JUDGMENT MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, J.- This order will govern two Intra- Court Appeals Bearing No. 205/96 and 206/96. The first Intra-Court Appeal is by Ghulam Sarwar appellant while second Intra- Court Appeal is by District Magistrate, Lahore. Both of these appeals have been filed under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and seek to call in question the order passed by learned Single Judge dated 7.5.1996.-The aforesaid order was passed in the following terms: "For the fore-going reasons, the refusal of the District Magistrate to permit the petitioner to take out procession is not tenable in law and is declared to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect and in consequence, the petition is accepted and the petitioner is permitted to take out the religious procession from Azakhana 31-A Rehmanpura, Lahore to Masjid- ul-Hussain at Imam Bara Road after Maghrib prayer till Isha time on 30th of Moharram or first of Safar, subject to the condition, as may be imposed by the District Magistrate for the maintenance of law and order situation."
2. The facts, which from the background of these Intra-Court Appeals, are that Muhammad Siddique/respondent herein/who was follower of Fiqa Jafaria, moved an application to District Magistrate, Lahore for issuing him a licence for taking out religious procession from his residence (Aza Khana) to Masjid-e-Hussain on 30th Moharram in year 1995. The leaned District Magistrate, vide order dated 13.11.1995, declined to grant him requested licence. Feeling aggrieved, the aforesaid Muhammad Siddique filed Writ Petition No. 16605/95 which was allowed by learned Single Judge of this Court on 7.5 1996. This is how, these I.C. As have come to this Court.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant, while disputing the correctness of impugned order, contended that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court was rendered in efficacious by its pronouncement in Azhar- ud-Din and others v. The State and others (1993 S.C.M.R. 1718), wherein it was held that religious practices of any sect shall conform to the Injunction of Holy Quran and Sunnah. He also placed reliance upon in the matter of Daily Ehsan (PLD 1949 Lah. 282) to contend that beating of breasts by Shia sect was forbidden by the Injunction of Islam. Secondly, that the rites performed by Shia sect were totally contrary to Holy Qur'an and Sunnah and could, not be allowed to be performed publicly. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Yousaf Kazmi, Advocate, however, strongly defended the order. He stated that it was fundamental right of any sect to take out religious procession in the streets subject to control imposed by licensing authority.
Reference was made to Sarfraz Hussain Bokhari v. D.M. Kasur and others (PLD 1983 S.C. 172).
4. Apart from above contention, learned counsel-for both the parties dwelled upon different sectarial concept of two sects. They submitted their written arguments containing their submissions.
5. We have heard the learned counsel at length, perused the record and attended to their contentions very carefully. The question raised in the Intra-Court Appeals were examined by this Court in Muhahat Ali v. The District Magistrate Camhellpur and another (PLD 1976 Lah. 755). After having examined Section 30 of Police Act, 1861 and relevant precedents his Lordship Mr. Justice Nasim Hassan Shah (as he then was) said for the Bench as follows: "A close reading of the above provision of law shows that clause (I) of Section 30 is intended to prescribe the routes by which the procession may pass, namely, on the public roads or in the public streets or thoroughfares and also prescribe the time at which such procession may pass.
The intention appears to be that in order to enable adequate measures to be taken for the orderly movement of the procession, the authorities may prescribe the most suitable route and time in this regard.
Clause (2) of Section 30 shows that if the District Magistrate is satisfied, . In his judgment that in case the procession is not controlled, there is likelihood of breach of peace, he can require the persons interested in taking out the procession to apply for a licence. This would show that the taking out of a procession, even in case where, breach of peace is apprehended, is not forbidden under Section 30 of the Police Act. The only restriction laid down where a breach of peace is apprehended is to require the organizer of ah assembly or a procession to apply for a licence, which shall be granted, for it does not stand to reason that the District Magistrate shall ask the organizer of the procession to apply for a licence and when they do so, he shall refuse to grant it.
He may impose condition, and these are detailed in the subsequent clause, viz. Clause (3).
The condition, laid down in clause (3) which can be imposed while issuing a licence for taking out of a procession or that the names of the licences may be specified (so that responsible persons take out the procession). Other conditions on which the procession is permitted such as that no one shall carry arms or raise any particular slogans etc., can also be laid down. In short, any condition necessary tor the orderly taking out of the procession can be prescribed. In other words, while the right to assemble and to takeout a procession is recognised, provision is made for measures to be taken to see that in the exercise of the said right public order is not disturbed. The keeping of order is not to be secured by refusing the citizen from assembling and forming a procession or by confining them to their on houses. If this was done, the necessity, for securing the order would not arise. The policy of the Police Act is to equip the authorities with sufficient power to take adequate measures to maintain law and order, without taking away the right of citizens of assembly and forming processions. At any rate, the right to assemble and form processions is not forbidden under Section 30 of the Polite Act through this object could conceivably be achieved by resort to some other laws, such as by invoking the provisions of Section 144, Cr.P.C. The conclusions that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the taking out of procession cannot altogether be forbidden under the Police Act, is sound. Furthermore, any instruction issued which run counter to the provisions of the Act are of no avail. The impugned order is therefore, not sustainable in law."
The above rule was approved by the Supreme Court in 1983 S.C. 172 and was followed by this Court in Khushi Muhammad v. Assisting Commissioner Vehari and another (PLD 1983 Lah. 192) and Syed Manzoor Hussain Bokhari and another v. S.P., City Lahore and two others (1990 M.L.D. 1807). Applying the aforesaid rule to the facts and circumstances of the case in had, it is quite clear that die order passed by learned Single Judge dated 7.5.1996 is eminently correct, just and does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or legal flaw, calling for interference by this Court.
6. For the afore-stated reasons these Intra-Court Appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As far contention, regarding the logical differences, we are of the view that these were/are not germane to controversy in had and more-so this Court is not competent to examine the said controversies. The parties will be well within their right to approach the forum of competent jurisdiction in this regard. We hope and pray that all concerned should act sagaciously with sanity and unity of Muslim Ummah and solidarity of the country.