' Z. A. CHANNA , J.-This constitutional petition by the Union of the employees of the Pakistan International Air Lines Corporation calls in question the legality of the judgment by a Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission, the respondent No, 1, rejecting the appeal of the petitioner-Union against the failure of the Registrar of Trade Unions to grant it registration under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance.
2. The facts, which form the background of this petition, briefly stated, are that on 9-10-1976, the petitioner-Union submitted an application under section 5 of the said Ordinance for its registration under that Ordinance. Though the applicant-Union apparently fulfilled all the conditions for registration under the said Ordinance, the Registrar failed to register it and instead the file of the petitioner-Union was either requisitioned by or was sent by the Registrar to the Government. Since the Registrar had neither registered the petitioner-Union within 15 days of the receipt of the application of registration nor had he raised any objections to the registration, as required by the said Ordinance, the petitioner-Union filed an appeal on 20.11-1976 to respondent No, 1, to exercise its powers under clause (d) of subsection (8) of section 22-A of the said Ordinance to register the petitioner-Union, since it was an industry-wise Trade Union. A Full Bench of the respondent No, 1, by its judgment delivered on 16-12-1976, rejected the appeal and refused to giant registration to the petitioner Union on the grounds that the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as the said Act, were applicable to all the employees of the P. I. A., that an examination of the provisions of the said Act and the said Ordinance discloses that their provisions overlap each other in all material aspects and both occupy the same field, that because of section 7-A of the said Act the provisions of the said Ordinance must give way and that the functions, rights and liabilities of a registered Trade Union are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. In other words, relying on the provisions of section 7-A of the said Act, the Commission has held that the provisions in the said Ordinance, relating to exercise of the functions, powers and duties of registered Trade Unions, are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act.
3. We have heard Mr. Ibadatyar Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner-Union, while the respondents have chosen to remain absent and have not contested the petition. In support of the petition Mr. I badatyas took us through the various provisions of the said Act and the said Ordinance in order to show that their provisions regarding registration and functioning of registered Trade Unions do not clash or are so inconsistent as to disentitle the petitioner-Union to registration.
4. Since, reliance has been placed by the Commission on section 7-A of the said Act, which was added by Ordinance 5 of 1965, it would be convenient to reproduce the same. It reads as follows :- "7-A. The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding to the contrary contained in the Trade Unions Act, 1926 or the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, or any other law."
5. In order to examine the aforesaid argument, we may, in the first instance, examine the relevant provisions of the said Act. Section 3 of the said Act provides that its provisions shall apply to every employment under the Federal Government and also to any class of employment to which the Federal Government, by Notification, makes such provisions applicable, and which employment the Federal Government considers to be essential for the defence or security of Pakistan, or for the maintenance of such supplies or services as relate to any matters within the legislative competence of the Federal Legislature and are essential to the life of the community. Section 4 of the said Act empowers the Federal Government to direct persons engaged in the employment, to which the provisions of the said Act are applicable, to remain in specified areas and not to depart out of such areas. Section 5 is a penal section and makes it punishable for any person to whom the provisions of the Act have been made applicable :-
(a) to disobey any lawful order given in the course of such employment or to attempt to persuade any person to disobey any such order ;
(8) refuse to work or to continue to work ;
(c) without reasonable excuse, to abandon his employment or to absent himself from work ;
(d) to depart from any area specified in an order under section 4 without the consent of the authority making that order.
' The said section also makes an employer of a person to whom the provisions of the said Act are made applicable, liable to punishment if he, without reasonable excuse discontinues the employment of such person either by closing the establishment in which such person is employed, or otherwise.
6. Section 6 of the said Act empowers the Federal Government to make rules regulating or empowering an authority to regulate the wages and condictions of service of persons to whom the provisions of the said Act are applicable. On such rules being made, any person failing to comply with them is deemed to be guilty of an offence under the said Act. Rules have been framed under this section empowering the Central Labour Commissioner to regulate, subject to certain conditions specified in the rules, the wages and other conditions of service of persons engaged in any employment to which the said Act is made applicable. It, however, does not appear from the record whether the wages and conditions of service of the employees of the P. I. A. Have been regulated or settled under the said rules. Subsection (1) of section 7 is again a penal section and provides punishment for a person who contravenes any of the provisions of the Act. We have already referred to section 7-A of the said Act whereby the provisions of the said Act are to override the provisions of other laws, including the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, which has been repealed and replaced by the said Ordinance.
7. A perusal of the various provisions of the said Act indicates that there is no provision in the said Act specifically prohibiting the registration of a Trade Union of employees or workmen to whom the provisions of the said Act are applicable. It, however, has to be examined whether the provisions in the said Ordinance relating to the registration of Trade Unions of workmen, to whom the provisions of the said Act are made applicable, are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the said Act. In other words, whether the functions, rights and the dudes of registered Trade Unions are such that they are incompatible and inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. The mere fact, however, that some of the functions of a registered Trade Union, whose members are subject to the provisions of the said Act, are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act would, in our opinion, not disentitle the Trade Union from registration, if it was otherwise entitled to registration, but would merely disentitle the Trade Union to perform those functions or to enforce those rights which are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act.
8. It is not disputed that the petitioner Union fulfils all the requirements under the said Ordinance for registration thereunder. Registration has been refused to it merely on the ground that its registration would be incompatible with and repugnant to the provisions of the said Act. We have already examined the various provisions of the said Act and it now falls to examine the various provisions of the said Ordinance regarding the functions, responsibilities, rights and privileges of registered Trade Unions and to see if all or merely some of the functions, rights, previleges, etc. Or registered Trade Unions are incompatible with the provisions of the said Act. Before, however, examining such provisions of the said Ordinance, we would like to briefly consider what exactly is meant by repugnancy or inconsistency, that is, what is the test of inconsistency and when the provisions of one statute can be said to override or displace the provisions of another statute.
9. Crawford, in his Interpretation of Laws, 1940 Edition, at page 631, stated that the test of reconcilement, inconsistency or repugnancy between two statutes is that they cannot stand together and observed as follows :- "The inconsistency or repugnancy between two statutes necessary to supplant or repeal the earlier one, must be more than a mere difference in their terms and provisions. There must be what is often called 'such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together. In other words, they must be absolutely repugnant, or irreconcilable."
10. We may also examine the matter from the somewhat different angle whether the said Act wholly displaces the provisions of the said Ordinance in regard to the functions of registered Trade Unions, particularly, their functions in regard to the relationship between the employer and workmen, as observed in the impugned order. The question whether a particular law has been totally displaced by another law was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan. In that case, the question that arose for determination of their Lordships was whether the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, had been displaced by the Political Parties Act, 1962, qua the power of the Government to declare an association, which was a political party, as unlawful. This issue was considered at considerable length by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case and all of them expressed their views on this important point. Cornelius, C. I. (as he then was), took the view that the two Acts were not1 wholly irreconcilable and that the one did not displace the other, and in this behalf observed as follows :- "In my opinion, while there are strong grounds for considering that the Act of 1908 did not contemplate associations of the size or importance of political parties, such as have inevitably developed through the introduction of democracy in the subcontinent during the period of 56 years which has elapsed since that Act was passed, and further that the Political Parties Act of 1962 does, in its concept and contemplation, allow to political parties an importance and an assurance of existence which stand at an appreciably higher level than are allowable in respect of associations in general, yet I find that when examined in detail, the provisions of the two Acts cannot be said to clash with each other so totally as to render the later Act nugatory in the face of the sections under the earlier Act. I find it impossible to deny the essentiality to the public interest of the existence of such power as is conferred by section 16 of the Act of 1908, to place associations with objectives gravely injurious to the maintenance of law and order and the public peace under abeyance. I find no difficulty in conceiving of a political party which may have the creation of anarchy by violence as its objective, either overt or concealed."
11. S. A. Rehman, J., while not accepting the thesis that the 1962 Act exhausted the law on the subject of Political Parties and their regulation, as such a view would unnecessarily deprive the provincial legislatures of their constitutional legislative right in this behalf, took the view that if only for grave conduct affecting the security of the State, a political party could be dissolved in the manner provided by the 1962 Act, the true intention of the legislature in enacting the said Act might well be that the provisions of 1962 Act are no longer available to the Government in respect of political parties.
12. Fazle-Akbar, J. Was of the opinion that the provisions of section 16 of the 1908 Act are inconsistent with the provisions of the Political Parties Act, 1962, and cannot stand together, and gave the following reasons in support of his view :- "It is, however, true that there is some overlapping between the provisions of the two Acts. Section 6(2) of the Act of 1962, provides for dissolution of the political parties under certain circumstances whereas section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act empowers the Government to declare an association 'unlawful'. Further various penal consequences follow such declaration. By declaring an association unlawful the Government really puts an end to the existence of such an association.
Thus in effect section 16 aims at complete suppression and termination of an association which interferes with law and order. It may, therefore, be said that these two sections, to some extent, operate in the same field independently, namely, that both the sections give power to wipe out an association. Now if they are exercised concurrently the result may be destruction of a political party though it may be properly functioning under the Political Parties Act. In other words the Provincial Government in exercise of its power under Criminal Law Amendment Act would be in a position to defeat the latter Act of 1962. To this extent it may be said that the provisions of section 16 of Criminal Law Amendment Act will be inconsistent with the Political Parties Act and they, therefore, cannot stand together."
13. Kaikaus, I. Also held that the Criminal Law Amendment Act is not applicable to political parties and that the only action that can be taken against them is under the Political Parties Act. This decision was reached partly on the basis of the Australian case reported as Clyde Engineering Company Limited v. Cowburn wherein Issac J., has observed that the mere fact that both the statutes were capable of performance was inadequate as the test for determining inconsistency and the vital question was whether on its true construction the later Act was intended to cover the whole ground and therefore to supersede the first.
14. Hamoodur Rahman, I., as he then was, also took the view that qua the political parties, the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, regarding the dissolution of associations was2 inconsistent with the provisions of the Political Parties Act and recorded his views as folio "I am unable, therefore, to accept the contention that the Political Parties Act is a complete code in itself governing political parties or that they cannot be subjected to any other law but this does not mean that I also accept the contention that there is no overlapping at all between the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 19C8, and the Political Parties Act. The distinction sought to be drawn by Mr. Manzoor Qadir between the legal existence or the corporate existence of a political party and its activities is a distinction in theory only, for, the Politica: Parties Act has prescribed no mode for bringing into legal existence a political party. It merely recognizes its de facto existence. If it had like the Companies Act or the Trade Unions Act provided as to how a political party should be brought into legal existence, then the distinction might have been material, but in the absence thereof I see no difference between the dissolution of a party and its complete incapacity to perform its activities. If it is not able to operate, it is dead for all intents and purposes. In this view of the matter if it is possible to take action under another statute to bring about the same result, namely, to make it impossible for a political party to function at all, as in the present case, it would, in my opinion, amount, in substance, to dissolving the party and to that extent the provisions of that statute would be inconsistent with the Political Parties Act, 1962."
15. The principles deducible from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court appear to be that where two statutes operate in the same field independently, though they may contain different provisions in this behalf :-
(a) if the giving effect to the provisions of one or the operation of that statute renders any provisions of the other statute nugatory, then to the extent that the provisions of the other are rendered or likely to be rendered nugatory the two statutes clash, are inconsistent with each other and the provisions of the latter statute (or of the statute which the Legislature intended to dominate) would override the provisions of the other statute ; and
(b) if the later statute (or the statute which the legislature intended to be dominant), on its true construction, was intended to cover the whole ground, it would, to the extent of the ground covered or intended to be covered, supersede and displace the other statute.
"We are of the opinion that the conditions laid down by their Lordships for the displacement of one statute by another are present in the instant case only to a very limited extent and do not affect the major portion of the range of functions of registered Trade Unions, as will be presently shown. In other words, the application of the provisions of the said Act to any particular workmen or employees will not make it impossible for its Trade Union to perform all or even most of the functions of a registered Trade Union."
16. We would also refer to the following passage from Craies on Statute Law, Sixth Edition, page 374, in regard to displacement of one statute by another t- "In other words, a general enactment is pro tanto avoided by an express enactment entirely inconsistent with it. By 29 Eliz.
1. c. 4, certain penalties were imposed upon Sheriffs who took larger fees for executing offi fa. Than were alio% ed by statute, but the sheriffs Act, 1887, provided that certain larger fees might in future be taken by Sheriffs if those fees were sanctioned by the Judges. It was argued in Pilkingaton v.
Cooke, (1847) 16 M & W 615 that the later Act repealed the earlier Act as being constraint to it. It was held, however, that as the subsequent statute only gave a power to the judges of allowing and thereby rendering lawful, an additional payment for executing aft. Fa , which power the judges might never exercise, it was wholly contingent in each case which arose whether the previous statute would he altered or abrogated in pursuance of the subsequent one. Consequently, the operation of the subsequent statute was not to repeal the previous one."'
17. The above passage has been reproduced with special reference to section 6 of the said Act, which, as already noticed, merely empowers the Federal Government or an authority designated by it to make rules regulating the wages and conditions of service of persons to whom the provisions of the said Act are for the time being made applicable.
18. It may also be noted that the said Act had repealed and replaced the Essential Services (Maintenance) Ordinance, 1941, which was a war time measure, and which was intended to ensure the performance of essential services during the conditions resulting from the war. It is in this context that Explanation 1 to subsection (1) of section 5 of the said Act is to be understood. The said explanation provides that the fact that a person apprehends that by continuing in his employment he will be exposed to increased physical danger is not a reasonable excuse for the purposes of either abandoning his employment, absenting himself from work, disobeying a lawful order given in the course of his employment or departing from any area where he is directed to remain under section 4 of the said Act. The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the said Act shows that it is of limited application. The said statement, which is a short one, reads as follows :- "The object of the Bill is to replace the Essential Service (Maintenance) Ordinance, 1941 (XI of 1941) which has become of limited validity services. The need for the provision continues during the pendency of the declaration of emergency issued by the Governor-General under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935."
19. Whereas the object of the said Act is to ensure the maintenance of Essential Services, whether in peace or in war, even under difficult conditions and circumstances, the object of the said Ordinance is wholly different. Its object according to its preamble, is to amend and consolidate the law relating, firstly, to the formation of Trade Unions, secondly, the regulation of relations between employers and workmen, thirdly, the avoidance and settlement of differences and disputes arising between employers and workmen, and fourthly, matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto.
It is quite clear from the recital of the preamble that the field to which the said Ordinance extends is much wider and also materially different from that covered by the said Act, though in certain limited matters, the two statutes may overlap. So far as the formation of Trade Unions, their rights, liabilities and responsibilities are concerned, the said Ordinance alone makes provision; in that behalf, while the said Act is wholly silent on that subject. The provisions in the said Ordinance relating to the rights, liabilities, etc. Of registered 'Dade Unions are contained in sections 7-B, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 61. It may also be pointed out that a registered Trade Union under certain circumstances is entitled to be declared a Collective Bargaining Agent and the further rights, liabilities and responsibilities of the Collective Bargaining Agent are detailed in sections 22(11) & ( 2), 23, 23-A (1) (a), 23-B (2) (a), 24(2), 25-A (1) (3) (4) & (6), 26, 32, 34, 39 and 43.
20. In order to properly appreciate the rights, liabilities and responsibilities of registered Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Agents under the said Ordinance, it would be convenient to briefly refer to the provisions contained in this behalf in the aforesaid sections of the said Ordinance.
21. Section 7-B requires every registered Trade Union to maintain, in the prescribed form, (a) a register of its members and the subscriptions paid by them, (b) an account book of receipts and expenditure, and (c) a Minute book.
22. Section 10 is important and provides for the cancellation of the registration of a Trade Union, upon the complaint of the Registrar of Trade Unions, if the Trade Union has
(a) contravened or has been registered in contravention of the provisions of the said Ordinance or the rules, or
(b) contravened any provisions of its constitution, or (c)made in its constitution any provisions inconsistent with the said Ordinance or the rules, or
(d) elected as its officer any person who is disqualified under section 7-A from being so elected.
23. Section 14 provides that: (a) every registered Trade Union shall be a corporate body and have the right to sue and be sued (while in the case of an unregistered Trade Union all its members must be parties to the proceedings which it wishes to institute or to defend), (b) the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1960, the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, and the Companies Act, 1913, are not to apply to a registered Trade Union.
' H. Section 17 again is important and provides that the provisions of section 120-B, P. P. C., shall not apply to in officer or member of a registered Trade Union or Collective Bargaining Agent in respect of any agreement made between the members thereof for the purpose of furthering the object of the Trade Union as contained in its Constitution, unless the agreement is an agreement to commit an offence or is otherwise violate of any law.
25. Section 18 again is important and gives registered Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Agents as well as officers and members thereof immunity from suits and other legal proceedings in respect of certain matters connected with their functions.
26. Section :0 confers powers on two or more registered Trade Unions to constitute a federation of Trade Unions and apply for its registration.
27. Section 21 prescribes the returns to be submitted by registered Trade Unions to the Registrar of Trade Unions.
28. Section 22 provides for the declaration of a registered Trade Union as a Collective Bargaining Agent, either if it is the only registered Trade Union in an establishment, or if there are more than one registered Trade Unions in an establishment, the workmen in the establishment by ballot elect it to be the Collective Bargaining Agent for the establishment.
29. Section 52 is also an important section and provides that until a Collective Bargaining Agent has been certified, a registered Trade Union which has been recognised by the employer is authorised to perform any act or a function which under the said Ordinance can be performed by the Collective Bargaining Agent.
30. Alongwith rights and privileges, the registered Trade Unions are also liable to certain penalties under the said Ordinance, if they are guilty of contravention of certain provisions thereof. Section 54 of the said Ordinance makes it a penal offence to commit any breach of any term of any settlement, award or decision which is binding on the party committing the breach.
31. Section 55 penalises wilful failure to implement any term of a settle meat, award or decision which it is the duty of the party committing the breach to implement.
32. Section 56 penalises the wilful making of any false statement in an application or other document submitted or required to be submitted under the said Ordinance or the rules thereunder as also the wilful neglect or failure to maintain or furnish any list, document or information required to be maintained or furnished under the Ordinance.
33. Section 61 provides for punishment of any officer or any other employee of a registered Trade Union who is guilty of embezzlement or misappropriation of the funds of a Trade Union.
34. Reference may also be made to section 63 which provides that where the person guilty of any offence under the said Ordinance is a company or other body corporate, every Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer or agent thereof is to be presumed to be guilty of such offence. Since a registered Trade Union is specifically given corporate status under the said Ordinance, this section would be applicable to such Trade Unions and to their officers and agents.
35. The Collective Bargaining Agents have even more important functions to perform than the registered Trade Unions. As already indicated, only registered Trade Unions are entitled to be Collective Bargaining Agents. Subsection ) of section 22 of the said Ordinance confers power on a Collective Bargaining Agent to implead any Federation of Trade Unions, of which it is a member, as a party to any proceedings under the said Ordinance to which it is itself a party. Subsection (12) of the said section is important and entitles the Collective Bargaining Agent to (a) undertake Collective Bargaining with the employer on matters connected with the employment, non- employment and the terms of employment or conditions of work, (b) to represent workmen in any proceedings, (c) to give notice of and declare a strike, and (d) to nominate representatives of workmen on the Board of Trustees of any welfare institution or provident funds and the workers Participation Fund.
36. Section 23 provides that at the request of the Collective Bargaining Agent the employer of the workmen who are members of a Trade Union shall deduct from their wages the amounts of the subscription of the funds of the Trade Union and such amounts are to be credited into the account with a branch of the National Bank of Pakistan or with the Post Office Savings Bank to be maintained by the Collective Bargaining Agent.
37. The Collective Bargaining Agent is also entitled to nominate shop-stewards, representatives of workers to participate in the management of a factory and on the works councils, to be appointed or set up under sections 23-A, 23-B and 24.
38. Section 25-A confers other important functions on the Collective Bargaining Agent. Subsection
(3) of the said section authorises the Collective Bargaining Agent to bring a worker's individual grievance to the notice of the employer. If the employer fails to communicate his decision on such grievance within the prescribed period or the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the Collective Bargaining Agent is entitled to take the matter to the Labour Court.
39. Section 34 confers power on the Collective Bargaining Agent to apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it under any law, award or any settlement.
40. Section 39 makes a settlement and award, to which the Collective Bargaining Agent is a party, binding not only on the Collective Bargaining Agent, but also on all workmen in the establishment or industry to which the dispute relates.
41. Section 43 is again an important section and entitled only a Collective Bargaining Agent or any employer to raise an industrial dispute.
42. The rights, privileges, liabilities and functions of registered Unions and Collective Bargaining Agents may, therefore, be roughly classified into the following categories :-
(a) undertaking of collective bargaining with the employer on matters connected with the employment of work, including terms of employment and conditions of work
(b) raising of industrial disputes and seeking reliefs of individual grievances of workmen t
(c) representing workmen in proceedings under the said Ordinance and nominating representatives of workers on various bodies, boards etc 1
(d) exemption from certain liabilities ; and
(e) punishment for its officers for breach of certain provisions of the said Ordinance.
43. It will thus be seen that except in regard to regulation of wages and conditions of services and certain limited matters conected with the performance of functions by employees, specifically tee right to either give notice of strike or to go on strike, the provisions in the two statutes do not overlap and hence cannot be said to be inconsistent with each other. Even in regard to the wages and other conditions of service of employees, as pointed 04 in the earlier part of this judgment, the said Act merely grants enabling powers to the Federal Government or any authority specified in this behalf to regulate the same. As such, there can be inconsistency between the provisions of the said Act and the said Ordinance relating to the wages and conditions of service of only such class of employers in regard to whom the Federal Government or its specified authority has prescribed or regulated their wages and other conditions of service. Since a somewhat different view was taken in two reported decisions of this Court, we would refer to the same. These are Syed Manzoor Ali v. Messrs National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and Employees' Union v. Pakistan Machine Tool Factory, Landhi. In Manzoor Alt's case, the question which arose for determination was whether the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, oust the jurisdiction of an Industrial Court or Labour Court to adjudicate industrial disputes as regards any class of employment declared to be an essential service in the slid Act. In that case one of the workmen of3 4 the National Bank of Pakistan, whose services had been terminated by the Bank, filed an application for relief before the Industrial Court under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. This application was resisted by the Bank on the ground that the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 have been made applicable to the employees of the Union and accordingly the Industrial Court had lost its jurisdiction to hear the application.
The contention which prevailed in that case was that the effect of section 7-A of the said Act was that as soon as it was extended to any employment the result was to exclude totally the applicability of the aforesaid Ordinance which was superseded by the said Ordinance. The decision was relied upon in the case of the Employees Union where it was observed that "the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, is that the grievance of the workmen and the Industrial disputes between the employer and the workmen were to be attended to, by the Central Labour Commissioner, who had a final say in the matter,"; and as the methods provided for the redress of such grievances under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, and the said Act, "are mutually inconsistent and therefore, the one prescribed under the Act and the rules has to prevail."
44. With great respect for the views expressed in the two decisions, we are inclined to the view that there would be inconsistency between the two methods only where the wages and conditions of service have actually been regulated under the said Act and that mere issuance of a notification applying the provisions of the said Act to any class of employees or the D framing of rules by the Federal Government under section 6 of the said Act delegating its powers to prescribe or regulate the wages and conditions of service of employees to whom the provisions of the Act have been made applicable, would not necessarily mean, without actually regulating their wages and conditions of service under the said Act, that the provisions of the said Ordinance relating to their wages and the terms and condition of employment, and their right to seek redress in respect of such matters under the said Ordinance would stand excluded.
45. A contrary view to the one taken in the two decisions referred to above was taken by the Lahore High Court in Chairman Water and Power Development Authority v. Punjab Labour Court (1). In that case an employee of WAPDA, whose services had been terminated, made an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before the Punjab Labour Court. Against the decision of the Labour Court holding that the termination of service of the employee was illegal, the WAPDA filed a constitutional petition to the High Court and, among other pleas, it urged that since the provisions of the said Act had been made applicable to all employees of the WAPDA, the application of section 34 of the said Ordinance was barred by reason of the provisions of section 7- A of the said Act. This contention was repelled with the observation that section 7-A of the said Act does not oust the application of section 34 of the said Ordinance.
46. On a careful comparison of the respective provisions In the said Act and in the said Ordinance in regard to the powers, functions and liabilities of registered Trade Unions, we are of the considered opinion that except in regard to matters relating to strikes, giving notices of strike, disobedience of lawful orders given to employees in the course of their employment, abandoning by employees of their employment or absenting themselves from work, departing by employees from any area where they are required to reason by an order issued under the said Act and in regard to any employees in respect of whom rules regulating their wages and conditions of service have been framed under section 6 of the said Act, the two statutes do not overlap and are not inconsistent with each other. The said Ordinance confers a number of other rights and privileges upon, and makes provision for the performance of several other functions by and the liabilities of, registered Trade Unions. These other matters in our view, are not affected by the provisions of the said Act and, consequently, can be performed by registered Trade Unions even where the provisions of the said Act are made applicable to their members. Furthermore, a declaration applying the provisions of the said Act to any class of employees has effect for only 6 months, though the period of validity of such declaration may from time to time be extended for a further period of months at a time, while the provisions of the said Ordinance are of a permanent nature.
Thus, even in respect of those matters for which provision is made in the said Act, the inconsistency in regard to corresponding matters in the said Ordinance will cease on the expiry of the period for which the provisions of the said Act are applicable. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the provisions in the said Ordinance regarding registration of Trade Unions and the certification of Collective Bargaining Agent are not inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. We would accordingly direct respondent No, 2 to register the petitioner Union under the said Ordinance, but in the circumstances of the case, would make no order as to costs. PLD 1964 SC 673 (1926) 37 C L R 466 1973 PLC 94 1974 PLC 201