' GHULAM RABBANI, J.--- Through this appeal, the appellants have challenged the order, dated 12- 11-1999 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court granting injunction application in favour of the respondent.
2. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff (hereinafter to be referred as respondent) filed a suit seeking declaration and injunction that the respondent is entitled to carry on their business of 'Meet and Assist Service" at International arrival and departure lounges and also at domestic arrival and departure lounges at Qaid-e-Azam International Airport without interference from the appellants/defendants (hereinafter to be called as appellants). The respondent also prayed for injunction with directions to the appellant not to interfere with the aforementioned business of the respondent and also for allotting the counters to them at the said airport. Their contention was that they were accorded permission vide letter, dated 23-9-1996 followed by agreement, dated 10-11-1996 to carry on the aforesaid business from 7-10-1996 to 16- 10-1999. Contention of he respondent was that since the appellants had declined to allot the counters as aforesaid and had also threatened to remove the counters of the respondent and to stop them from carrying on their business, they were constrained to file the aforementioned suit.
3. The respondent also moved a separate application for grant of temporary injunction which has been granted under the impugned order with directions to the appellant to allow the respondent to continue with the use of counters in the lounge on payment of necessary fees.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have also examined the available material.
5. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that this appeal has been filed with delay of three days which was beyond the control and power of the appellant. He submitted that the appeal was prepared well in time inasmuch as that copy of the same was forwarded to the respondent by Registered Post A.D. Much before expiry of period of limitation, however, the appeal could not be presented since the post of Law Officer concerned remained vacant till 13-12-1999 when the new incumbent received his posting order and on said date concerned officer attempted to come in High Court but his entry in the premises was impossible due to restriction on account of a case fixed before the Incharge, Anti-Terrorist Activities Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, prayed that the short delay in preferring the above appeal be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is pertinent to note that the appellant has moved an application for condonation of the delay supported by an affidavit which has remained unchallenged by the respondents. In the aforementioned circumstances, we are constrained to observe that the contents of the affidavit having gone unchallenged are deemed to be true and the delay in preferring the appeal is condoned. Next, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the period of licence, according to agreement, commenced from 17-10-1996 and expired on 16-10-1999, but the learned Single Judge under the impugned order, dated 5-11-1999 has allowed the respondent to continue with use of the counters in the lounges beyond stipulated period under the licence which had already lost its efficacy by lapse of time. He further contended that the permission which was initially granted to the respondent was in the nature of revocable licence thereby creating no vested right to entitle him to the grant of injunction as prayed by him.
Besides, he argued, during the subsistence of licence, the respondent had misused the same as he stated soliciting, customers looking for porters, a line of business for which the appellant had already granted licence to other persons. He added that the respondents had caused harassment to the customers and the complaints kept pouring in against him continually. Learned counsel for the respondents. However, took up the stand, in his arguments, that though the appellant had granted permission to the respondents to carry on the aforementioned business; but, no counters were provided to the said respondents to conduct their business practically and the respondents were not made factually capable to be in a position to carry on their business, therefore, the term of three years is to be construed to run from the day when counters were provided to them. He submitted that counters were provided to the respondents under the orders of this Court passed on 22nd May, 1999, therefore, the period of the permission is to run from that date notwithstanding the duration of licence agreement viz from 17-10-1996 to 16-10-1999, therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in allowing him to continue the business under the impugned order. To controvert the aforementioned submission, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that according to the terms of licence the appellant was not under any obligation to provide the counters to them, therefore, the ground raised by the respondent has no weight. It is significant to note that with the assistance of both the learned counsel, we have gone through the licence agreement and do not find any condition to oblige the appellant to provide counters after granting the permission to the respondents to run their business.
6. Be that as it may, the respondents are merely holders of a revocable licence to be construed so from the terms of the agreement to the effect that the licencor reserves the right to terminate it at any time without notice and without causes being assigned and also without any compensation. It is explicitly stated in the said licence agreement that licence shall remain in force for a period of three years commencing from 17-10-1996 to 16-10-1999. Admittedly, the said licence stood already expired when the impugned order was passed.
7. Considering the above facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the respondent patently had no prima facie case for grant of the injunction under the impugned orders. Consequently, we set aside the impugned order and allow this appeal with no order as to cost.