1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.----This appeal has been directed against the Order of the High Court, dated 7-2-2000, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent was disposed of on the basis of statement given by Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate, who was counsel for the appellants, herein, in the High Court.
2. The respondent, herein, filed a writ petition in the High Court alleging that a contract was given to him for completing the Greater Water Supply Scheme, Bagh Town, and the work order was also issued. Consequently, the respondent immediately hired the services of labour and purchased other machinery to start work according to work order/contract and, thus, invested millions of rupees, the detail of which has been given in the memo. Of writ petition. It was alleged in the petition that subsequently the respondent came to know that the appellants, herein, were going to amend the work order so as to pave the way for rescinding the contract which was duly entered into by the parties. Thus, he sought direction against the appellants, herein, in terms that they should be restrained from amending the work order/contract, dated 20-10-1999 or rescinding the contract. The High Court sent for the comments from the concerned department, wherein, it was contended that according to the calculations made by the respondent, herein, the cost of the contract comes to Rs,6,95,57,067; it was contended in the comments that in view of clause (2) of work order the work regarding certain items could not be started before the relevant scheme was revised and the contractor excluded from the estimate the cost of the items which are not related to the execution of the scheme and that according to Condition No,19 of the agreement/work order, the department is competent to cancel any item from the contract. Thus, the respondent was directed to complete the work allotted to him to the extent of costs of Rs,2,50,00,000 till the rest of the scheme was revised. It was further contended that the appellants, herein, were not going to rescind the contract but they had to revise the scheme as is also envisaged in the work order itself.
2. After filing of the aforesaid comments, Raja Muhammad Hanif, the counsel for the appellants in the High Court made a statement in the High Court on 7-2-2000 that the respondent was given contract for the completion of water supply work the costs of which were to the extent of Rs,6,96,57,067 and the work order was also issued. He further stated that the period for completion of the work is 36 months but as the requisite funds were not available for the time being, the respondent was directed to do the work to the tune of Rs,2,50,00,000; he undertook on behalf of the appellants that rest of the work would also be got completed by the respondent according to the contract between the parties and that the same would not be cancelled. On this statement, the High Court passed the impugned order in terms that in view of the statement and undertaking of the counsel for the appellants, herein, the petitioner (who is respondent herein) did not want to press the writ petition and, thus, the same was dismissed. After stating the gist of the statement of Raja Muhammad Hanif, Advocate, the High Court, observed in the judgment as under:--- "In the light of the statements and undertaking of the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, the petitioner does not want to press this writ petition, therefore, it is hereby dismissed. This writ petition stands disposed of in the terms indicated above."
3. ' The present appeal has been filed alleging that Raja Muhammad Hanif, the counsel for the appellants in the High Court, had no authority to make the aforesaid statement and, thus, a declaration is prayed for in terms that the said statement made by the counsel for the appellants was without authority and was of no legal consequence.
3. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, has drawn our attention to the comments filed by the department through Raja Muhammad Hanif, their counsel in the High Court, and has argued that the comments were filed according to the instructions of the appellants but the aforesaid statement was a deviation from the comments filed without any authority. The learned counsel has submitted that this is well-settled principle of law that an attorney cannot enter into a compromise or make any concessional statement in favour of the opposite-party without specific authority in that regard. The learned counsel has submitted that the statement of Raja Muhammad Hanif, if judged in light of the said comments, would clearly show that the same was made without the consent of the appellants and, thus, is not binding on them. The learned counsel has also argued that the phrase 'the writ petition stands disposed of in terms indicated above' occurring in the operative paragraph of the impugned judgment clearly indicates that the High Court passed the impugned judgment on basis of the statement of Raja Muhammad Hanif which was unauthorized. He has contended that the expression "dispose of means 'to bring the matter to an end' and, thus in the instant case it would imply that the respondent did not press his writ petition in view of the statement made by Raja Muhammad Hanif, the counsel for the appellants, herein, and the same was dismissed. While elucidating the connotation of the expression 'dispose of', he referred to the meanings of words as given in Black's Law Dictionary which are reproduced as under:--- "To alienate or direct the ownership of property, as disposition 'by will. Used also of the determination of suits."
4. ' He has also cited an authority reported as Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. Emperor (AIR 1947 Bombay 306), while considering the meanings of words 'dispose of', it was observed as under:--- "We have had the advantage of an extremely able argument on both sides during the course of which we have been referred to various dictionary meanings of the expression 'dispose of', from which it appears that the primary meaning is 'to alienate', 'to sell' or 'to transfer', whereas the secondary meaning of 'dispose of is ' to get rid' of or 'to part with' in the sense of bringing something to an end or causing it to cease to exist."
5. (Underlining is ours)
6. ' The learned counsel has also relied upon the following authorities in support of his contention that 'compromise' or any other 'act' by the counsel for a party to the detriment of such party is not binding on it:-- ' In a case reported as Ghulam Nabi v. Ashraf Ali (1994 SCM R 1709), there was a charge of collusion of the counsel for the defendant with the plaintiff; the attorney for the defendant filed a concessional written statement supporting some of the assertions made in the plaint; concessions made by the counsel were denied by the defendant contending that same were made without his consent. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff, inter alia, on the basis of concessional written statement filed by the counsel for the defendant; the appeal to the District Judge was dismissed. On revision petition to the High Court, the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff was set aside holding that the written statement filed was collusive and fraudulent. The petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court was refused by the Supreme Court observing that the findings given by the First Appellate Court and the High Court did not call for interference.
7. ' In a case reported as Mst. Noor Jahan v. Azmat Hussian Farooqi (1992 SCM R 876), it was held that the counsel of a party who was given the power to compromise the matter, could enter into the compromise only regarding the subject-matter of the suit and had no authority to compromise on the collateral matters which were alien to the original suit. It was further observed that the power to compromise must be specifically given and could not be inferred.
8. ' In a case reported as Muhammad Afsar Khan v. Khadim Hussain (PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 143), it was observed that power of attorney under Order III, rule 2, C.P.C., should be strictly construed; such power of attorney gives only such authority as it confers expressly or by necessary implication and not beyond that. Identical view was expressed in a case reported as Muhammad Mehrban v.
9. Sadrud Din (1995 CLC 1541).
10. ' In a case reported as Government of West Pakistan v. Nasir M. Khan (PLD 1965 SC 106), it was held that admission made by the Government's counsel before the High Court misrepresenting the Government is not binding on the Government, especially so when same is on a point of law.
4. Kh. Shahad Ahmad, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents, did not seriously controvert the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants that the power to make the aforesaid statement was not specifically given by the appellants to Raja Muhammad Hanif, Advocate. However, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the present appeal is incompetent because the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent and he was not given any relief. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the appellants cannot be regarded as being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, because the writ petition filed against the appellants was dismissed. He has strenuously argued that the appeal to this Court is competent only if any relief is given to the party concerned and not otherwise. The learned counsel has cited following authorities to substantiate his contentions:- ' In a case reported as Khan Muhammad v. Abdul Aziz (1992 SCR 54), while interpreting the provisions contained in rule 1 of Order III, C.P.C., it was held that there is difference between 'compromise' and 'withdrawal of an appeal'. However, it was held that as withdrawal by the counsel was made without authority, the order of dismissal of the appeal on the basis of withdrawal made by the counsel was set aside and the case was remanded to the High Court for decision on merits.
11. ' In a case reported as Bashir Ahmad v. Muhammad Qasim (1992 SCR 69), while interpreting the scope of rule 1 of Order HI, C.P.C., it was observed that while interpreting the contents of power of attorney, the intention of the executor of power of attorney should be kept in Mind. It was opined that as the party concerned agreed before the Commission regarding the boundary of the suit land, such party could not subsequently deviate from the admission made and set up a case that the land in possession of the appellant was different from the suit land.
12. ' In a case reported as AKLASC v. AJ&K Government (1999 SCR 418), it was observed that contractors assailed the relevant notification as being violate of the Constitution. Thus, it was held that it cannot be said that the writ petition was for the enforcement of a contractual liability' and same was held to have been validly filed.
13. ' In a case reported as Muhammad Aslam v. Member, Board of revenue, (Settlement and Rehabilitation Wing), Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1980 SC 45), the compromise arrived at by the parties was recorded by the High Court in a writ petition and an order was passed on the basis of the same. Thereafter, one of the parties tried to wriggle out of the order by filing an inter- Court appeal which was also dismissed observing that after compromise, the party concerned could not be allowed to deviate from it. The petition for leave to appeal filed to the Supreme Court was also rejected observing that as the matter was settled through compromise, there was no justification for allowing the petition for leave to appeal.
5. We have given due consideration to the matter in light of the contentions raised at Bar. It may be pointed out that there is hardly any doubt that if the power to do an act has not been specifically given to an attorney, such an act, whether compromise or otherwise, is of no legal consequence at the A option of the concerned party. It is evident that even some of the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, support the aforesaid view. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that as the writ petition filed by the respondent was dismissed, the appeal is incompetent is concerned, we are afraid we cannot subscribe to that. It is correct that the writ petition was dismissed but it is evident from the impugned order that the writ petition was dismissed because the respondent did not press the same in view of the aforesaid statement made by Raja Muhammad Hanif. The High Court has incorporated the said statement in the impugned judgment and thereafter observed that in view of the aforesaid statement and undertaking given by Raja Muhammad Hanif, the respondent did not press the writ petition and, thus, the same was dismissed. It clearly implies that if the appellants do not question the statement of their counsel despite the fact that it was made without their consent, it would be deemed that the statement made by Raja Muhammad Hanif was made with their consent.
14. Obviously, this may create hurdle in their way to wriggle out of the consequences of the said statement. Thus, we are of the view that it cannot be said that as the writ petition filed by the respondent was dismissed, the appellants cannot be regarded as aggrieved party so as to challenge the impugned order by filing an appeal to this Court. Therefore, we repel the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal filed by the appellants is incompetent.
15. We have already pointed out that the statement made by Raja Muhammad Hanif was made without any legal authority as is evident from the letter of his appointment to act and plead as counsel for the appellants. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the aforesaid statement made by Raja Muhammad Hanif, Advocate, the counsel for the appellants in the High Court, having been made without any legal authority is of no legal consequence.
16. ' In the light of what has been stated above, we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remand the case to it to decide the writ petition filed by the respondent according to law. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.