1. ' The first rent appeal has been filed against the order, dated 12-10-1996 of the 8th Rent Controller, Karachi (South) in Rent Application No,1773 of 1989, whereby he ordered the ejectment of the appellants/opponents and directed them to hand over vacant possession of the case premises to the respondents/applicants within sixty days from the date of the order.
2. ' The brief facts leading to filing of this appeal are that respondent No, 1/applicant, who claimed himself to be the owner/landlord of shop bearing No,125 in Saddar Cooperative Market Limited, Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi (hereinafter referred to as the premises in dispute), let out the same to appellant No,1 on a monthly rent of Rs,350 vide an agreement of tenancy, dated 16-11-1971.
3. A sum of Rs,4,000 was deposited by the appellant No,1 with the respondents by way of advance deposit, refundable at the time of vacation of the premises in dispute. The aforesaid agreement of tenancy was renewed vide agreement, dated 19-8-1978. Respondent No,1/applicant in his ejectment application stated that appellant No,1 was a persistent defaulter as he never paid rent in time in accordance with the terms of the agreement and w,e,f, February, 1989 stopped the payment of rent and had fallen in arrears thereof. Respondent No,1/applicant further stated that the premises in dispute was required by him in good faith for carrying on handicraft business therein, as he and his children, who were jobless, had sufficient experience of handicraft business.
4. Respondent No,1/applicant also stated that appellant No,1/opponent No,1 had sub-let the premises in dispute to appellant No,2 and respondent No,2 (opponents Nos.2 and 3) without his permission.
5. Both the appellants filed their written statements, wherein' they admitted the existence of relationship of landlord and tenants between themselves and respondent No,1, but denied the claim of respondent No,1/applicant of being the owner of the premises. Both the appellants submitted that as per agreement, dated 10-8-1978, appellant No,1/opponent No,1 was permitted or was granted the right to sub-let the premises in dispute to any other person to whom he agreed to accept him as his permanent tenant in place of appellant No,1/opponent No,l. It was further submitted that a sum of Rs,50,000 was paid by appellant No,1/opponent No,1 to respondent No,1/applicant after receiving which, he surrendered his right to eject the opponent on any ground and also gave him the right to sublet the premises in dispute. With regard to the default in payment of rent, appellant No,1/opponent No,1 submitted that he had been paying the rent of the premises in dispute regularly but respondent No,1/applicant never issued receipts in proper time.
6. He further submitted that the rent for April, 1989 was refused to be accepted by respondent No,1/applicant on which he started depositing the same in M.R.C. No,744 of 1989. He denied to have sub-let the premises in dispute to appellant No,2 and respondent No,2 (opponents Nos.2 and 3) and submitted that appellant No,2/opponent No,2 was his attorney and manager and used to look after the business in his absence. He also denied the averments of respondent No,1/applicant that the premises in dispute was required by him bona fide and in good 'faith for starting handicraft business and submitted that the children of respondent No, 1/applicant did not have any experience in handicraft business and he wanted to eject him with mala fide and dishonest intention.
7. ' No written statement/reply was filed by respondent No,2/appellant No,3 and the ejectment case/rent case was ordered to proceed ex parte against him.
8. ' On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the opponent No,1 is defaulter in payment of rent w,e,f, February, 1989?
(2) Whether the opponent No,1 has sub-let the case premises to opponents Nos.2 and 3?
(3) Whether the case premises are required by the applicant for his personal bona fide use and for the use of his children?
(4) What should the order be?
9. ' Before the Rent Controller; respondent No,1/applicant, to prove his case, filed his own affidavit-in- evidence and also examined two witnesses on his behalf namely, Muhammad Nawab Khan and his son Muhammad Muhammad Jalaluddin, both of whom filed their affidavits-in-evidence. They were duly cross-examined on behalf of appellants/opponents Nos.1 and 2. Both the appellants filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence as well as of their witness Akhtar Hussain and were duly cross-examined on behalf of respondent No,1/applicant. The aforesaid parties had also brought on record several documents in support of their respective case. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the Rent Controller decided the aforesaid issues as under:-- "Issue No.1 In the affirmative.
10. Issue No.2 In the affirmative.
11. Issue No.3 In the affirmative.
12. Issue No.4 In view of the findings on issues Nos.1 and 3, the Rent Controller ordered ejectment of the appellants and respondent No,3 from the premises in dispute."
13. ' I would first deal with the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the appellants to the effect that the tenancy in question was in perpetuity and respondent No,1 had surrendered his right to seek ejectment of the appellants. Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from the perusal of the rent agreements in dispute, it is crystal clear that respondent No, 1 /applicant had agreed to let out the premises in dispute to appellant No,1 in perpetuity and had surrendered his right of evicting appellant No,1 from the premises in dispute as such, the ejectment application/rent case filed by him for seeking ejectment of appellants/respondent No,2 from the premises in dispute was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone, with regard to this preliminary objection. It is to be noted that this was neither raised before the Rent Controller or if raised, was not pressed before him, which is evident from the fact that the Rent Controller had not framed any issue with regard to the forfeiture/surrender of the right by respondent No,1 to eject the appellants on any of the grounds available to a landlord under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance. As this question/issue had not been raised or considered before the Rent Controller, the same cannot be allowed to be raised in the appeal. Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui in support of his above contention, referred me to the case of:--
(1) Mst. Zehra Begum v. Pakistan Burma Shell Ltd. PLD 1984 SC 38,
(2) Muhammad Rizwan v. Mst. Naimat Bai 1991 CLC 156, and
(3) Muhammad Hanif v. Mumtaz Ahmed PLD 1986 Kar.
14. 16.
15. ' I have gone through the aforecited three cases and find that only the case of Mst. Zehra Begum v.
16. Pakistan Burma Shell Limited PLD 1984 SC 38 is relevant for the purpose of the issue in dispute.
17. However, before the appellants/opponents Nos.2 and 3 can take the benefit of the pronouncement made in the aforecited case, it is pertinent to note that an agreement providing no period of tenancy and suggesting the same to be in perpetuity ought to have been executed on the stamp paper of the required denomination and should have been registered as every agreement purporting to transfer lease hold rights in immovable property for a period exceeding 11 months requires payment of a particular stamp duty as well as registration, which is evidence from the observations made in the case of Mst. Zehra Begum v. Pakistan Burma Shell Limited PLD 1984 SC 38.
18. In this connection, reference may also be made here to the case of Mustafa Hussain Siddiqui v.
19. Malik Islam Akbar 1984 CLC 2869, which was relied upon by Mr. Muhammad Akram Zuberi, learned counsel for respondent No,1 in support of his contention that an agreement of lease executed on a stamp paper of Rs,10 or Rs,4 which was also not registered could not create tenancy in perpetuity or without any fixed period of time and could, at best, be treated as an agreement of lease for a period of less than one year. It is to be observed that the two rent agreements on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui in support of his contention that the tenancy in question was a perpetual tenancy or a tenancy for no fixed period, were on non judicial stamp papers of Rs,10 and Rs,4 and were also not registered with the result that the aforesaid two agreements of tenancy would not give rise to creation of tenancy for no fixed period or in perpetuity. The pronouncements relied upon by Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui in the cases of Muhammad Rizwan v. Naimat Bai 1991 CLC Note 2 at p.156 and Muhammad Hanif v. Mumtaz Ahmed PLD 1986 Kar. 16 do not refer to the creation of tenancy for no fixed period or in perpetuity and are of no help to the case of the appellants in so far as this issue is concerned. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is to be concluded that tenancy in question was not for unspecified period of time or in perpetuity and by execution of the two agreements of tenancy, respondent No, 1/applicant did not forego or surrender his right to seek ejectment of the appellants from the premises in dispute.
20. Regarding the contention that the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to proceed with the rent case had been taken away on the ground that appellant No,1 had paid a huge sum of Rs,50,000 to respondent No,1 by way of Pugree in addition to the payment of monthly rent, it may be observed that the same is devoid of any force inasmuch as mere fact that tenant had paid a specified amount in addition to rent would not take away the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in a case in which relationship of landlord and tenant was not denied as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of M.K. Muhammad v. Muhammad Abu Bakar 1993 SCM R 200. In the case in hand, both the appellants/opponents contested the rent case wherein they admitted respondent No,1 to be the landlord of the premises in dispute which admission amounted to establishment of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the aforesaid parties.
21. ' With regard to the question of default in payment of rent, appellant No,1 submitted that rent for the premises in dispute had been paid by him till March, 1989 whereafter respondent No,1 refused to accept the rent for the month of April, 1989 and the rent tendered through money order was refused to be accepted leaving him with no other alternative but to start depositing the rent in Miscellaneous Rent Case No,744 of 1989. It was further submitted that respondent No,1 did not issue receipts of rent for the months of February and March, 1989. Respondent No,1 on the other hand, categorically stated on oath that appellant No,1 committed default in the payment of rent w,e,f, February, 1989, therefore, burden of proving that rent for the months of February and March, 1989 had been paid by appellant No,1 to respondent No,1/landlord was on appellant No,1, which he had failed to discharge as he failed to bring any material to prove or substantiate his claim that the rent was paid by him but receipts thereof were not issued. With regard to the payment of rent for the month of April, 1989, the case of appellant No,1 is that respondent No,1/landlord refused to accept the same when it was tendered to him personally as well as when remitted by means of money order and the same was started to be deposited in Court. However, appellant No,1/tenant did not bring on record any evidence to establish that the rent for the month of April, 1989 was tendered to respondent No,1/landlord and the same was refused to be accepted by him. Regarding the tender of rent by way of money order, a photostat copy of money order coupon dated 11-4- 1989 was produced by Ajaz Ahmed son of Hafeez Ansar Ahmed, attorney of appellant No,1 in the trial Court as Exh.O/3, addressed to respondent No,1 purporting to be from MRs, Inam Ahmed, wife of appellant No, 1/tenant. My attention was drawn to the contents thereof according to which rent for the months of February and March, 1989 was paid/sent through one Ismail but in spite of repeated requests receipts were not issued. According to the said contents rent forthe month of April, 1989 amounting to Rs,450 was being remitted by way of money order and request was made for issuing receipts for the months of February, March and April, 1989. The aforesaid money order coupon is of no assistance to the appellants. In the first place the money order coupon does not bear any endorsement or report from the Postal Authority/Postman that addressee appellant No,1 was approached by him for handing over the sum of Rs,450 and that he refused to accept the same. Secondly, it is to be observed that the money order was not sent by appellant No,1 tenant but his wife who admittedly was not the tenant of the shop in dispute and no evidence was brought on record to establish that she has been authorized to tender rent by way of money order on behalf of appellant No, 1 . In the circumstances there is no evidence on record to establish that the rent for the month of April, 1989 was remitted to respondent No,1 by way of money order and he refused to accept the same. The said money order coupon also is of no assistance in establishing the payment of rent for the months of February and March, 1989.
22. ' Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, relying on the cases reported in (i) 1984 CLC 2637 and (ii) 1994 CLC 1866, objected to the maintainability of the rent case and submitted that the shop in dispute belonged to the Government and was allotted to respondent No,1, who had let out the same to appellant No, 1 . He further submitted that respondent No,1 was entitled to recover the rent but could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller for ejectment of the tenant. This issue was neither raised by appellant No,1 in the reply statement filed by him nor was raised before the Rent Controller. The issue requires determination of factual question relating to the status of Saddar Cooperative Market as to whether the same is a Government property or is owned and managed by a Cooperative Society. Mr Akram Zuberi, on the other hand submitted that the objection raised on behalf of appellant No,1 was absolutely without any substance and did not merit any consideration in view of the fact that ejectment cases filed by the other allottees/lessees of the shops in the Saddar Cooperative market went up to the Supreme Court and the orders of the Rent Controller ordering ejectment of the tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent were upheld at the stage of the Supreme Court. Mr. Akram Zuberi, in support of his above contention placed reliance on the cases of (i) Mukhtar Ahmed v. S.M.A. Naqvi reported in 1992 SCM R 1144, (ii) Noor Ahmed and others v. Khawaja Imran Ahmed, reported in 1992 SCM R 1152, and (iii) Muhammad Shafie Chaudhry v. Saeed Ahmed reported in 1996 SCM R 1784.
23. ' Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui next submitted that the finding of the Rent Controller in holding appellant No,1 to be a defaulter is absolutely illegal and cannot be sustained in view of the categorical statement made by appellant No,1 of making payment of a sum of Rs,50,000 to respondent No,1 by way of Pugree. He further, submitted that the Rent Controller completely failed to take into consideration this aspect of the case and submitted that where a tenant had paid a specified amount by way of Pugree in addition to the payment of rent, then he could not be held to be a defaulter and could not be ordered to be evicted from the premises in dispute in view of the pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in the case of M.K. Muhammad v. Muhammad Abu Bakar 1993 SCM R 200 that a tenant could not be held to be a defaulter in rent where it was established that the landlord received an extra sum which he was not entitled to receive and which would have been sufficient to cover up the arrears of rent for the period of default. I am in full agreement with the observations/pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in the aforecited case. However, the pronouncements made above would have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case in view of the fact that appellant No,1 failed to bring on record evidence to establish beyond any doubt that a sum of Rs,50,000 was paid by him by way of Pugree to respondent No, 1/landlord. It transpires that at the time of proceedings, the appellants did not press the question with regard to payment of Pugree of Rs,50,000 as is evident from the fact that no issue to this effect was framed by the Rent Controller. In the circumstances, it cannot be held with certainty that respondent No,1 had received an extra amount over and above the monthly rent so that it could be applied or adjusted against the arrears of rent for the period of default.
24. ' In view of the above reasoning, I have not the least doubt in my mind that appellant No,1 had committed wilfull default in payment of rent w,e,f, February, 1989 and rendered himself liable to ejectment.
25. ' Regarding the issue relating to sub-letting of the premises in dispute by appellant No,1 to appellant No,2 and respondent No,2, the Rent Controller relied on the evidence of respondent No,1 and his witness Nawab Khan, both of whom categorically stated that appellant No,1 had sub-let the premises in dispute to appellant No,2/opponent No,2 and this fact was known to the majority of the allottees as well as Exh.2/A which is a visiting card under the name and style of Messrs Pakistan Handicraft Products run by Shaikh Ijaz Ahmed, appellant No,2 in the premises in dispute and came to the conclusion that the premises in dispute was sub-let to appellant No,2/opponent No,2 who was carrying on his own business in the shop in dispute under the name and style of "New Pak Handicrafts". For this conclusion the Rent Controller, however, observed that in accordance with the rent agreement, dated 16-8-1978 between appellant No,1 and respondent No,1 (Exh.A./17) appellant No,1 was given the right of sub-letting the premises in dispute by respondent No,1 to a person of his choice as per paragraph No,4 of the agreement (Exh.A./17). On the basis of the above, the Rent Controller held that notwithstanding the fact that the shop in dispute had been sub-let by appellant No,1 to appellant No,2, the same would not be a ground for ejectment of appellant No,1 as it was done in accordance with the permission given to him by respondent No, 1/landlord and such a subletting would not fall within the ambit of section 15(1)(2)(iii)(A) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance so as to give right to respondent No,1 to seek ejectment of appellant No,1 and/or any other subsequent person who had been put into possession of the shop in dispute. Mr. Akram Zuberi, learned counsel for respondent No,1, submitted that a right which has been conferred on a person by a statute could not be abridged, curtailed or surrendered by the said person on the basis of an agreement with another person. He further submitted that Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, has provided a statutory right to the landlord to eject his tenant on any of the grounds enumerated in section 15 of the Ordinance and such a right could not be surrendered or waived by means of a contract between the landlord and the tenant. Elaborating his arguments, he submitted that if it be admitted for the sake of arguments that respondent No,1 had surrendered or agreed to surrender his right of seeking ejectment of appellant No,1 on the ground of sub-letting of the premises in dispute by appellant No,1 to any other person, the right of respondent No,1 to eject appellant No,1 on the ground of sub-letting would still continue to be intact and it could not be said that respondent No,1 was stopped or barred from seeking ejectment of appellant No,1 on the ground of sub-letting as the parties could not contract out of law. Mr. Akram Zuberi in support of his above contention placed reliance on the case of Malik Islam Akbar v. Mustafa Hussain 1992 CLC 1753. He also placed reliance on the case of M.K. Muhammad v. Muhammad Abu Bakar 1991 M LD 801 in support of his contention that where the provisions of law permitted a landlord to eject the tenant on the ground specified in it which were not subject to any agreement then such would amount to conferment of statutory right and no one could contract out of it as no person could contract out of statute and assert a superior right over the provision of law and any agreement contrary to it would be void.
26. ' In view of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the case-law cited by them, I have not the slight hesitation in holding that the Rent Controller had erred in coming to the conclusion that the sub-letting of shop in dispute by appellant No,1 to appellant No,2 and respondent No,2, which fact he had held to have taken place, did not warrant ejectment of appellant No,2 or any other person holding possession as a sublessee as he wrongly concluded that respondent No,1 had permitted appellant No,1 to sub-let the shop in dispute to any person of his choice and thereby surrendered his right to eject appellant No,1 on this ground.
27. ' Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui submitted that the respondent No,1 could not challenge or dispute the above finding on this issue as he neither filed cross-appeal nor any cross-objections in Otis appeal. Mr. Akram Zuberi refuted the contention advanced by Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui and submitted that it was devoid of force in view of the fact that after filing of an appeal against the ultimate decision, entire matter stands reopened and must be decided according to the prevailing law. For the above, he placed reliance on the cases of:--
(1) Mst. Khursheed Begum and others v. Ahmed Bakhsh and others PLD 1985 SC 405 and
(2) The Province of East Pakistan v. Muhammad Hassan Mir PLD 1965 SC 1.
28. ' He further submitted that this appeal has been filed under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance which does, not provide for filing of cross-appeal or cross-objections as is required under Order 41 of the C.P.C. For the above, reliance may be placed on the cases of (i) Abdul Mehdi v. Mst. Abdul Hakim 1990 M LD 2182 and (ii) Abdul Haq and another v. Syed Basharat Ali 1985 CLC 1429. It may also be pointed out that finding of the Rent Controller on this issue was absolutely illegal, based on a wrong assumption which is contrary to the principle of law that respondent No,1 had surrendered or waived his statutory right of seeking ejectment of appellant No,1 on the ground of sub-letting, which does not find favour from the observations made in the case of M.K.
29. Muhammad v. Muhammad Abu Bakar 1991 M LD 801 that the parties could not contract out of statute and where the law permitted a landlord to eject the tenant on the grounds specified in the statute, then such grounds would always remain available to the landlord irrespective of any agreement envisaging surrender or waiver of such grounds by the landlord. I, therefore, set aside the finding of the Rent Controller and hold that the shop in dispute having been sub-let by appellant No,1 to appellant No,2 and respondent No,2, respondent No,1 had acquired the right to eject the appellants and respondent No,2 and/or any other person having been put into in possession by appellant No, 1 .
30. ' Regarding the issue of personal bona fide requirement of the shop in dispute, Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui submitted that ejectment of the tenant on this ground can be sought and obtained by the landlord only if he is also the owner of the premises in dispute, having the right to sell, transfer, dispose of and/or alienate the property in dispute in any manner he likes. He, however, submitted that in the present case, respondent No,1 is not an absolute owner of the premises in dispute and has no authority to dispose of, sell, transfer or alienate the property in dispute so as to confer ownership of proprietary right on the seller or the transferee and, therefore, he would not have the right to seek ejectment of the appellants and respondent No,2 from the premises in dispute on the ground that the same is required by him in good faith and reasonably for starting and carrying on the business alongwith his son. In support of his above proposition. Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddique placed reliance on the case of:-
(1) Muhammad Raees v. Imamuddin 1997 M LD 530 and
(2) Ejaz Khan v. Shahida Iqbal Qureshi 1994 CLC 932.
31. ' He concluded that in view of the above position of law, the Rent Controller had wrongly held that the premises in dispute was required by respondent No,1 for his personal use, in good faith, reasonably with bona fide intention. Mr. Akram Zuberi on the other hand, submitted that respondent No,2 is a lessee of the premises in dispute, which is owned by Saddar Cooperative Market Limited and for all purposes, he is virtually the owner of the premises in dispute and in this connection, he drew my attention to Exh.A./13, which is an agreement for perpetual lease of the shop entered into between the Cooperative Development Fund and Projects and respondent No,1 in 1963, whereby it was agreed that lease of the shop in dispute be granted in favour of respondent No,1 in perpetuity and for ever. He further submitted that in view of the above, there can be no dispute with regard to the fact that respondent No,1 is a lessee in perpetuity as per clause (i) of the aforesaid agreement and is to be equated with an owner as envisaged in section 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance. He further, submitted that the argument of Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui that for seeking ejectment of a tenant, the landlord should also be the owner of the premises in dispute is nowhere the requirement of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance and in this connection, he drew my attention to clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, wherein the word used is "landlord" and vehemently refuted the contention of Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui that the landlord should also be the owner of the premises in dispute.
32. However, in advancing the above arguments, Mr. Akram Zuberi seems to have lost sight of clause
(g) of section 2 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, which defines personal use to mean the use of the premises by the owner thereof. In the case of Muhammad Raees v. Imamuddin 1997 M LD 530, which has been relied upon by Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui in support of his contention that only an owner could apply for ejectment of a tenant on personal requirement, what has been held is that the landlord seeking ejectment bona fide for personal need would mean the owner of the premises other than a Rent Collector. In the present case, it has nowhere come on record that respondent No,1 was or is merely a Rent Collector.
33. ' He further submitted that as a matter of fact, there is material on record to establish that respondent No,1 was an allottee of the shop in dispute and by virtue of agreement dated 1963 (sic)
34. Exh.A./13 lease in perpetuity was to be granted in favour of respondent No,1 after making payment of a certain amount, a part of which has already been paid by him in favour of the lessor/Cooperative Development Fund and Projects and he would have the right to transfer, alienate and rent out the shop in dispute but would not have right to dispose of or sell the shop in dispute. This contention does not find favour in view of clause (2) of the afore-referred two agreements, which clearly stipulated that until all the instalments mentioned in clause (2) of the agreement were paid, the status of the respondent No,1 would be that of a licensee and he would not have the right to sub-let, transfer or assign his interest to any other person. In the circumstances, the very act of respondent No,1 in-letting out the shop in dispute to appellant No,1 was illegal and without lawful authority as it was in clear disregard of the provisions of an agreement whereby perpetual leasehold rights were to be created in his favour. The Courts would not grant legality or legitimacy to an illegal or void act and would undo the same for establishing the rule of law. In the present case, respondent No,1 admittedly not being the owner/proprietor of the shop may not be legally entitled to seek ejectment of the appellants or anybody else in occupations of the shop in dispute, but the appellants or anybody else in occupation of the shop in dispute also cannot be allowed to continue to be in possession or occupation of the shop in dispute as their occupation or possession would be absolutely illegal and unlawful in view of the fact that respondent No,1 had no authority to let out the shop in dispute to any person as he was neither the owner nor the landlord thereof. Thus, though respondent No,1 would not have the .Ground of reasonable and personal bona fide requirement available to him for ejectment of the appellants and respondent No,2 from the premises in dispute as he has failed to establish himself to be the owner thereof, but the appellants and respondent No,2 would have to be ejected from the premises in dispute as they are occupying/possessing the same illegally, unlawfully and against the provisions of the agreement dated 1963 (sic) (Exh.A./13) which prohibited an allotttee/respondent No,1 to transfer, alienate, dispose of or sell the same before acquiring leasehold rights in respect of the premises in dispute and in the absence of which he would not have the authority to legally let it out.
35. ' In view of the reasoning advanced above, the observations made by this Court in the case of Muhammad Raees v. Imamuddin 1997 M LD 530 and Ejaz Khan v. Shahida Iqbal Qureshi 1994 CLC 932 have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case and cannot be applied to it. In view of the above, I am of the view that the findings of the Rent Controller on this issue is to be upheld though on grounds different than what were advanced by the Rent Controller.
36. ' Upon the above discussion, I am satisfied that this appeal is without any substance and merits no consideration. Accordingly, it stands dismissed upholding the impugned order of the Rent Controller. The appellants, respondent No,2 or any other person in occupation of the premises in dispute either through respondent No,1 or through the aforesaid parties are directed to hand over vacant possession of the premises in dispute to respondent No,1 within sixty days from the date of this order.