1. ' JAVED IQBAL, C.J.--- This is an appeal preferred on behalf of Azam Jan Zarkoon under section 10 of Contempt of Court Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) assailing judgment dated 26-12- 1997 passed by a learned Single Bench of this Court in Suo Motu Contempt Case bearing No,21 of 1997.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that on 28-11-1997 Mr. Atiq-ur-Rehman informed Registrar of this Court vide report (Exh.P/13) that on 27-11-1997 he was contacted by Mr. Kaleem Imam S.S.P., Quetta by means of telephone and told that Azam Jan Zarkoon has made a telephonic statement mentioning therein that various important files of Honourable Supreme Court have been removed from Supreme Court, Registry Branch at Quetta and named Honourable Mr. Justice Amir-ul-Mulk Mengal (Retired), Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary and Mr.Atiq-ur-Rehman and further asked for lodging of an F.I.R. Regarding the abovementioned occurrence. The F.I.R. Could not be lodged as S.S.P. Thought that it was motivated to disrepute the Honourable Judges and undermine the authority of High Court. The said report was placed before the then Honourable Chief Justice who was pleased to make the following order: "Be placed before Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who shall proceed in accordance with law."
2. ' After completion of necessary mandatory formalities the trial concluded and on having been found guilty for the commission of contempt of Court Azam Jan Zarkoon was sentenced to undergo S.I. For 6 months and to pay fine of Rs,5,000 and in default whereof to suffer 1-1/2 month S.I., hence this appeal.
3. It is mainly contended by Azam Jan Zarkoon that the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is contrary to law, facts and justice as the evidence has not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. It is next contended that the report got lodged by the appellant with Police Station Bijli Road Quetta does not fall within the ambit of the Act as no contempt whatsoever was committed and as such the question of initiation of contempt proceedings does not arise. It is next contended that the necessary formalities as envisaged under Cr.P.0 were not complied with by the concerned S.H.O., who failed to record the statements of Messrs Mr. Justice Amir-ul-Mulk and Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry which caused a serious prejudice. It is pointed out that the statement of Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Pakistan Registry Branch Quetta and other officials were got recorded on 29-12-1997 by the S.H.O., in the presence of Registrar of High Court and thus they could not portray the exact picture of the alleged incident. It is contended that contempt proceedings were initiated to harass and victimize the appellant who got lodged report with Police Station Bijli Road, Quetta in good faith and no mala fides were involved. It is urged with vehemence that the S.H.O. Concerned failed to investigate the case in a transparent manner and no incriminating material whatsoever was collected. It is next contended that the statements of Mr. Atiq-ur-Rehman, Additional Registrar of this Court were got recorded on three different occasions i,e, 28-11-1997, again on 28-11-1997 and subsequently on 19- 12-1997. It is pointed out that the above mentioned statements are contradictory but the same escaped unnoticed and the appellant was deprived from getting the benefit of doubt which could have been given to him as matter of right and not grace. It is urged with vehemence that no one could be judge in his own cause and this objection was raised time and again which has not been considered in the light of settled norms of justice. It is also pointed out that various past references have been made in the impugned judgment which being irrelevant should have not been taken into consideration by the learned single Judge but on the contrary the same were considered and relied upon which caused a serious prejudice. It is argued that w,e,f, 26-11-1997 when the then Honourable Chief Justice of Supreme Court was restrained from performing his duties by a Bench of Supreme Court at Quetta various news items were published in different newspapers and statements were given by lawyers and Bar Association and a news was also published about the Registry Branch of Quetta and thus no contempt whatsoever has been committed by the appellant who attempted to lodge F.I.R. In good faith and for the protection of valuable record pertaining to Honourable Supreme Court. It is urged with firmness that the cognizance of the matter was taken by the then Honourable Chief Justice and in view of provisions as contained under section 8(5) of the Act no proceeding could have been initiated by a Single Judge and matter should have been referred to Senior Judges of this Court but in violation of the said provisions of law the matter was referred to S.B. And thus, the entire proceedings are ab initio, void and on this score the impugned judgment is liable to be set-aside. In order to substantiate his contention PLD 1972 SC 39 = NLR 1995 SC 142 were referred.
4. Mr. Noor Muhammad Achakzai learned Additional Advocate-General appeared on behalf of State and strenuously controverted the view point as canvassed by the appellant and contended that a serious contempt has been committed and deliberate attempt was made to undermine the authority of High Court and scandalize the then Honourable Chief Justice and Senior puisne Judge of this Court. It is contended that the information communicated to S.S.P., Quetta was based on mala fide and it was so done with ulterior motive as the incident never occurred and thus, a false and concocted report was got lodged. It is pointed out that the investigation has been completed in a fair and impartial manner and all the allegations levelled in this regard seem to be devoid of merits and thus, hardly deserve any consideration. It is pointed out that appellant is a habitual contemner and different complaints were made against him by the subordinate Courts and in this regard particular reference was made to the contempt proceedings got initiated by Mrs. Tahira Baloch, Presiding Officer Labour Court and appellant was also convicted. It is further mentioned that no infirmity whatsoever could be pointed out and the impugned judgment has been passed after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the appellant and it is in accordance with law and settled norms of justice and as such hardly needs any interference. Mr. Noor Muhammad Achakzai the learned Additional Advocate-General, however, could not reply that the proceedings should have been initiated by two Senior Judges of this Court in view of section 8 (5) of the Act as initially cognizance of the matter was taken by the then Honourable Chief Justice.
5. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of appellant and for State in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have minutely perused the impugned judgment. The contentions of appellant as mentioned hereinabove mainly revolves about two points:-
(a) The contempt proceedings should have not been initiated by Honourable Single Judge being a party as no one could sit as a judge in his own cause.
(b) The provisions as contained in section 8(5) were not complied with as the contempt proceeding should have been initiated by two Senior Judges of this Court because cognizance of the matter was taken by the Honourable Chief Justice.
3. ' We have dilated upon the abovementioned contentions with care and caution. In so far contention No,1 as mentioned hereinabove is concerned "It is well-settled that the same person should not be the prosecutor and the judge in any action. It is also well-settled that a Judge should not hear any matter in which he has personal interest in the decision on it. A proceeding for contempt of Court is, however, an exception to this general rule. When a contempt is committed in the face of a Court, it is that Court which is the proper Tribunal to decide the whole latter. PLD 1972 SC 39. Litigants are not entitled to have a say in the selection of Judges. In cases of contempt of Court the maligned Judge has necessarily to sit on the Bench trying the case because the facts constituting contempt are in his knowledge and matter has to be decided then and there. PLD 1975 Lah.
4. 1534. Proceedings for contempt of Court are an exception to the general rule that same person should not be both Prosecutor and Judge. PLD 1972 SC 39. The said proposition was further clarified in case State v. Mujibur Rehman PLD 1973 Lah. 1 wherein it was held as follows:-- "There are four further matters to be noted in respect of the law of contempt, which to a certain extent conflict with the principles of general law. These are: first, that truth is no justification to an act of contempt; second that the Press has no special privilege when it commits an act of contempt, in this respect its liability being neither more nor less than that of an ordinary citizen: third, that there can be no objection to a Judge's taking part in the proceedings against the contemner even if he himself was the subject of a vile attack; and fourth that proceedings are not to take the form of a trial and punishment may be meted out brevi menu, i,e, summarily."
5. ' The abovementioned contention was also agitated before the Honourable Single Bench by whom each and every aspect of the contention has been discussed in depth and with diligent application of mind. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "To meet with this objection, learned Additional Advocate-General contended that ordinarily a case is not heard by 'a Judge, whose interest is involved in a case, but there is exception to this rule, as for as contempt proceedings are concerned. He further emphasized that it is not a case in which, interest of Presiding Officer of this Court is involved, but to protect the judiciary, as a whole from baseless and false allegations, instant proceedings have been initiated. According to him, the judgment cited by respondent had not rendered any help to him, because in this very report, the Honourable Supreme Court has discussed the exceptional rule of hearing the contempt case, by a Judge, who has been allegedly scandalized. He also cited a judgment reported in PLD 1973 Lah.
6. 1.
7. ' Before examining the judgments cited by respondent as well as learned Additional Advocate- General, it is noteworthy that in the instant case, the respondent has not committed the contempt of only one Judge of Court, but on the face of it, had involved the whole Institution, by scandalizing the Honourable Chief Justice, the next Senior Judge as well as Additional Registrar of High Court.
8. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, this case can be considered where the interest of a particular Judge is involved. In the judgment, relied upon by respondent i,e, Ashfaque Ahmed Sheikh v. The State PLD 1972 SC 39, it was held that proceedings for contempt of Court is, however, an exception to this general rule. When the contempt is committed in the office of Court, it is that Court, which is proper tribunal to decide the whole matter. Similarly, in the case of Mujibur Rehman Hashmi PLD 1973 Lah. 1, it was held that 'where a deliberate attempt has been made to damage the reputation of a Judge and to create a wholly incorrect impression about his conduct as a Judge, it would be contrary to public interest to leave the matter there. A Judge cannot be a plaintiff in a suit for libel in a subordinate Court or in his own Court, and he cannot enter, as suggested in the impugned article, into a public controversy in the Press like politician or any other ordinary citizen. A refutation of the false and malicious campaign against him being necessary, he can explain his position only from the Bench. It is for this reason that several authorities have laid down that not only the defamed Judge should take notice of his own contempt, but in a fit case it is his obvious duty to take part in the proceedings in order to maintain the confidence of the public in the Court which the respondents attempted to impair. In this very' authority, it was further held that the object in allowing a Judge to sit in his own cause and punish the contemner seemingly is to improve the abstraction to the stream of justice, as early as possible and in the shortest period, so that the public confidence in the State and its system of administration of justice is restored. A Judge who stops brevi menu any attempt to interfere with the course of justice actually performs his Constitutional and public duty. The power of a Judge sitting to punish his own contempt is, therefore, meant to prevent any damage to the public confidence in the organs of the State. It is a mode of vindicating majesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage. The power thus, entrusted to a Judge is wholly unrelated to his personal sensibility be they tender or rugged."
9. ' The nature of jurisdiction in contempt proceedings has been decided in various cases and substance whereof is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is considered to be special jurisdiction governed by its own rules even where they come in conflict with some general principles of law. The jurisdiction is sui generis and has developed an independent corpus of rules which originating in the Common Law of England consists of a special set of principles."
10. ' In re: Amrit Bazar Patrika 45 IC 338; In re: Tarit Kanti AIR 1918 Cal. 988; In re: Medhava Singh AIR 1923 Pat. 185; In re: An Advocate of Allahabad AIR 1935 All. In re: K.L. Gauba AIR 1942 Lah. 105; Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh AIR 1954 SC 186 and Ashfaq Ahmed Sheikh v. State PLD 1972 SC 39 ref.
(e) Contempt of Court---Judge Scandalized---Can take part in proceedings against contemner.
11. ' A Judge who has been defamed cannot be a party to proceedings for defamation before a lower Court or before his own colleagues. Nor can he reply to such allegations in the Press. Since any proceedings taken under the ordinary law would bring the Court of which the Judge is a member into contempt and in certain cases truth can be an answer to defamation, a long series of cases is to be found in the law reports laying down that truth is no jurisdiction for contempt. As the proceedings are taken in the public interest, there is nothing wrong on the part of a Judge who has been scandalized taking part in the proceedings for contempt. In fact, some cases lay down that in circumstances he is not only not disqualified from taking part in the proceedings but that it is his duty to do so. If the scandalized Judge cannot be a litigant before the lower Courts or before his own Court and cannot reply to the attacks made on him in Press, where the allegations made against him are false, and will cast a serious doubt on the purity of the administration of justice if not repelled, the only place for him to reply to these allegations is in his judgment where he can refer to such evidence as is unimpeachable and above all suspicions.
12. ' Whether a deliberate attempt has been made to damage the reputation of a Judge and to create a wholly incorrect impression about his conduct as a Judge, it would be contrary to public interest to leave the matter there. A Judge cannot be a plaintiff in a suit for libel in a subordinate Court or in his own Court, and he cannot enter, as suggested in the impugned article, into a public controversy in the Press like politician or any other ordinary citizen. A refutation of the false and malicious campaign against him being necessary, he can explain his position only from the Bench. It is for; this reason that several authorities have laid down that not the defamed Judge should take notice of his own contempt, but in a fit case it is his obvious duty to take part in the proceedings in order to maintain the confidence of the public in the Court which the respondents attempted to impair.
13. ' In re: K.L. Gauba AIR 1942 Lahore 105; Ashfaq Ahmed Sheikh v. State PLD 1972 SC 39; In re: William Tayler AIR 1918 Cal. 713; Emperor v. Murli Manohar AIR 1929 Pat. 72; In re: Subrahmanyan AIR 1943 Lahore 329; In re: Karamatullah Khan PLD 1970 SC 400 and Attorney-General for Pakistan v. Yusuf Ali Khan PLD 1972 SC 115 ref.
14. ' Counsel of accused conceded that in an ex-facie contempt the defamed Judge could punish the contemner but where a Judge was scandalized in any other manner, he being the wronged person should not sit on the Bench. There is no difference in a case where contempt is committed in the face of a Judge or where he is scandalized by published matter. The object in allowing a Judge to sit in his own cause and punish the contemner seemingly is to remove the obstruction to the stream of justice as early as possible and in the shortest period, so that the public confidence in the State and its system of administration of justice is restored. A Judge who stops brevi menu any attempt to interfere with the course of justice actually performs his Constitutional and public duty.
15. The power of a Judge sitting to punish his own contempt is, therefore, meant to prevent any damage to the public confidence in the organs of the State. It is a mode of vindicating majesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage. The power thus entrusted to Judge is wholly unrelated to his personal sensibility, be they tender or rugged." .
16. ' Marshall's Book on Natural Justice and Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh C.J. AIR 1954 SC 186 not applicable.
17. ' Dorsey K. Offutt v. United States of America 99 L Ed. 11 distinguished.
18. ' Rex v. Almon (1765) Wilmot 243 ref.
19. ' In re: K.L. Gauba AIR 1942 Lahore 105 and Ashfaq Ahmed Sheikh PLD 1972 SC 39 rel. PLD 1972 Lah 3.
20. It may not be out of place to mention here that "Court punishes contemner not in order to protect Courts or Judges or juries but in order to safeguard and uphold the rights of suitors and ensure that justice be done. This jurisdiction exists for the purpose of preventing interferences with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the Courts. The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judge personally from imputations to which they be exposed as individuals. It is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice is weakened".
21. (Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P. 1954 SC 10(13)
22. ' In Helmore v. Smith (No,2) (1886) 35 Ch. D 449 at P.455 Bowen, L.J.
23. "The object of the discipline enforced by the Court is not to vindicate the dignity of the Court or the person of the judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice!"
24. ' Lord Morris summarized the necessity for punishment for contempt of Court in Attorney-General v.
25. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1974) AC 273(302) in these words:- "In an ordered community Courts are established for the pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In the general interests of the community it is imperative that the authority of the Courts should not be imperilled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are Concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognized Courts of the land are so flouted that their authority wanes and is supplanted."
26. The law on the contempt of Court is founded entirely on public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of parties to a litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and it should be limited to what is reasonably necessary, for that purpose".
27. (Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1973) 3 All ER 54 (60) (HL) per Lord Reid. The purpose of contempt proceedings is too well-known. No personal consideration weighs with the Judge but it is for the administration of justice which is supreme that the contemner is punished and the purpose of punishment is to make known to all, however, low or high he may be, that they have to obey and respect the law without any excuse or exception." (Syed Aftab Ejaz v. State, PLD 1978 Lah.
28. 361 (DB).
29. ' In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, it can safely be inferred that the proceedings initiated under Contempt of Court Act are an exception to the well-entrenched legal proposition that same person cannot act simultaneously both as Prosecutor and Judge. In such view of the Single Bench was fully competent to proceed with the contempt proceedings and no illegality whatsoever has been committed and accordingly the main contention being devoid of merits hardly needs any consideration.
30. We have also examined the second contention which has been agitated vehemently and pressed time and again by arguing that the Contempt Proceedings could have only been initiated by a Bench comprising of two Judges as the cognizance of the case was taken initially by the Honourable Chief Justice. It seems appropriate to re-produce hereinbelow section 8 (5) of the Act which runs as follows:- "When in a case the first cognizance of the offence has been taken by the Chief Justice, the functions of the Chief Justice under subsections (1), (2) and (3) shall be performed by a Bench of Judges composed of the two next most senior Judges available."
31. ' It would reveal from a bare reading that in a case cognizance where of has been taken at first instance by the Chief Justice, the powers and jurisdiction as conferred upon him under subsections (1), (2) and (3) of section 8 of the Act shall be delegated to a Bench of Judges comprising of two senior Judges subject to availability. It may not be out of place to mention here that section 8 of the Act lays down that "Where a Superior Court initiates proceedings for contempt of Court committed not in its view or presence and such contempt involves personal scandalization of such Judge as distinguished from scandalization of the Court as a whole, the Judge shall forward the case with his comments, if he so desires, to the Chief Justice, of the Court, and the Chief Justice shall if he deems it necessary call for further comments from such Judge or make an inquiry, if necessary, and then transfer the case for hearing to another Judge including himself or to a Bench of Judges excluding the Judge who originally took cognizance of the offence and such Judge or Bench of Judges shall hear the case. If at any later stage the Chief Justice finds it necessary in the interest of justice to transfer the case to another Judge, he may transfer the case of another Judge.
32. The Judge or Bench of Judges hearing the case invite or receive further comments from the Judge originally taking cognizance of the offence and shall call and hear such immense whom the Judge concerned may desire to be examined in support of the charge. The comments made by the Judge shall be treated as evidence and the Judge concerned shall be required to appear as witness. If the contempt is committed against the Chief Justice and he takes cognizance of the offence the functions of Chief Justice as indicated above shall be performed by a Bench of Judges consisting of the two next most senior Judges as may be available at the time". The contempt of Courts Parliament and Public Servants. (1st Edition).
33. ' There is no cavil to the proposition that absolute powers have been conferred upon Honourable Supreme Court and High Court and thus it becomes imperative that due care, deliberation and caution must be observed and all the provisions as enumerated in the Act irrespective of the fact whether the same are technical, non-technical or semi-technical and the procedure as prescribed in the Act are to be followed in letter and spirit and no deviation is to be allowed on the ground that no prejudice would have been caused to the contemner. It must be kept in view that jurisdiction as conferred upon the Courts for the initiation of contempt proceedings, by no stretch of imagination, can be termed as "ordinary" but admittedly it is an "extraordinary" one and no other law, enactment, regulation, ordinance, rules made, or procedure enumerated thereunder including the Code of Criminal Procedure and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 have no bearing as the act is to be exclusively controlled by its own provisions and procedure which is capable enough to meet all sorts of eventualities and thus it is not discretionary but mandatory to follow the provisions and procedure of the Act when any antecedent process has to be put in motion. It is worth mentioning here at this juncture "that the jurisdiction to punish contemner is considered to be a special jurisdiction governed by its own rules even where they come in conflict with some general principles of law. The jurisdiction is sui generis and has developed an independent corpus of rules which originating in the Common Law of England consists of a special set of principles" In re: Amrit Bazar Patrika 45 IC 338; In re: Tarit Kanti AIR 1918 Cal. 988; In re: Medhava Singh AIR 1923 Pat. 185; In re: An Advocate of Allahabad AIR 1935 All. I; In re: K.L. Gauba AIR 1942 Lahore 105; Sukhdev Singh v.
34. Teja Singh AIR 1954 SC 186 and Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh v. State PLD 1972 SC 39 Ref. State v. Mujibur Rehman PLD 1973 Lah.
1. We have also examined carefully the question as to whether section 8 (5) is subject to any scholarly interpretation as the language employed in the said section is free from any ambiguity and confusion. The answer would be certainly in negative. It is well-settled by now and hardly needs any elaboration that "the language of a statute should be interpreted in its plain grammatical sense. The interpretation should advance the object of the Act. Muhammad Hassan Khan v. Narain, AIR (1949) All. 210 (FB); Rulia Ram v. Rex AIR (1949) All. 716 quoting Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes; Bhagwati Prasad v. Sham Chander, AIR (1949) All. 68; Manohar Das v.
35. Golam AIR (1949) Cal.
225. Restrictive provisions should not be liberally construed or extended through the medium of interpretation. (Municipal Board, Mathuras v. Dr. Radha Bullabh AIR (1949) All. 301). A prohibition in derogation of the right of suit should be strictly construed. Humayun Mirza v. Governor of U.P. (1949)
36. Oudh 31. The natural meaning of the words should be accepted though it may produce unfortunate results. Gangaram v. Santosh Kumar; (1949) 248. A construction should be avoided which would reduce the legislation to futility. Noakes v. Doncastler Amalgamated Collieries, (1940) AC 1014 at 1022. The primary rule of interpretation is to take the words in their natural, literal or grammatical sense. If the words admit of only one meaning the language should be taken as decisive of the intention of the Legislature and should not be departed from even if it produces some hardship (Moolji Jaitha & Co. V.K.S. & W. Mills Co. F.C. 83 at 116 (suit for land meaning of). When the language is of doubtful import, the position under the pre-existing law may be considered for aiding interpretation. (ibid, at p.117). When the words used are elastic or vague, the words should be taken in the sense in which they would harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. (Bank of England v. Vagliano (1891) AC 107 at p.141:60 U QB 145.
37. ' We have also examined as to whether the principle of "casusomissus" can be pressed into service.
38. It is well-settled by now that the said principle should not be pressed into service and there should be no wrong interpretation on the basis of speculation or probability. In this regard reference can be made to AIR (1957) SC 832 + AIR (1953) SC 148. It is otherwise well-settled by now that "the duty of the Court is to give full effect to the language used by the Legislature. It has no power either to give the language a wider or narrower meaning than the litera-one, unless the other provisions of the Act compel it to give such other meaning London Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Durex Products Ltd. AIR (1963) SC 1882 at 1887, (1964) 2 SCR 211, Narian v. University of St. Andrews (1909) AC 147, 78 UPC 54, Pentiah v. Veeramallappa AIR 1961 SC 1107, (1961) 2 SCR 295. Where the drafting is defective, "A Judge should ask himself the question how if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases". Per Lord Denning in Sea Ford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 115 at 164, Sagoon Jayadee v. Sociedade Civil Edos Taxis AIR 1966 Goa 38 (FB). A Court of law is not authorised to apply a casus omissus or to alter the language of a Statute for the purpose of supplying a meaning". (Raja Bhirabendra v. State of Assam ILR (1956) 8 Assam 379 (FB).
39. ' In view of what has been mentioned hereinabove, we are afraid that no deletion, amendment, addition or insertion can be made while interpreting- the provisions as contained in section 8(5) of the Act to deviate from the procedure by allowing the Honourable Chief Justice to exercise his jurisdiction under subsections (1), (2) and (3) to constitute a Bench of learned Single Judge which could not have been done. In this regard we are, fortified by the dictum laid down in the following authorities:-- "Big Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh (1960) SCJ 44, AIR 1959 SC 1331, Shri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay (1957) SCJ 679, AIR 1959 SC 459, Mahadeolal Khodia v. Administrator General of W.B. AIR 1960 SC 936, Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Hinchy (1960) AC 748, Poppalal Shah v. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 275, (1953) SCJ 369, Hira Devi v. District Board of Shahjahanpur (1952) SCJ 533, AIR 1952 SC 362, Tirath Singh v. Bachittap Singh AIR 1955 SC 830, (1955) SCJ 797, Halbsury's Laws (3rd Edn.) Vol.36 at 390."
40. It is an admitted feature of the case that cognizance of the matter was initially taken by the then Honourable Chief Justice and as such it was mandatory for his Lordship to constitute a Bench comprising of two senior Judges and thus, in our considered opinion the learned Single Judge was not competent to proceed with the contempt proceedings and therefore, we are, inclined to accept this appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and resultantly convict/appellant is acquitted of the charge. He is on bail and his bail bonds stand discharged.