. Under the first letter the occupants were required to exercise their option by 31-12-1974. However the time was extended for exercising the option by such occupants up to 30-11-1976 vide Letter No, 57 P.M. 76/1073 R(L). While extending the time limit it was re-asserted that the price of the land shall be determined at the rate of Rs, 100 per P. I. U. As decided in the circular dated 27-5-1975. The petitioner's case was ultimately disposed of by the Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha and the petitioner was permitted to purchase the excess land to the extent of 263 P. I. Us. At the rate of Rs, 100 per P. I. U.
The petitioner has challenged the order dated 13-12-1976 in this petition.
3. The facts in the other connected writ petitions are similar to the facts in Writ Petition No, 268/R of 1977 except that the number of P. I. Us. Involved in each case is different.
4. It will, therefore, be seen that the question that will arise for decision in all these cases will be whether the petitioners are entitled to purchase the excess land at the rate of Rs, 10 per P. I. U. As decided by the first letter dated 20-11-1974 or that they should be charged at the rate of Rs, 100 per P. I. U. On the basis of the decision taken vide letter dated 27-5-1975. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that the petitioners had applied exercising their option before 31-12-1974 as provided in the first letter dated 20.11-1974 and through no fault of theirs if the cases are not finalised by the competent authority till such time the second letter dated 27-5-1975 was issued enhancing the price from Rs, 10 to Rs, 100 per P. I. U. They are entitled to the benefit under the first letter. He has referred to Mian Irshad Ali v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Islamabad and others (1). However the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has frankly conceded that the persons, who had not exercised their option before the issuance of the second letter dated 27-5-1975 cannot claim benefit of the first letter. The learned Advocate appearing for the Department has, however, argued that the right to purchase the excess land at a particular rate is not a vested right and, therefore, if for any reason, the cases could not be finalised before the second letter dated 27-5-1975 was issued by which the price was enhanced from Rs, 10 to Rs, 100 per P. I. U. The occupant shall have to pay the price at the revised rate.
5. The Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance XV of 1974 was promulgated on 30-9-1974. It was later replaced by Act XIV of 1975. "Section 3 of this Ordinance lays down that all properties, both urban and rural, including agricultural land, whether occupied or unoccupied, which may be available for disposal immediately before the repeal of the aforesaid Acts or Regulations, shall stand transferred to the Provincial Government, on payment of such price as may be fixed by it, for disposal (a) in the case of urban properties by Provincial Government under a Scheme to be prepared by it in this behalf and (b) in the case of rural properties, by the Board of Revenue of the Province under a Scheme to be prepared by the Provincial Government in this behalf ; provided that the agricultural land occupied by any person continuously for four harvests immediately preceding Kharif 1973 shall first be offered for sale to such persons unless an order of ejectment has been passed against him in respect of that land, provided further that only so much land shall be offered to such persons as does not together with land already held by him exceed a subsistence holding within the meaning of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972.
6. It is thus clear that a statutory right to purchase the land had accrued to such person, who were in occupation of the available land and the land sought to be purchased together with land already held by them did not exceed a subsistence holding within the meaning of Land Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The first letter dated 20-11-1974 was issued in pursuance (1) PLD 1975 Lah. 7 of proviso to section 3 of the Ordinance. According to sub-paragraph (ii) the occupants were required to submit their option by 31-12-1974. Under paragraph (iii) it is provided that the sale price shall be determined and payable at the rate of Rs, 10 per P. I. U. Of the land to be purchased. It was lastly provided that the work with regard to the disposal of occupied land should be completed by 31-3-1975. It may be noted that in all the cases the petitioner, admittedly applied before 31-12-1974 and their cases were not finalised for one reason or the other. The decision to revise the rate at which the land occupied were to be sold was taken in May 1975. This decision was communicated to all concerned vide Memo. No, 3804-75/ 1206/R(L), dated 27-5-1975. It provided that the matter has been reconsidered by the Government and it has been decided that the disposal o all un- allotted available land will henceforth be at the rate of Rs, 100 per P. I. U. Instead of Rs, 10 per P. I. U.
As communicated by office circular Memo. No, 915-Po1/74, dated 20-11-1974. Immediately thereafter the date to exercise option was extended up to 31-5-1976. (I have gathered A this date from another Memo. No, 57-PM-76/1073-R(L), dated 14-7-1976 by which the date was further extended upto 30.11-1976). There does not appear to be any intention on the part of the Government to apply the revised rates to cases, which were pending disposal and in which the options had been exercised before 31-12-1974. The words "henceforth" are very significant. The date for exercise of option was also extended. It is therefore, quite clear that this letter was intended to apply to those persons, who did not exercise their options earlier but had to exercise their options after the date i,e, 27-5-1975. Even if it be assumed that by this letter it was intended that it will apply to all the pending cases, I am not prepared to agree with the learned counsel appearing for the Department, that as the right to purchase the land at a particular price is not a vested right, the same cannot be enforced by a constitutional petition. The person occupying the lands whose holding was less than the subsistence holding has an absolute right to purchase. The Board of Revenue was left only with framing the policy to enforce this right. This policy was thus framed under the letter dated 20-11-1974. The person purchasing the land was to pay at the rate of Rs, 10 per P. I. U. The decision was also taken that the case had to be finalised before 31-3-1975. If through no fault of the applicants and on account of the inaction on the part of the authorities the cases were not concluded by the stipulated date, they cannot be penalised. They were to be dealt with in the same manner as large number of such persons whose cases had been finalised before the revised rates were enforced by letter dated 27-5-1975. In this regard I can refer PLD 1975 Lah. 7 with advantage. Under supplementary scheme certain rights to retain the temporary urban allotments were given to a rural claimant. However this right was later withdrawn. The question, therefore, raised in this case was if the person, who had applied for retaining the temporary urban allotment would be entitled to the benefit of the letter giving such concession, the later having been withdrawn before such allotment was. Made. A Division Bench of this Court dealing with this point has observed thus :- "The question that falls for determination is whether the petitioner had acquired any right under the second proviso, and if so whether he could enforce the same through writ jurisdiction. The further question that arises is as to what is the effect of inertia on the part of the Central Government or the Chief Settlement Commissioner in not taking a decision on the application of the petitioner before the change in policy. The term 'right' has been the subject of debate before the various superior Courts of the country exercising writ jurisdiction. The trend of authority now is that the word 'right' for the enforcement whereof the Court will come to the rescue of the aggrieved person, is not in the jurisdic sense. In Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another PLD 1969 SC 233 at p. 231 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held : ' the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding of this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict jurisdic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal advantage or the curtailment of a privilege or liberty or franchise".
' The ratio decidendi of Mian Rafi ud-Din and 6 others v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 2 others in no manner militates against Mian Irshad Ali's contention. Here the Government did realise the hardship of Mian Irshad Ali and granted him the privilege of the second proviso. The assertion of the right had been accepted and thus it became a complete and accrued right. On that view of the matter it can be safely held that when Mian Irshad Ali put in his application alongwith other persons so situated, he was entitled to consideration of his case justly, fairly and equitably, as laid down in Montgomery Flour & General Mills Limited v. Director, Food Purchases PLD 1957 Lah.
914. The principle enunciated in this case has been approved of and applied in Ikram Bus Service v.
Board of Revenue PLD 1963 SC 564 with following observations :- "Even an administrative body such as an R. T. A. Is under Legal obligation to deal with all applications before it fairly, justly and equitably and an applicant has a legal right to demand that the administrative body should determine the matter with whose decision it is charged, in accordance with the law.
' Extending the same principle, it can be said that if Mian Irshad Ali had applied within time in accordance with law for grant of benefit which had been declared by the Central Government to be available to all claimants of the type it cannot be urged with success that because his application had not been placed before the Central Government till such time the benefit had been withdrawn, Mian Irshad Ali was precluded from pressing his claim before the Central Government on the ground that it was not his fault that his case was forwarded to the Central Government for appropriate orders. The Central Government when approached, did recognise its omission and taking cognizance thereof proceeded to rectify the wrong done to the petitioner and gave him relief by issuing orders in the months of February and April 1965. The Central Government, if it has the power to approve of the schemes to be promulgated by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and has further the power to amend, modify, vary or cancel the scheme so recommended by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, it is not denuded of power to extend the benefit to a person whose application had remained lying with the Chief Settlement Commissioner for no fault of his. The prejudice that may be caused to rights accrued because of repeal of a statute has been kept in view while enacting the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
It is the principle of equity that has been placed on the statute book and we see no reason why the same principle be not extended to cases of hardship when the policy of the Government is changed and the benefit, which could definitely be extended to particular citizen, has not been given to him because of no remiss on his part."
7. I. Therefore, have come to a conclusion that the Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Settlement Commissioner was not justified in allowing the petitioners to purchase the excess land on the revised rate of Rs, 100 per P. I. U. I therefore, declare that part of the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner/Assistant Commissioner to be without lawful authority by which each of the petitioners has been permitted to purchase land at the rate of Rs, 100 per P. I. U. The price charged will be at the rate of Rs, 10 per P. I. U. As determined under letter dated 20-11-1974. There will be order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.