' S.A. RABBANI, J.---Messrs United Bank Ltd., respondent No,1, filed Suit No,215 of 1994 in the Banking Tribunal No,II at Karachi against present respondents Nos.2 and 3 and others for recovery of loan.
Petitioners were not, originally, a party to the suit, but later on, through an application under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C., they were joined as defendant.
2. Messrs United Bank Ltd., plaintiff in the suit, then filed an application under Order XXXVIII, Rule 5, C.P.C. Before the Tribunal for attachment before judgment of the properties of the present petitioner and for attachment of securities lying with the State Bank of Pakistan. The Tribunal allowed the application vide its order, dated 22nd February, 1997 and attached the properties/securities. This Order of the Tribunal has been called in question by way of the present petition.
3. This is the pith of the matter, but the petitioner made the following verbose prayer:-- ' The petitioner prays that this Honourable Court be pleased to--
(a) Declare that the impugned order dated 22-2-1997 was passed by respondent No,4 when he had ceased to function as Presiding Officer or link Judge of Banking Tribunal No,II Karachi since the Ordinance No, XXV of 1997 called Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finance) Ordinance, 1997 was promulgated on 4-2-1997. Thus, the Order was void and passed without lawful authority. _
(b) Declare the claim of respondent/plaintiff in the said, suit was for over Rs,230 million and because of the said Ordinance No,XXV of 1997 w,e,f, 4-2-1997 only the High Court of Sindh at Karachi would have jurisdiction to try the said suit as it involved a claim of over Rs,10 million, the claim being in excess of Rs,230 million.
(c) Declare the impugned order is wrongful when it states at page 3 that the petitioner/defendant No,9 has taken over the assets and liabilities of Messrs Azmat Bangladesh (Pvt.) Limited. In any case Messrs Azmat Bangladesh (Pvt.) Limited was not a party to the said suit at Karachi and the petitioner's head office at Dhaka was also not a party in the said suit at Karachi.
(d) Declare the petitioner Bank branch at Karachi is a separates legal entity as compared to its head office at Dhaka.
(e) Declare the under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. Application of respondent No,2/defendant No,1 was granted without notice to the petitioner and the petitioner was ordered to be made a party vide order dated 2-12-1996 without giving an opportunity to the petitioner for hearing, and thus, the said order of 2-12-1996 is void and of no effect. The petitioner was neither a proper nor a necessary party in the said suit as the petitioner did not avail any finance from respondent No, 1/plaintiff and the petitioner was not a customer, beneficiary surety or indemnifier within the meaning of the then Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and was wrongfully made a party as defendant No,9 in the said snit.
(f) The provisions of Order 38, Rule 5, C.P.C., under which the application was made by respondent No,1 as against the petitioner/defendant No,9, were not attracted as the petitioner was not about to dispose of whole or any part of its properties nor abscond from the jurisdiction of the then Banking Tribunal No, II at Karachi.
(g) Declare that the impugned order dated 22-2-1997 is void and illegal for the reasons given in the para. Hereinabove with the heading Ground and the order was passed without having regard to the merits of the case the express provisions of Order 38, Rule 5, C.P.C., as well as, the then Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the Ordinance No,XXV of 1997 dated 4-2-1997.
(h) Direct the State Bank of Pakistan not to honour the impugned order of 22-2-1997 conveyed to State Bank of Pakistan on 24-2-1997 and if any action has been taken by S.B.P. Pursuant to the said illegal and void order, the position ante be restored."
4. Likewise, the learned counsel for the petitioner advanced lengthy arguments, but the material and relevant argument for the present purpose is that the Tribunal passed the impugned order on 22nd February, 1997 while the law, under which the Tribunal was established and was empowered, was repealed on 4th February, 1997, and thus, the order was without jurisdiction.
5. There is no dispute on the fact that the impugned order was passed by the Tribunal on 22nd February, 1997. The point to be determined, therefore, is whether the Tribunal had authority and jurisdiction on that date to pass such an order. Mr. Azizur Rehman produced Ordinance XXV of 1997 which was published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, dated February 4, 1997. This Ordinance, which was named as the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance, 1997 (XXV of 1997) had section 23 as a repealing clause, which is reproduced below:-- "23. Repeal.-- The Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (XIX of 1979) and Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984), are hereby repealed."
6. Mr. Ansari, learned counsel for the respondents Nos.2 and 3 concedes that the impugned order was without jurisdiction.
7. Mr. Moinddin Ahmed, learned counsel for he respondent No, I, submitted that these two Ordinance were actually repealed on 2nd June, 1997 by section 28 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (Act XV of 1997). This Act was published in the Gazette on 2nd June, 1997.
8. Both of these Laws viz Ordinance XXV of 1997 and Act XV of 1997 have almost the same long title and it mentions that object of both the laws was:-- "to repeal and with certain modifications to consolidate and re-enact the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (XIX of 1979) and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984)."
9. The two laws viz: Ordinance XXV of 1997 and Act XV of 1997 were promulgated on different dates and the question is as to which of them actually repealed the said Ordinances issued in 1979 and 1984. Ordinance XXV of 1997 was promulgated on February, 4, 1997 and by virtue of Article 89(2) of the Constitution, it was to expire on 3rd June, 1997. Under the same Constitutional provision, the Ordinance was to be laid before the Houses of Parliament. On its laying before the National Assembly, the Ordinance would be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the National Assembly, under clause (3) of Article 89 of the Constitution. Since it was this Ordinance that was treated as the Bill introduced, which was finalised in enactment of the Act XV of 1997, the Act carried the same repealing clause in section 28, with the addition of repeal of this Ordinance itself. All this would have been done as a routine, otherwise the repeal clause in the Act XV of 1997 was not at all required, because both the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 already stood repealed on 4th February, 1997 on promulgation of Ordinance XXV of 1997, and this Ordinance itself was to expire on 3rd June, 1997 i,e, the next day of the commencement of Act XV of 1997. The repetition of the repeal clause created the confusion.
10. It may be specifically pointed out that the repeal of a law, or expiry of an Ordinance, does not revive what such a law had deleted or repealed. Analogy is on the reality that once one is killed, in whatever manner, the death of the killer shall not resuscitate him. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as Article 264 of the Constitution give the law on this point. Both are almost identical provisions. Under Article 89 of the Constitution, an Ordinance stands repealed on expiry of four .Months, and Article 264(a) of the Constitution provides that where a law is repealed, or is deemed to have been repealed, by , under, or by virtue of the Constitution, the repeal shall not, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect.
11. By virtue of this Constitutional provision, the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 stood unrevivably repealed with the promulgation of Ordinance XXV of 1997 i,e, On February 4, 1997. Those Ordinances had created the Tribunal and conferred jurisdiction on it. The Tribunal, as well as the jurisdiction, did not exist on 22nd February, 1997 when the impugned Order was passed. The petition is, therefore, allowed to the extent of the declaration that the impugned order passed by the Banking Tribunal No,II at Karachi, on 22-2-1997 was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. No order as to costs.