MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J. -- By this judgment I propose to dispose of C.Rs. Nos. 330, 331, 332 and 333 of 1985. The admitted factual position is that a property located within the municipal limits of Jhang was permanently transferred to one Mst. Shamim Ara daughter of Masoom A.I Khan on 27.4.1968. She alienated small pieces of land measuring about 3 marlas each to the respondents in the C.Rs. It appears that a Deputy Administrator filed a complaint before the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board stating that the said property has been "erroneously" transferred to the said lady who had further transferred it in small pieces to the said respondents. Admittedly, they were not made parties before the said Chairman. The order, however, narrates that notices were issued and in response thereto one Mazhar Hussain appeared. The Chairman validated the transfer to the extent of area sold to said Mazhar Hussain and ordered resumption of the remaining area vide order dated 27.11.1976 which is Ex.D-1. It appears that the respondent in the case had filed four suits for possession of the land from the persons who were claiming to be the tenants of the present petitioner. Later on the present petitioner was also impleaded as defendant No. 2. Relying upon the said order Ex.D-1 the petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit. The learned Trial Court framed issues. Relevant being issue No. 4-A which is reproduced as follows:- (4-A) Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit?
After recording the evidence the learned Civil Judge decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 2.5.1984. An appeal tiled by the petitioner was dismissed by a learned Addl. District Judge, Jhang, vide judgment dated 20.10.1984.
2. Ch. Fazal-i-Hussain, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in view of the bar contained in Section 14 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. He relied upon the cases of (1) Evacuee Trust Property Board Vs. Muhammad Siddique (1995 SCM R 1748), (2) Rashida Bibi Vs. Amir Yousuf A.I Khan, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamabad and another (1995 SCM R 183) and (3) Evacuee Trust Property Board Vs. Mst. Zakia Begum (1992 SCM R 1313) in support of the said proposition. Out of the said cases in the first case it was held that the question as to whether transfer of land was protected under Section 10 (1) of the Act vested within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Board whose decision was final as provided under Section 10 (2) of the Act and the jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide this question was totally barred under Section 14 of the said Act. The above- mentioned second case was decided on the basis of its own facts by holding that the transferee at the time of issuance of PTD was aware that the property was a trust property and the controversy was yet to be settled when he obtained the transfer document. In the above-mentioned third case, the findings were similar to those in the first case.
3. To determine the question of jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it will he useful to reproduce the relevant sections of the said Act as follows:- Sec.
10. Validation of certain transfers. (1) An immovable evacuee trust property:-
(a) if situated in a rural area and utilized bona fide under any Act prior to June, 1964 for allotment against the satisfaction of verified claims; and
(b) if situated in an urban area and utilised bona fide under any Act for transfer against the satisfaction of verified claim in respect of which Permanent Transfer Deeds were issued prior to June, 1968, shall be deemed to have been validly transferred to sale to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and the sale proceeds thereof shall be reimbursed to the Board and shall form part of the Trust Pool.
(2) If a question arises whether a transaction referred to in sub- section (1) is bona fide or not, it shall be decided by the .Chairman whose decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.
(3) If it is decided that a transaction referred to in sub-section
(1) is not bona fide; the Chairman may pass an order cancelling the allotment or transfer of such property:. Provided that no decision under sub-section (2) or order under sub-section (3) shall he taken or passed in respect of any property without giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
"Sec.
14. Bar of jurisdiction. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any Matter which the Federal Government or an officer appointed under this Act is empowered under this Act to determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be granted or issued by any Court or other authority in respect Of any action taken or to he taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act."
A reading of. The above two sections would show that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands barred in respect of any matter -which the said Chairman is empowered under the Act to determine. Now the relevant question which the Chairman can determine under Section 10 (2) of the said Act is as to the bona fide of the transaction. This means that the Chairman' will have exclusive jurisdiction to decide a question raised before him to the effect that the transaction referred to in Section 10 (1) of the Act is not bona ,fide . A perusal of the order Ex.D-1 would show that no such question was raised before Chairman. The order itself narrates that the . Property was "erroneously" transferred to Mst. Shamim Ara. No gainsaying the fact that mala fide is a question of fact. It has first to he pleaded with full particulars and then to he proved. No body alleged before the Chairman that the transaction was mala ,fide . There was, thus, no question of any decision by the Chairman of a question which was never raised before him. On the other hand, it is an established rather admitted position that the property was transferred to the said lady before the date fixed in Section 10 (1)(h) of the said Act. This factual position leads to a clearly defined legal consequence provided in the said law i.e. That such a property shall he deemed to have been validly transferred by sale to the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the sale proceeds thereof shall he reimbursed to the Board and shall form part of the trust pool. The only order, which could be passed by the Chairman on the application, was to make a claim to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for reimbursement of the sale proceeds of the property. The impugned judgments show that the only evidence led by the petitioner was the order which was produced as Ex.D-1. No plea of mala fides was raised and no evidence whatsoever was led either before the Chairman or before the Trial Court. It may be added herewith reference to the case of Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi Vs. Saeed Ahmed Khan and others (PLD 1974 S.C. 151) that mala fide is one of the most difficult thing to prove and the onus is entirely upon the person who alleges mala fide to establish it. Mala fides must be pleaded with particularity. The Supreme Court also issued a prohibition against launching of any inquiry merely on the basis of vague and indefinite allegations. In the present case, as stated above, there is not even a vague allegation of mala fides in any of the cases. In this view of the matter, the bar contained in Section 14 read with Section 10 (2) of the said Act is not attracted at all. I also endorse several other observations made by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned judgment regarding the conduct of the Chairman. No other point was raised. Civil revision petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.