ORDER RASHEED AHMED RAZVI, J. - This Execution Application has been filed against the decree dated 11th May, 1989 passed by this Court in Suit No. 264 of 1987 (Federation of Pakistan v. Sardar Abdul Rashed and another). It was filed on 30th December, 1997, after a lapse of more than 8 (eight) years and 7 (seven) months from the date of decree. In such circumstances office is of the view that this Execution Application should have been filed within three years from the date of decree as provided under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and thus raised objection to the maintainability of the instant proceeding in view of two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases: Mahboob Khan v. Hassan Khan Durrani (PLD 1990 S.C. 778) and Mian Akbar Hussain Vi'.
Mst. Aiysha Bai & others (PLD 1991 S.C. 985). Learned Standing Counsel replied the said objections by putting the following note:- "...With regard to objection No.2, it is submitted that the rulings i.e. PLD 1990 S.C, 778 and PLD 1991 S.C. 985 relate to cases prior to the enforcement of the Constitution of 1973.
Under Article 175 (2) of the Constitution the High Court of Sindh is not a District Court while exercising original civil jurisdiction. Accordingly the limitation period for filing an execution application under a decree passed in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction is six years "
2. In the first case i.e. Mehboob Khan {supra) it was held, inter alia by a Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court that the first application for execution of a decree would be governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, while rest of the application made, therefore, will be governed by the six years time limit as prescribed in Section 48, CPC. In the second case Mian Akbar Hussain (supra) another Full Bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with a decree passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, on the original side, held that it was Article 181 of the Limitation Act, which will be attracted in a decree passed by this Court, while exercising its original civil jurisdiction. Reference was made by the Supreme Court to the case of Province of Sindh v. Haji Razzaq & others (1991 S.C.M.R. 920) through which the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in appeal in the matter of Haji Razzaq v. Usman and another (PLD 1975 Karachi 944) was set aside and the view of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Firdous Trading Corporation and others v. Japan Cotton and Journal Trading Co. Ltd. (PLD 1961 Karachi 565) was upheld. It would be relevant to quote the operative portion of the order in the case of Mian Akbar Hussain (supra) as it fully answers the submissions of Mr. S. Tariq Ali. It reads as follows:- "..... As is obvious from the judgment quoted above while entertaining and trying Civil Suits the High Court of Sindh is exercising 'District Court jurisdiction in contradistinction to the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court'. Article 183 provides a period of limitation of six years for enforcing a judgment, decree or order from any High Court in the exercise of its 'ordinary original civil jurisdiction'. Therefore it is the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Sindh which will determine the applicability of the Articles. In the light of the judgment of the Court quoted above Article 183 cannot be applied. Therefore either Article 181 or 182 will be applicable. In both the cases the period of limitation is three years. It 4s not the case of the respondents that the right to enforce the decree arises from a date other than the date of decree. Therefore, the execution application should have been filed within a period of three years from the date of judgment/decree "
3. On 2nd September, 1998, after hearing Mr. S. Tariq Ali at length and after confronting him with the above-cited rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, he took another plea in addition to his written reply whereafter, following order was passed which is reproduced as under:- "...In order to distinguish the two cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as pointed out by the office, Mr. S. Tariq Ali has referred to the proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 24 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. He argued this Section was neither considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Firdous Trading Corporation and others v. Japan Cotton & General Trading CO.
Ltd. (PLD 1961 (W.P.) Karachi 565) nor in the two cases referred by the office. The proviso was introduced through an amendment made in the year 1963 showing the pecuniary limits of District Court below Rs.25000/- and of High Court above Rs.25000/-. Mr. Tariq Ali is not in a position to state categorically whether there was any subsequent amendment changing the pecuniary valuation.
He requests for time. At his request adjourned to 4th September, 1998 "
4. Mr. Tariq Ali has shown me a latest copy of Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, written by Mr. Abdul Wahid Chaudhry, published in the year 1998 by Messrs Nadeem Law Book House, 7-Turper Road, Lahore. According to this book, the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1962) is the same as was introduced in the year 1963. Relying upon this publication, it was argued by Mr. Tariq Ali that the jurisdiction in respect of a case where Pakistan is a-defendant, the jurisdiction vested in this Court is not that of a District Court jurisdiction but it is an original civil jurisdiction. It was further argued that this provision of law was not cited before any of the Courts which so far have considered the cases of original civil jurisdiction. Learned Standing Counsel went up to the extent of submitting that all suits, value of which exceeds twenty-i.e thousand rupees should be filed before this Court. According to the learned counsel there was no amendment in the figure as mentioned in the proviso to S.24(l) after the year 1963. It was further argued that in the two cases relied upon by the office, the Federal Government was not a party and, therefore, the ratio laid down in the above cases are not attracted. Before proceeding further, it would be advantageous if the provision of Section 24(1) as printed in the above book is reproduced:- S.24, Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, page No. 56.
Section 24. Civil Courts having unlimited jurisdiction regarding value to try suits against the State and its servants in their official capacity: (1) No Civil Court not having jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regards value and no Court of the Small Causes shall receive, entertain or register any suit in which Pakistan or any of its Province or any public officer as defined in clause (17) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) in his official capacity is a party: Provided that in the Karachi District any such suit, if the value thereof does not exceed twenty-i.e thousand rupees, may be instituted in only in the Court of such Civil Judge and of the First Class, and in the High Court where the value of the suit exceeds twenty-i.e thousand rupees.
(Note: Now the above proviso stand amended).
5. Mr. S. Tariq Ali has also referred to Section 7 of the Sindh Civil Courts (Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1992, as well as on the Articles 175, clause (ii) and 268 (vi), Constitution, 1973. It will be seen that in the year, 1996, a proviso was also added to Section 7 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, which, so far as the Province of Sindh is concerned, reads as follows:- "... 7. -- Original jurisdiction of the Court of District Judge. - Subject to any law for the time being in force, the original jurisdiction of the Court of District Judge in civil suit and proceedings shall be without limit of the value thereof excepting in the Karachi Districts where the original jurisdiction in civil suits and proceedings of the value exceeding i.e lacs of rupees shall be exercised by the High Court: Provided that the civil suits and proceedings of the value not exceeding i.e lacs of rupees in respect of the District of Karachi pending in the High Court immediately before the commencement of the Sindh Civil Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1991, shall stand transferred to the concerned district Courts of Karachi for disposal...."
6. In fact if the provisions of Sections 7 and 24 are read in light of the three decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as mentioned hereinabove, it will show that even in cases falling under Section 24 of the Ordinance, 1962, the jurisdiction exercised by this Court is that of District Court. It is equally incorrect to say that in Karachi Division all suits against Federal or Provincial Governments, value of which exceeds rupees twenty- i.e thousand, are to be filed before the High Court. No judicial precedent was cited by Mr. Tariq Ali and I am not inclined at least to uphold what has been stated by him. It will create a void in the working of Civil Courts within Karachi. Now, I will take up his last submission in the following paragraphs.
7. Section 24 of the Ordinance, 1962, prohibits receiving, entertaining and or registration of any suit in which Pakistan or any of its province or any public officer as defined in clause (17) of Section 2 of the CPC has been impleaded in his official capacity as party. This prohibition applied to the Small Causes Courts as well as to such Civil Courts not having jurisdiction in original suits without limits as regards value. On the initial promulgation of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (PLD 1962 West Pakistan Statute 1116), there was no mention about the Karachi District. Fir the first time, in the year 1963, through Civil Courts (Amendment) Order, XII of 1963 (PLD 1963 West Pakistan Statute 219) a proviso was introduced bifurcating the Courts into two Courts .Of different pecuniary jurisdiction; one of District Courts and other of High Court. Initially, the limit determining the pecuniary jurisdiction was fixed at Rs.25,000/-. All suits not exceeding the value of Rs.25,000/- were required to be instituted in the Courts of District Judge, the Additional District Judge or a Civil Judge of the First Class and in the High Court where the value of the suit exceeded twenty-i.e rupees. It is this valuation which was amended from time to time. Learned Standing Counsel has been deceived by the latest Edition of 1998, published by Messrs Nadeem Law Book House, 7-Turner Road, Lahore, which does not incorporate up to date amendments insofar Province of Sindh is concerned. It is regrettable to note that no efforts were made to look into the law journals for the amendments merit after the. Wear 1963. This aforesaid proviso and other figures mentioned in Section 24 of the Ordinance, 1962, were amended from time to time by the following laws.-
(i) Ordinance, XIII of 1970 (PLD 1971 Sindh Statutes 27),
(ii) Ordinance XIII of 1971 (PLD 1972 Sindh Statutes 6).
(i.e) Ordinance VI of 1981 (PLD 1981 Sindh Statutes 75).
(iv) Act-III of 1992 (PLD 1993 Sindh Statutes 3).
8. After the last amendment the above proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, is to be read as follows:- .... Provided that in the Karachi District any such suit, if the value thereof does not exceed i.e lacs of rupees, may be instituted in the Court of District Judge, the Additional District Judge or a Civil Judge or, the First Class, and in the High Court where the value of the suit exceeds i.e lacs of rupees...."
9. The Member, Inspection Team, High Court of Sindh, is directed to take up the matter of non- incorporation of amendments with the publisher at Lahore in association with his counter part (M.I.T. - Lahore High Court) at Lahore. A copy of this order may also be issued to the author Mr. Abdul Wahid Chaudhry for incorporating amendments in the reprints.
10. In view of the above-stated legal position the arguments of learned Standing Counsel appear to be misconceived and therefore the present execution application is dismissed being time-barred, filed with unexplained delay of more than 5-1/2 (i.e and a half) years after expiry of time limit provided in Article 181 of the Limitation Act.