' This Civil Revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as the C.P.C.) is directed against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below through which respondent/ .Plaintiff was declared to be the owner of an agricultural land bearing Serial Nos.912 to 916 consisting of 8 acres approximately. On 26-9-1988, the suit was decreed in favour of respondent/plaintiff by the learned H-Senior Civil Judge, Larkana, whereafter appeal was filed by the present petitioners against' the same which was dismissed by the learned II-Additional District Judge, Larkana. Hence this revision.
2. During hearing of this Civil Revision, it was noted that the same was presented on 28-6-1993 calling in question the judgment and decree, dated 25-2-1992 passed by the learned II-Additional District Judge, Larkana. Admittedly, there appears to be delay of more than 16 months after excluding time consumed in obtaining the certified copies. It was contended by Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan that the delay was caused due to departmental procedure as the sanction letter was received late from the office of Solicitor at Karachi. It was argued that the Government land is involved in the suit, therefore, the delay may be condoned. He has placed reliance on the case of Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary and 3 others v. Abdul Malik 1994 S(A1R ,411 hat case pertained to a Civil Revision of 1990, when there vase no nine unit prescribed to file civil revision. It is to be seen that in the month of May, 1992 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was amended by Act VI of 1992 PLD 1992 CS 226 through which a proviso was introduced in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code providing 90 days time to file revision application against the decision of the subordinate Court. In this back ground, it was contended by Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan that since the decree was passed prior to the coming in force of Act VI of 1992, therefore, the time limit of 90 days is not attracted. This question was taken care of by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Malik (ibid) where it was held, inter alia, that though there is no period prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act for filing a civil revision but it is to be filed diligently within a period of 90 days, but the same can also be filed after the expiry of 90 days provided the petitioner makes out a good case for condoning the delay." (Emphasis added).
3. There is another angle to look at the question of delay in the filing of this civil revision. Prior to the Act VI of 1992, it was general practice of the Court to treat the revision application within time if it was filed within a period of 90 days and any unreasonable delay beyond that part was held to be laches. Act VI of 1992 was promulgated in May, 1992, but despite that, the instant revision was filed after delay of 13 months. The reason that the matter was delayed as the Department was awaiting the approval from the Solicitor is not sufficient ground to condone the delay of 13 months. This is a clear case of negligence on the part of Government officials. In a recent case, Lahore High Court, Lahore v. Nazar Muhammad Fatiana and others 1998 SCMR 2376, it was held, inter alia, by a Full Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court that "The latest view seems to be that the Government cannot be treated differently than a ordinary litigant while considering the question as to whether sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act."
In the circumstances, I am of the considered view that this revision is time-barred and is liable to be dismissed.
4. I would like to refer here the case of Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darzi and others 1970 SCMR 558, where a former Chief Justice of Pakistan Hamoodur Rahman, J. (as his Lordship then was) while referring to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 observed, inter alia, that while seeking condonation of delay, the Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant, because, of the fact that the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much large. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Messrs Pakistan Pipe and Construction Co. Ltd. v. City Mukhtiarkar and another PLD 1984 Karachi 28 at 33 held, inter alia, that the Limitation Act equally applies to the Government as much as to any citizen unless it is shown that its application is excluded under some law. Same view could be found in the case of The West Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation and 2 others v. Soomar and 2 others PLD 1984 Karachi 190 where a learned Single Judge Saleem Akhtar, J. (as his Lordship then was) while following the rule laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Hamid Darzi (supra) held, inter alia, that the law does not provide for different treatment to the Government departments or organization. No different rule can be applied between a citizen and Government department. It was further observed that by laps of time vested right is accrued to the other party which it cannot be deprived of lightly.
5. Then, it was contended by Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan that this Court is competent to take suo motu revision against the two orders of the subordinate Court as valuable Government land is involved. I have asked the learned counsel to point out any illegality touching the question of jurisdiction or violation of any law in the two judgments impugned in this revision. It was contended that the plaintiff/respondent has not sought any declaration in respect of suit property and has filed the suit mainly for perpetual injunction. This plea was not raised before any of the two Courts below. I have scrutinized both the orders; two issues were framed on the point whether the plaintiff is owner of the suit property and whether his possession is lawful and bona fide. Evidence was led to prove and disprove these issues by both the parties. It is not the case of the applicant that in case the relief pertaining to declaration would have been sought by the respondent/plaintiff the jurisdiction of trial Court could have been exceeded in any other way. It is an admitted position that if the suit would have been filed for declaration, it would have been competent suit and within the jurisdiction of the trial Court. In my considered view the non-claiming of the relief of declaration was not fatal.
In a Full Bench decision of this Court Sharaf Faridi and 3 others v. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another PLD 1989 Karachi 404 at 439, it was held, inter alia, that a Court having jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a matter, has the power to mound a relief according to the circumstance of the case, if dictates of justice so demand even if such a relief has not been expressly claimed, provided the relief to be given is within the compass of the jurisdiction of the Court. If any further reference is needed, see Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastigir PLD 1978 Supreme Court 220 and the case of Mrs. Zehra Begum v. Messrs Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. PLD 1984 SC 38.
6. In the case of Saiyyid Abul A'la Maudoodi and others v. Government of West Pakistan and another PLD 1964 SC 673, it was held by Hamoodur Rahman, J. (as his lordship then was) that, "the Court is not powerless to grant a relief that the justice of cause requires to the same extent as if it had been asked for". The Honourable Supreme Court went to further extent in the case of Mst.
Amina Begum PLD 1978 SC 220, where reference was made to several reported cases. It was held that a discretion is vested in the Courts to be judicially exercised in proper cases in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, to shorten litigation, and to do complete justice between the parties and mould the relief according to the altered circumstances in the larger interest of justice (emphasis added). In another case reported as Sadullah Jan and 2 others v. Additional Secretary, Home any Tribunal Affairs, N.-W.F.P. Peshawar and 4 others PLD 1991 SC 811, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that "while granting relief to a successful plaintiff, it is always open to the Court to grant him such general relief, as in the interest of justice the nature of the case may demand".
7. Then, it was contended that there is a Notification pertaining to the year 1887 of the Government of Bombay through which the suit property was shown to be a Forest land. A photostat copy of this document was produced during the trial. As against that several other documents were produced by the plaintiff/respondent in order to show that the land was lawfully allotted to him by the applicant No,2 namely Province of Sindh. In the evidence, it was admitted by the present applicants/defendants that the Government of Sindh had written to the Barrage Mukhtiarkar for cancellation of land allotted to the plaintiff/respondent, but no action was taken from his side. It is to be noted that the applicant No,1 Divisional Forest Officer, Larkana and Barrage Mukhtiarkar both are under the administrative control and authority of the applicant No,2 herein namely Government of Sindh. In case, one Government officer has illegally and unauthorisedly allotted a piece of land not vested in his department, but belonging to other department, this can always be ratified, subject to the principle of nature justice and strictly in accordance with law.
8. With the aforesaid observations, this Civil revision stands dismissed being time-barred with no order as to costs.