1. CH. UAZ AHMAD, J.~ Brief facts out of which the present appeal arises are that respondents declared that property in question as Waqaf vide Notification dated 22.7.1998. The appellant filed application under Section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 .On 5.1.1999 before the District Judge Gujranwala who entrusted the same to the Addl. District Judge, Gujranwala.
2. Respondents filed reply of the petition and raised the preliminary objection that the petition is barred by time. Learned Addl. District Judge dismissed the petition vide judgment dated 18.11.1999 as time-barred. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that notice was not served to the appellant and the appellant came to know about the Notification issued by the respondent qua the property in question on 16.12.1998 and appellant tiled petition on 11.1.1999 within one month from the date of knowledge. Therefore, the judgment of the learned Addl. District Judge is not in accordance with law as per law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PLD 1977 S.C. 639 (Muhammad Ishaque's case). He further stated that the basic order is void. Therefore, learned Addl.
3. District Judge was erred in law to dismiss the same on the ground of limitation as the limitation does not run against the void order as per law laid down by the superior Courts.
2. Learned counsel of the respondents submits that the impugned judgment is in accordance with law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments:- PLD 1991 S.C. 102 (Chief Administrator Auqaf Vs. Muhammad Ramzan).
4. 1982 SCM R 160 (Etahi Bakhsh Vs. Chief Administrator Auqaf).
5. He further submits on the basis of the aforesaid judgments that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in the proceedings initiated under the Punjab Waqaf
3. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record myself. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the admitted facts in chronological order to resolve the controversy between the parties.
(i) The Notification dated 22nd July, 1998 was published in the Punjab Government Gazette vide Notification No. SOP-1-(3062) Auqaf 84.
(ii) Petitioner filed petition under Section 7 of the Punjab Waqaf Properties Ordinance, 1979 before the District Judge, Gujranwala on 11.1.1999.
6. (i.e) Respondents filed written statement with preliminary objection that the petition is time-barred as the appellant has to i.e petition within thirty days from the date of publication of the Notification and is liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone.
(iv) The petition was dismissed by the Addl. District Judge vide judgment dated 18.11.1999 as barred by limitation.
7. The contention of the learned counsel of the appellant that mere Printing of notification in gazette is not sufficient to constitute Publication unless and untill the Notification must be passed on to the Sales Depot and displayed at suitable public places for sale as per principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Ishaq's cas6 (P.L.D. 1977 S.C. 469) and the period of limitation was condoned. Muhammad Ishaq's case was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 17.5.1977.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Elahi Bakhsh's case (1982 SCM R 160) has laid down the following principle:-- The last para of clause (2) of Section 29 makes it clear that Section 5 would not apply to an application under a special law or local law.
9. It is further observed:- We are, therefore, satisfied that the Provisions of the Ordinance do not contemplate and provide that the District Courts shall exercise the power of dispensation for sufficient cause which is contended in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that Elahi Baldish's case was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 4th April, 1961 which was not brought into the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at the time of deciding Muhammad Ishaq's case. Ilahi Bakhsh's case was also followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court subsequently in Muhammad Ramzan's case (P.L.D. 1991 S.C. 102) Chief Administrator of Auqaf v. Muhammad Ramzan. The word 'notification' mentioned in Section 6 of West Pakistan Waqaf Properties Ordinance, 1959 was interpretated by the Karachi High Court in Chief Administrator of Auqaf v. Mst. Norran and 7 others (1980 CLC 378) and observed as under:- - "The word "notification" as was pointed out by Mr. Amal Mian is defined in the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 as meaning a notification published under proper authority in the official Gazette.
11. The learned counsel is, therefore, right that the same meaning should be given to the word "notification" under Section 6 of the said Ordinance. The argument finds indirect support in a decision of Supreme Court reported in Syed Muhammad Ali Shah Bukhari Vs. Chief Administrator of Auqaf (i) in which it was contended on behalf of the appellant that before notification under Section 6 was issued the appellant should have been given a notice of hearing which contention was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In that case too what was published was notification in the Gazette issued under Section 6 of the said Ordinance."
12. It is pertinent to mention here that Syed Muhammad Ali Shah Bokhari's case (1972 SCM R 297) was also not brought into the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at the time of deciding Muhammad Ishaq's case. Impugned notification was published in the gazette and the appellant was cognizant of t. Section 5 of the Limitation was not applicable and inordinate delayed Iling of the petition was not condonable on any earthly justification precedent case proceeded upon wholly distinguishable feature and was not helpful to the point at issue in appeal. Even otherwise the earlier judgments f the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not brought into the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at the time of deciding Muhammad Ishaq's case, Even otherwise Elahi Bakhsh's case was also relied by this Court in Mst. 'atool Begum v. The Chief Administrator Auqaf (1993 CLC 683.
4. In view of what has been discussed above this appeal lias no merit and the same is dismissed.