1. SARMAD JALAL OSMANY, J.---C.M.A. No,2384 of 1999 has been filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. By the plaintiff seeking an interim order restraining the defendant and all persons claiming under it from installing a 70 K.V. Generator and Filter Assembly Plant in the suit premises till the final disposal of the suit on which ad interim orders were obtained by the plaintiff on 25-3-1999. C.M.A.
2. No,5592 of 1999 is an application filed by the defendant under Order 39, Rule 4 of the C.P.C. Seeking a discharge of the interim order. I propose to dispose of both these applications by this order. Briefly the facts of the matter as alleged in the plaint are that the plaintiffs alongwith others are the owners of a multistoried building constructed on Plot hearing Survey No,10/1, Survey Sheet C.L. 10 in the Civil Lines Quarters Karachi, more popularly known as "Al-Farid Centre" which consists of 49 offices and business premises and is fully occupied and at any given time on a working day about 2000 persons are present in or about the said building. The defendant is in the occupation of the ground floor of the said building consisting of about 8109 sq. Ft. As a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs,9,000 under an agreement of tenancy, dated 17-7-1970 which was continued vide further tenancy agreement. Dated 15-10.1987 which tenancy expired on 31-3-1997. It is the stand of the plaintiff that the tenancy agreements were neither appropriately stamped nor registered as per law and consequently do not confer any right, title or interest in the property at all to the defendant. It is further alleged in the plaint that the plaintiffs alongwith other five co-owners of the building and sixteen other co-owners of Pakistani Handicrafts Building being joint family members became owners of the respective portions of the buildings vide a Decree of this Court in Suit No,191 of 1996 whereby the portions awarded to each party in the building became their exclusive property and consequently the portion occupied by the defendant came to the share of the plaintiffs. In acknowledgment of this the defendant has been paying rent to the plaintiffs since January, 1995 up to July, 1997 whereafter the plaintiffs filed Rent Case No,138 of 1994 for fixation of fair rent in consequence of which the defendant has been depositing rent in Court. The particular dispute which has given rise to these proceedings is the plaintiffs' objection to the defendant's, proposed installation of a Filter Assembly Plant in its premises alongwith a 70 K.V.
3. Generator for which purpose on 25-2-1999 it started demolition of existing walls within the premises and removal of ventilators which according, to the plaintiffs was damaging the property and likely to be dangerous for the whole building. To avert this negative state of affairs the plaintiffs filed Suit No,171 of 1999 before the learned 13th Civil Judge. Karachi South for the purpose of declaration and injunction to the effect that the defendant's action of demolition of walls within the demised premises and removal of ventilators was illegal, unauthorised and unlawful. However, interim relief was refused by the learned Civil Judge whereafter the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. For withdrawal of the suit as the value of the subject-matter was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Civil Court which was opposed by the defendant who moved an application for contempt. These applications are still pending before the learned Civil Judge. In the meanwhile the defendant had completed the demolition work and re-constructed the demised premises which according to the plaintiff has seriously affected the weight-bearing capacity of the beams and the pillars upon which the building stands and all these actions have been undertaken without the consent of the plaintiffs and/or sanctions from the concerned authorities. It is the plaintiffs' position that previously the defendant was only an agent of M/s. Lucus Batteries, U.K. And in consequence thereof was selling such batteries in Pakistan but now the entire completion of the defendant's business would change viz. To one for the assembly of filters for which purpose a plant was proposed to he installed and so also a 70 K.V. Generator. It is the further stand of the plaintiff that the installation of the Generator would be dangerous to the building by virtue of vibrations and it would also cause sound pollution and hence the suit and the application for temporary injunction. The contents of the application are supported by the affidavit attached thereto and the same allegations as contained in the plaint are repeated therein. In the counter-affidavit filed to the stay application a preliminary objection has been taken to the effect that since Civil Suit No, 171 of 1999 is pending before the learned Civil Judge, Karachi South on the same cause of action, consequently the present suit is not maintainable in terms of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. So also it is maintained on the legal plane that as no permission was obtained from the Civil Court by the plaintiff for filing the present suit on the same cause of action the latter is barred under Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. On merits it is submitted that as per clause 7(f) of the lease agreement between the predecessors-in- interest of the plaintiffs dated 17-7-1990 to Lessee (defendant) has the right to use the demised premises inter alia for the purpose of assembly/manufacture of batteries and other automotive parts and components and for the purposes as mentioned in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the defendant as amended from time to time and for purposes incidental thereto provided that these activities do not damage the premises. The life of this agreement was ten years. Subsequently the parties entered into another lease agreement, dated 15th October 1987 also for a period of ten years at an enhanced rent and the defendants were accorded a right to get the lease extended on mutually agreed terms. Again clause 7(f) as appearing in the previous lease agreement was reproduced in the subsequent lease agreement as clause 4(f). It is thus the defendant's stand that in terms of clause 4(f) of the last-mentioned lease agreement they have an unfettered right to use the demised premises for any industrial and/or commercial purpose as may be deemed appropriate by them and it was for such reason that the plaintiffs never objected to the use of a part of the premises as a workshop, service station and battery assembling plant and as a plant for manufacture of other automotive parts and components. Consequently as per the defendant the plaintiffs are now stopped from raising any objection for use of the demised premises for any manufacturing/commercial purpose. It is further averred in the counter-affidavit that none of the partitions of the demise premises are load bearing and hence removal of the same would not cause any damage to the structure of the building and consequently the establishment of a diesel fuel filter assembly plant on a portion of the demised premises which is fully automatic and wherein only about five persons would be employed would hardly be a nuisance for the other residents of the building in question. In this regard the defendants have relied upon the report of Engineering Consultants Int. (Pvt.) Limited dated 27-3-1999 who were appointed as Commissioners for the purpose of inspection of the demised premises in Suit No, 171 of 1999. As regards the installation of a 70 K.V Generator it is submitted that this has been acquired from M/s. Siemens Pakistan in order to ensure a regular supply of electricity to the proposed plant and the same will be housed in a sound proof canopy, thus, ruling out any noise pollution. In this regard a report from M/s. Siemens Pakistan is attached which supports their contentions. For all the foregoing facts and reasons the stay application is opposed. In support of C.M.A. No 2384 of 1999 Mr. Iqbal Kazi, has firstly contended that the initial lease agreement executed in 1970 for the demised premises as well as subsequent lease agreement in 1987 were required to be registered under the law being for a period of ten years and since they were not so registered did not create any right, title or interest in the premises as per sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, as well as section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently at the most the defendant was a statutory tenant all along and could not, therefore, invoke the various provisions of the lease agreement in order to claim any particular right bestowed upon it which would be in conflict with its rights as a statutory tenant. In any event according to learned counsel as even the latest agreement has expired in 1997 to this extent also the defendant was only a statutory tenant from 1997 onwards. Thus, as per learned counsel the defendant could not invoke the provisions of either clause 7 (f) of the 1970 Lease Agreement or the corresponding clause 4(f) of 1987 Lease Agreement which purported to allow the defendants to carry out certain commercial/industrial activities within the demised premises, inter alia to use the same as an assembly for the manufacture of batteries and other automotive parts and components and for the purpose mentioned in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the defendant- Company as amended from time to time. Consequently it is the learned counsel's submission that the installation of the proposed Filter Assembly Plant and a 70 K.V. Generator to provide power for the same is contrary to the defendants' rights as a statutory tenant. In support of this contention learned counsel has relied upon Abdullah Bhai and others v. Ahmed Din (PLD 1964 SC 106), Zarina Khawaja v. Mahboob Shah (PLD 1988 SC 190). Habib Bank v. Munawar Ali Siddiqi (1991 SCMR 1185), Muhammad Rafique v: Habib Bank (1994 SCMR 1012). Learned counsel's next contention is that the demolition work carried out in the demised premises by the defendant has considerably damaged the same inasmuch as the removal of the existing walls/partitions had affected the load-bearing capacity of the beams and pillars which was dangerous for the whole building. In this connection learned counsel has relied upon the photographs attached with the plaint, as well as a report of the plaintiff's engineer according to whom the defendant's action of demolition of the partitions/walls has damaged the building and seriously affected the load-bearing capacity of the beams and pillars. In this regard learned counsel further says that even if it be considered that the defendants were allowed to and carry out structural repairs to the premisses in terms of the provisions of the lease agreements, this did not give it licence to damage the building.
4. It is learned counsel's further contention that the installation of a 70 K.V. Generator would create noise pollution as well as vibrations, the latter of which is potentially dangerous to the building and whereas the former would be a nuisance to the occupants thereof. Further learned counsel has contended that the sanctioned load for the demised premises was only 35 K.V. Which is evidenced by the electricity bills issued by KESC whereas the proposed generator is of 70 K.V. Which prima facie is much above the reguirements of the defendant and consequently should not be allowed to be installed. Furthermore, no permission has been taken from KESC for the installation of the proposed generator. As regards the filing of Suit No, 171 of 1999 before the learned 13th Civil Judge, Karachi South on 27- 2-1999, learned counsel submits that the prayer in the said suit was against the demolition being carried out in the demised premises and accordingly an application for temporary injunction was also tiled and as no such injunction was granted, the plaintiff filed an application for withdrawal of the suit under Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. With the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit. However, such permission was denied vide order dated 12-4-1999 and the suit dismissed as having become infructuous as per the plaintiff's own submission. Learned counsel further says that in Suit No,171 of 1999 the prayer was to restrain the defendants from demolishing the suit property whereas the present suit was filed after such demolition had been carried out for which damages have been claimed and consequently this is a subsequent cause of action. In this connection learned counsel points out that the suit before the Civil Court was filed on 25-2-1999 and the present suit filed on 22-3-1999. Consequently as per learned counsel the suit is not hit by Order 2, Rule 2 or Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. As the subsequent suit is founded on a fresh cause of action. For the foregoing facts and reasons learned counsel prays that the application under consideration be granted and that the defendant be restrained from installation of the Generator and Filter Assembly Plant in the demised premises till the final outcome of the suit. On the other hand Mr. Akhtar Ali Mehmood learned counsel for the defendant has strenuously opposed the stay application on a number of grounds. Firstly learned counsel contends that the suit is barred under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C.
5. Read with Order 23, Rule 1(3). In this connection learned counsel says that as far as Order 2, Rule 2 is concerned the plaintiff should have claimed damages in Suit No, 171 of 1999 filed before the learned Civil Court and failure to do so precludes it from claiming the same before this Court hence the suit is not maintainable since the earlier suit was between the same parties on the same cause of action. Secondly it is the learned counsel's contention that failure to obtain permission from the lower Court for filing of the present suit which was denied as per order dated 12-4-1999 also precludes the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. In this regard learned counsel has relied upon Feroze Khan and 4 others v. Zarman All and another (1993 CLC 1478). Achar and another v. Abu Bakr Modi (1995 CLC 465), Muhammad Yousuf Memon v. Karachi Stock Exchange (1995 CLC 183 (DB)), National Bank of Pakistan v. Hashim Khan. (1995 CLC 88 (DB)), Muhammad Latif v. Muhammad lqbal (1996 CLC 1672) and Dr. Akhtar Hussain v. S.M. Hanif and 2 others (1990 MLD 165.2). On merits learned counsel has argued that the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the validity of the lease agreements already acted upon by the parties as per section 114 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order. Secondly learned counsel submits that the terms contained in the two Lease Agreements continue to remain in force notwithstanding expiry of the same and, thus, the defendant could carry out the manufacture of batteries and automotive parts as well as make structural repairs in terms of the expired lease agreement. In this regard learned counsel has relied upon Alif Din v. Khadim Hussain (1980 SCMR 767), Muhammad Yousuf v. Abdullah (PLD 1980 SC 298), Mrs. Alima Ahmed v. Amir Ali (PLD 1984 SC 32), Mrs. Zarina Khawaja v. Mahboob Shah (PLD 1988 SC 190), Mst. Maqsooda Begum v. Hamid Mahmood Butt (1999 CLC 391) and Muhammad Rafique v. Habib Bank Limited (1994 SCMR 1012). Further learned counsel has argued that as regards the provisions of section 49 of the Registration Act, the terms contained in an unregistered document which was compulsorily registrable under the law can be looked into for a collateral purpose although the same could not clothe a person with any right, title or interest in the property in question. Consequently as per learned counsel the terms of the lease agreement could be looked into for the purpose of establishing the use of the demised premises to which parties had agreed to viz. For the purpose of carrying out the assembly of batteries and other automotive parts and in this respect learned counsel has relied upon Mrs. Zarina Qaisha v. Arbab Wali Muhammad (PLD 1976 Peshawar 128), Cotton Trading Corporation v.
6. Sheikh Sultan Trust (1981 CLC . 623) and Habib-ur-Rahman v. Wadhiara (PLD 1984 SC 424). As regards the factum of the alleged demolition being carried out in the demised premises, learned counsel says that initially only open space was given on .Rent to the defendant and the partitioning of the premises was as per the defendant's own requirement. Consequently the plaintiffs cannot now object to the demolition of the said partitioning for the purpose of installation of the proposed Filter Assembly Plant and. Generator. Learned counsel says that since the defendant has the right to install an assembly for the manufacture of batteries and other automotive products, therefore, the proposed utilization of the premises for the installation of a Filter Assembly Plant which is an automotive product cannot be objected to by the plaintiffs for which purpose only the interior of the premises are being altered by demolition of the existing partitions and construction of new ones. According to the learned counsel the demolition of partitions has nothing to do with the load-bearing capacity of the pillars etc., as such partitions were installed after the Wilding was constructed at the behest of the defendant. In this regard learned counsel has relied upon the report of the Commissioner appointed by the learned Civil Court for the purpose of carrying out an inspection of the premises and reporting whether the demolition of the partitions would be dangerous to the building which prima facie establishes that the defendant's activities within the demised premises would not affect the load bearing capacity of the pillars etc. And hence not dangerous for the building. Secondly as far as the installation of the Generator is concerned, learned counsel submits that the same is a standby one to be used only in case of power failure and would not cause any noise pollution since it is enclosed in a sound proof conopy and as per the specification of the manufacture viz. M/s. Siemens Pakistan it would not cause any sound pollution since the sound level would be 75 decibels at a distance of seven metres from the canopy which is not hazardous. Secondly the Generator would be mounted on rubber vibration pads which would absorb the vibrations produced by the Generator and finally that the smoke and exhaust gas from the Generator would be released in the atmosphere which would not cause any air pollution. For all the foregoing facts and reasons learned counsel has submitted that no prima facie case has been made out for the issuance of the injunction contemplated in the application as it is uncertain whether the issues which have been raised can be decided in the plaintiff's favour. As regards balance of convenience, learned counsel says that the defendants have invested a huge amount for the import of the plant in question and, therefore, the balance lies in its favour as per P.I.A. Corporation v. Hazir (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 1993 Karachi 190). Finally as regards irreparable loss etc., learned counsel submits that since the suit has also been filed for damages which is adequate compensation for the alleged losses ,suffered by the plaintiff to this extent too no case is made out for the grant of an injunction. In rebuttal Mr. Iqbal Qazi has submitted that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 and Order 23, Rule 1 bar fresh suits based on the same cause of action which is not evident in the present case since the previous suit was filed to restrain the defendant from demolishing the suit property whereas the present suit impugns installation of the proposed plant and Generator after such demolition had been carried out for which damages have also been claimed and which is, therefore, a subsequent cause of action. In this connection learned counsel has relied upon M.K. Abbasi v.
7. United Bank Limited (1983 CLC 482). He further submits that whether permission was given or refused by the learned Civil Court is irrelevant in the circumstances as a fresh cause of action has accrued to the plaintiffs. Regarding the well-known conditions for granting temporary injunction learned counsel says that prima facie the plaintiffs have established their case viz. The possibility of structural damage to the building and' nuisance as far as the noise and gas which would be emitted by the Generator cannot be ruled out since in the first case there are two conflicting reports regarding the structural damages and in the second case a powerful generator of 70 K.V.
8. Would be a nuisance as it would be functioning constantly as per requirement of the plant whereas the authorized load at the demised premises is only 35 K.V. Concerning the issue of damages learned counsel says that the claim in the suit is for the alteration already carried out in the demised premises by the defendant whereas for the alleged nuisance and structural damages to the building these cannot be calculated in terms of money. Hence this aspect of the matter is also in the plaintiff's favour as far as issuance of an injunction is concerned. I have heard both the learned counsel at length and I have also gone through the documents placed on the record and my conclusions are as follows:--
1. As regards the non-maintainability of this suit, it would be seen that Order 2(2), C.P.C. Prohibits filing of a fresh suit on the same cause of action if the plaintiff omits; except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all the reliefs which he is entitled to in respect of the same cause of action.
9. Similarly Order 23, Rule 1(3) also precludes the plaintiff from instituting any fresh suit if permission has not been obtained for withdrawal of the earlier suit and filing of the fresh suit. The principle on which both these provisions of the C.P.C. Are based is the same viz. That a plaintiff should not be allowed to engage in needless rounds of litigation on the same cause of action at the expense of the defendant as well as the Court. In the present case it would be seen that as per the plaint in Suit No, 171 of 1999 filed before the learned Civil Court the cause of complaint is that the defendant on 25-2-1999 had started the demolition of the interior walls, partitions and ventilators of the demised premises which as per the plaintiffs was unauthorized, unlawful and would cause harm to the entire building and consequently a declaration and injunction was prayed for the purpose of stopping the defendants from doing so. However, the plaint in the present suit would disclose that after filing of the previous suit before the learned Civil Court and upon failure to obtain a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from carrying out the demolition work, the defendant had completed such demolition and construction of new partition which has changed the weight bearing capacity of the beams and pillars without the consent in writing or even verbal permission from the plaintiff and/or permission from the authorities for affecting such changes (Para. 9 of the plaint). It has been further alleged in the plaint that the purpose for which the portions of the building have been demolished and are being reconstructed is to install a 70 K.V. Generator as well as the Filter Assembly Plant and consequently the suit has been filed for the purpose of obtaining an injunction restraining the defendants from installing the plant and generator in the demised premises and for demolition of all unauthorised construction made in the premises as well as for restoration of the construction as it stood originally. So also an amount of Rs,2,000,000 has been claimed being compensation for damages caused to the premisses by the defendant. It would, thus, be seen that the two suits were filed on two separate causes of action. The first suit was filed before the learned Civil Court on 27-2-1999 on the basis that on 25-2-1999 the defendant had started carrying out the demolition work without the permission/consent of the plaintiff with a prayer to issue an injunction to restrain the defendants from doing so whereas the second suit was filed on 22-3-1999 after demolition work had been carried out and the plaintiff was in the process of installing the generator and filter assembly plant. The term 'cause of action' has not been defined in the Civil Procedure Code but it is now well-settled that this term means the bundle of facts upon which the plaintiff bases its claim against the defendant. In my view, the cause of action in the previous suit being No, 171 of 1999 filed before the learned Civil Court is entirely different from the one based upon which the present suit has been filed and as much appears very clearly in the cause of action clause in both the plaints. As far as the cases cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the defendant are concerned these were decided on a finding by the learned Courts that the causes of action in the subsequent suit was the same as in the original suit and hence the subsequent suit was not held to be maintainable. To this extent all these causes are distinguishable. Hence for all these reasons in my opinion this suit is not barred under the provision of Order 2, Rule 2 or Order 23, Rule 1(3) of the C.P.C.
2. The second issue to be considered in the matter is whether in terms of sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act the relevant clauses in the lease agreements as to the running establishment of a workshop/plant for the assembly of batteries and other automotive parts in the demised premises can be relied upon by the defendants to justify the installation of the proposed filter plant and generator. It is settled law that in terms of the aforementioned provisions of the Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act any document which is compulsorily registrable and has not so been registered does not operate to create, declare, assign, limit whether in present or in future any right, title or interest whether vested or contingent in immovable property. However, such a document can be looked into for a collateral purpose for example if a sale of property is evidenced through an unregistered document which was compulsory registrable, although this would not operate to create any right, title or interest in the property in favour of the purchaser, it could be adduced in evidence so as to establish some other collateral right such as a charge on the property for the amount paid by the purchaser towards the purchase of the property in question. Consequently, the purchaser can always claim the sale consideration and to prove the same he can produce the unregistered sale-deed in evidence. As much has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Habib-ur-Rahman v.
10. Wandania (supra). However, it would be seen that the particular collateral right sought to be established would depend upon the document in question and also upon the particular laws applicable to such document in the present case the rent laws. Similarly there is no cavil with the argument put forward by learned counsel for the defendant that even though the lease agreement has expired, the terms and conditions of the said agreement survive on the doctrine of holding over. Again the legal sanctity of any such particular right claimed by the lessee would depend on whether or not the same is in conflict with the general law and rent laws. In this respect the leading case is that of Mrs. Zarina Khawaja v. Mehboob Shah (supra) where the Hob'ble Supreme Court has laid down, inter alia, that after expiry of the agreement of tenancy, the relationship between the parties would be governed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement of tenancy provided they do not come in conflict with the general or the rent laws. Consequently it would be seen that in the particular context of this case the real issue would be whether or not the terms and conditions of the expired unregistered lease agreement between the parties whereby the defendant claims to have the right of installing a Filter Assembly Plant and 70 K.V. Generator are in conflict with general and the rent laws in this case the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. As a statutory tenancy had come into existence between the parties. Reference in this connection can be made to Alif Din v. Khadim Hussain and Mst. Maqsooda Begum v. Hamid Mehmood Butt (supra). In this regard section 15(ii), (iv) and (v) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance would be relevant which provides some of the conditions under which the landlord would be entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the rented premises viz. That the tenant has committed such acts which are likely to impair the material value and the utility of the premises or the tenant has indulged in such activities that are causing nuisance to the neighbours. Even otherwise such grounds can be taken in regular civil suits under the general law. As to the first ground urged by learned counsel for the plaintiff it would be seen that there are conflicting reports of two qualified engineers, the first one appointed by the learned Civil Judge and the second by the plaintiff, regarding the activities of the defendant within the demised premises. As per the first report of the engineer appointed by the learned Civil Court, it is opined that demolition etc. Of the walls/portions within the demised premises would not cause any harmful effect to the building whereas as per the second report this assertion has been contradicted and it has been certified that such demolition work would certainly damage the load- bearing capacity of the pillars upon which the building stands. In my view, therefore, as this is strictly a question of fact no opinion can be given at this stage as to the veracity and correctness of either of these reports without taking evidence and consequently it would be in the interest of justice to maintain status quo. As regards the second issue of nuisance etc., viz. Noise pollution and vibrations which could be caused by .The installation of the proposed Generator, it would appear, prima facie, that since the authorized load of the electricity meter installed at the demised premises is only 35 K.V. And admittedly the proposed plant would require a 70 K.V. Generator which would be used constantly for the purpose of providing power to the plant, hence potentially it could be a source of nuisance to at least the residents of the first few floors of the building and to persons moving around the building at the ground level.
11. It would also be seen that whatever may have been the activities of the defendant in the demised premises with regard to the establishment of a workshop and assembly for batteries, the installation of a plant alongwith a powerful generator in a commercial area prima facie, seems to be in violation of the zoning laws. Consequently, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have made out a reasonable prima facie case for the grant of the injunction prayed for. As to the quantum of losses etc., it would be seen that damage caused by the potential nuisance value of the Generator in question in my view cannot be quantified. Similarly the balance of convenience is also in favour of granting the injunction rather than rejecting it. In these circumstances, this application is allowed and the defendant is restrained from installing the proposed Filter Assembly Plant and Generator within the demised premises till the disposal of the suit. However, as learned counsel for the defendant has displayed some urgency in the matter due to the heavy investment made by the defendant, it is ordered that the suit shall be heard and disposed of within three months from today. The parties shall be free to nominate a Commissioner for the purpose of recording evidence.
12. Order accordingly. As C.M.A. No,2384 of 1999 has been allowed, C.M.A. 5592 of 1999 vacation of status quo orders earlier granted stands dismissed.