KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, J.- Two real brothers, namely, Muhammad Sadiq and Haji Sardar A.I jointly owned some moveable and immovable property and were also jointly carrying on, inter alias, the business of manufacturing soap. According to the record before us the said Sardar All died on 5.7.1984 whereafter some disputes cropped up between the said Muhammad Sadiq on one side and some relatives and heirs of the above mentioned Sardar A.I on the other side, relating to the above-mentioned business and property.
2. The dispute which is the subject matter of the present proceedings before us relates to two plots bearing No. 206 and 207 in Block "A" of Nazimabad in Faisalabad City. These plots were originally owned by one Ikram-ul-Haq who was at the relevant time living in KENYA and who consequently executed a general power of attorney on 25.9.1961 in favour of his brother Neem-ul-Haq, to inter alia, deal with the said plots including the power granted to the said attorney to constitute some one else as an attorney to deal with the property of the said Ikram-ul-Haq including the said two plots. In exercise of the powers conferred on the said Naeemul-Haq by the said Ikram-ul-Haq, the said Naeem-ul-Haq, on 18.6.1962, executed a further power of attorney constituting his father Abdul Haq as attorney to deal with the property of the said Ikram-ul-Haq including the plots in question.
On 7.9.1967 this Abdul Haq who, as has been mentioned above, is the father of the above- mentioned Naeem-ul-Haq and Ikram-ul-Haq, as an attorney of the said Ikram-ul-Haq, entered into an agreement for the sale of the plots in question in favour of Muhammad Sadiq and Sardar A.I above mentioned through the said agreement of sale. This Abdul Haq admitted receipt of the entire sale price relating to the plots in question and further admitted having handed over possession of the said plots to the said Muhammad Sadiq and Sardar A.I. It may he mentioned here that Sadiq and Sardar then constructed a soap factory on the said two plots.
3. Disputes having arisen, as has been noticed above, between Muhammad Sadiq and the successors-in-interest of his late brother, namely, Sardar A.I, the parties agreed to have the said disputes resolved through arbitration and consequently Ch. Bashir Ahmad and Muhammad Umar Khan of Faisalabad were appointed as the Arbitrators to resolve these disputes.
4. Through an award dated 18.1.1990, the said arbitrators settled the issue of distribution of business and various properties between the said Muhammad Sadiq and the successors-in-interest of Sardar A.I and so far as the plots in question, namely, plots hearing No. 206 and 207 of Block ' A'
Nazimabad were concerned, they were settled to have fallen to the share of Muhammad Sadiq. On 7.2.1990 the said Muhammad Sadiq, his four sons and his wife made an application to the learned Senior Civil Judge at Faisalabad for making the said award dated 18.1.1990 as the rule of the Court impleading the heirs and the successors in interest of the said Sardar A.I as respondents to this petition. The said respondents submitted their reply to the said petition on 7.4.1990 and admitted the award in question as a result of which the said award was made the Rule of the Court through an order dated 17.5.1990 passed by a learned Civil Judge at Faisalabad.
5. Pursuant to this award which had become the Rule of the Court, the successors-in-interest of Sardar A.I even disposed of certain properties which had fallen to their share but allegedly for ulterior motives they started obstructing the transfer of the plots in question in the name of Muhammad Sadiq who then brought a civil suit on 28.9.1991 for the purpose but the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. The said Muhammad Sadiq then tiled a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale relating to the plots in question which was dismissed on 5.7.1995 on account of non-availability of evidence.
6. In the meantime, it came to the notice of the said Muhammad Sadiq that in complete disregard of the above mentioned award which had become the rule of the Court and to which all the heirs and successors-ininterest of Sardar A.I were a party and also in utter derogation of his own earlier stand before the Courts of law and otherwise, a son of above said Sardar A.I, namely, Abdul Rasheed manoeuvred to procure a fresh power of attorney from the original owner of the plots in question, namely, Ikramul-Haq who had, as has been noticed above, executed power of attorney in favour of his brother Naeem-ul-Haq inter alia with respect to the plots in question and which Naeem-ul-Haq had in turn executed a power of attorney in favour of their father, namely, Abdul Haq who had then entered into at. Agreement with Muhammad Sadiq and the father of the said Abdu. Rasheed, namely, Sardar A.I for the sale of these plots. The said Ahdu Rasheed on the strength of this power of attorney allegedly obtained fron Ikram-ul-Haq, transferred to the plots in question in favour of his owl brothers, namely, Abdul Hameed who was also a party to the above notice proceedings held in respect of all the joint property above mentioned including the two plots in question.
7. It is the claim of Muhammad Sadiq that he then made efforts to get a criminal case registered against the said Abdul Rasheed and others with respect to this alleged fraud, cheating and forgery by the said Abdur Rasheed and others and having failed in his efforts he finally approached this Court through Constitutional petition bearing W.P. No. 2807 of 1996 and it was in pursuance of this petition that ultimately an F.I.R. Bearing No. 110 of 1996 at Police Station Factory Area Faisalabad was registered against Abdur Rasheed and others for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 420/467/468 and 471 P.P.C.
8. While the investigation in pursuance of this F.I.R. Was still in progress, the said Abdul Rasheed and others tiled a Constitutional petition bearing W.P. No. 16735 of 1997 and prayed that the said F.I.R.
Bearing No. 110 of 1996 he declared to he illegal, ultra vires, false, frivolous, based on mala fide and of no legal value and liable to be quashed/cancelled.
9. Through a judgment dated 18.9.1997 passed in the said Writ Petition bearing No. 16735 of 1997, a learned Single Judge of this Court granted the above noticed prayer and quashed the F.I.R. In question bearing No. 110 of 1996 of Police Station Factory Area of Faisalabad by holding that the power of attorney dated 5.1.1995 was admittedly executed by Ikram-ul-Haq in favour of Abdul Rasheed in pursuance whereof the said Abdul Rasheed accused executed an agreement of sale in favour of his brother,, namely, Abdul Hameed accused; that both these documents were not fake nor the result of any forgery; that no forgery had been committed by the petitioners in respect of these two documents; that the contents of the F.I.R. Revealed that the dispute between the complainant and the petitioners was essentially of a civil nature which had been the subject matter of litigation between the parties; that the dispute could best be resolved through the Civil Court; that the complainant could not be allowed to set the machinery of criminal justice in motion to enforce his civil rights and finally that the continuance of the prosecution would be an abuse of the process of law and would not serve any purpose to meet the ends of justice.
10. Aggrieved by this judgment dated 18.9.1997, Muhammad Sadiq above mentioned has tiled this Intra Court Appeal essentially on the ground that a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution seeking the quashment of an F.I.R. Was not competent; that the writ petitioners had approached this Court with unclean hands as the act of Abdul Rasheed accused petitioner in transferring the plots in question in favour of his own brother was dishonest and in complete disregard of his own consistent stand before the arbitrators and before the Courts of Law; that his said act was also offensive of the order dated 17.5.1990 of a learned Civil Court whereby the above mentioned award had been made a Rule of the Court to which proceedings the said Abdul Rasheed and his brother Abdul Hameed were artier and by virtue of which Rule of Court he plots in question had fallen o the share of Muhammad Sadiq appellant herein; that the Courts of Law id not ever come to the aid of any person who acted in derogation of any judgment or order of a Court of Law; that while filing the Constitutional petition bearing W.P. No. 16735 of 1997, the petitioners therein had contumaciously 'concealed the factum of the above mentioned award and the same having been made the rule of the Court and finally that the declaration made by the learned Judge in Chamber to the effect the act in question of Abdul Rasheed and Abdul Hameed accused and others was not culpable in law, was a declaration which was based on no evidence and which declaration had pre-empted other proceedings pending in the Courts of law including writ petition No. 157 of 1997 which had been tiled by the writ petitioners calling in question the transfer of the plots in question in favour of Muhammad Sadiq and others by the concerned officials of the Faisalabad Development Authority.
11. The jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 199 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which can he invoked only to meet extra ordinary situations. This jurisdiction is or and was never meant to he treated-as an additional or as "ANOTHER" remedy provided by law. It was essentially for this reason that Article 199 of the Constitution specifically provided that this Court shall have jurisdiction under the said ,provisions of the Constitution ONLY when the law from which a matter emanated did not provide any other adequate remedy to cater for the problem in issue.
Therefore, the prime question in every case of Article 199 of the Constitution as also in the present case is whether an aggrieved person who resorts to the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, has or has not any other adequate remedy available to him under the law.
12. Registration of an FIR under section 154 of the Cr.P.C. Is only an information received by an officer incharge of a Police Station with respect to the alleged commission of a cognizable offence for the purpose of setting the law into motion. The said provisions of section 154 of the Cr.P.C. Did not, and rightly so, leave any discretion with the S.H.O. Of a Police Station to refuse to record an F.I.R. On the ground that information conveyed to him was, according to his knowledge and assessment, not correct. The check against lodging of FIR based on false information was not refusal by the S.H.O. To reduce such an information in the form of an F.I.R. But he deterrent in the same connection was prosecution and punishment of offenders under section 182 of the PPC. Therefore, the recording of an FIR does not become an illegality, warranting quashment of the same by this Court, only because the information contained therein was not correct.
13. Once an FIR is registered, it then becomes the duty of the Investigating Officer to un-earth evidence; to collect material and to opine whether in his view the information was or was not correct. He has powers under section 169 of the Cr.P.C. To release an accused person if the investigating officer was of the view that sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying the forwarding of an accused person to a Magistrate, were not available. This is then the first remedy which an accused person has under the law and where he can demonstrate to the investigating officer/S.H.O. That the accusations levelled against him were baseless and asking the said investigating officer/S.H.O. To release him if he was in custody. If an accused person he not satisfied either with the conduct of the investigating officer or with the conduct of the investigation by him then he has remedies before the superior police officers who are also S.H.Os. By virtue of the provisions of section 551 of the Cr.P.C.
14. These are then the remedies which an accused person has before the police officers but the law, in its wisdom, has not left an accused person completely at the mercy of the police officers even during the course of an investigation. It is always open to such a person to seek his discharge from a competent Magistrate under section 63 of the Cr.P.0 if he could demonstrate even while the investigation was in progress that the accusation levelled against him were unfounded. He even has a right to ask the competent Magistrate to cancel the very F.I.R. Under Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934 if he could establish that no offence at all stood committed.
15. An accused person then has a remedy before the Magistrate who gets seized of the matter under section 190 of the Cr.P.C. And which Magistrate has powers to refuse to take cognizance of the case if it could be shown to him either that the allegations levelled in a given FIR were false or that sufficient material was not available on record connecting the accused person with the offence allegedly committed by him. His further remedy is before the learned Trial Court which has authority to refuse to charge an accused person and consequently to discharge him and which Court subsequently has powers under section 249-A of the Cr.P.C. Or under section 265-K of the said. Code, as the case may be, to acquit an accused person at any stage of the trial.
16. It would thus be noticed that after registration of an F.I.R., a person falsely accused of the commission of an offence, has remedies open to him at every step and at every stage during the course of investigation or during the course of a trial.
17. In the presence of all these remedies which are thus available to an accused person, it could not be said that an accused person did not have adequate remedies available to him under the law and consequently a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution would become incompetent.
18. There is yet another aspect of this matter. It is a principle too well established by now that this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 199 of the Constitution would not, ordinarily, embark upon an exercise to determine intricate, contested and complicated questions of fact. Resolution of such like controverted issues is ordinarily left to the proper forums prescribed by any given law because indulging in such an exercise would have the effect of pre-empting and encroaching upon the jurisdiction lawfully vesting in the competent officers and Courts. It may he added that involvement of this Court in matters which can be competently, properly and adequately dealt with by other for a prescribed by law, might have and in at has had adverse effect on the disposal by this Court of matters which have to be dealt with exclusively by this Court.
19. Reverting now to the case in hand, it may be mentioned that the accused persons of the present case have, above noticed, adequate remedies available to them. Whatever pleas they may have in their defence, the case can be competently raised before the investigating officer and before the competent Courts and Magistrate as mentioned above. No law could be shown which prohibited recording of an F.I.R. With respect to matters which were pending adjudication before the competent Civil Courts as the only prohibition in the field is contained in section 195 of the Cr.P.C. Which created a bar on taking of cognizance of cases by the Courts of Law, in certain situations and did not prohibit recording of F.I.Rs.
20. In view of what has been discussed and noticed above, since this Court got clothed with jurisdiction to issue writs under Article 199 of the Constitution only when no other adequate remedy was available and as remedies are available to the Writ Petitioners in the present case and since this Court did not ordinarily venture into resolving disputed questions of fact in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction and further because no law prohibited registration of the F.I.R. In question, therefore, Writ Petition No. 16735/97 was liable to he dismissed.
21. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated, 18.9.1997 is set aside and writ petition No. 16735/97 is dismissed. There shall however, be no order as to costs.