' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment of the High Court, dated 29-10-1997, whereby the writ petition filed by respondents 1 to 3 was accepted.
2. The brief facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that the Public Service Commission through its advertisement No,1 of 1995 called applications for the posts of 27 Civil Medical Officers from the State Subjects; allocating quota of six posts for District Muzaffarabad, three for District Bagh, four for District Poonch, three for District Kotli, four for District Mirpur and seven for refugees settled in Pakistan. The test for the posts was held by the Public Service Commission between April 26 to May 21, 1997. In accordance with its terms of advertisement, Kh. Ejaz Ahmed could not qualify the test who had applied against District Muzaffarabad, while Syed Abadain Haider (in Writ Petition No,261 of 1997) who had applied against District Bagh, Dr. Muhammad Saeed and Dr. Aftab Hussain Khan (in Writ Petition No,287 of 1997) who had applied against District Muzaffarabad and Poonch respectively were declared successful and consequently selected for the posts of Civil Medical Officers alongwith the pro forma-respondents in writs against the quota of their Districts. The Handout to that effect is issued separately for each District by the Public Service Commission on 9- 6-1997.
3. Through a Government order, dated 22-4-1997, issued from Health. Secretariat, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, six out of twenty seven advertised posts of Civil Medical Officers were derequisitioned and consequently the Districtwise quota was re-adjusted by the Director General Health vide, his order, dated 23-4-1997; reducing the quota for refugees to five, for Muzaffarabad five, for Bagh two, for Poonch three and for Mirpur three. Thus, two seats from the quota reserved for refugees settled in Pakistan and one each from the Districts of Muzaffarabad, Poonch, Bagh and Mirpur were dropped. On 26-4-1997, the Health Secretariat, issued a Notification appointing pro forma-respondents Nos,6 to 9 allegedly against the above stated posts dropped from the allocated districtwise quota on the recommendations of the Law Department.
4. The High Court observed that respondents having been legally admitted to the test declared successful against the advertised vacancies the order, dated 24-4-1997, derequisitioning six seats and the order of Director-General of Health Services, dated 23-4-1997 re-adjusting quota are declared without lawful authority and of no legally effect to the extent of the writ petitioners (respondents). It was further observed by the High Court that the petitions are accepted and respondents are directed to issue the orders of appointment of the petitioners (respondents) in the light of Handout issued by the Public Service Commission on 9-6-1997, from their respective Districts. Secretary and Director-General Health shall pay Rs,5,000 as special costs to the writ petitioners (respondents) besides the costs of the litigation vide order,. Dated 29-10-1997. It is the aforesaid order of the High Court which is the subject of present appeal.
5. In the aforesaid case the leave was granted to the appellants vide order, dated 2-3-I998. So far as the direction of the High Court is concerned the learned Advocate-General, who appeared in support of the petition for leave to appeal, did not press for grant of leave. However, he submitted that other direction namely that the Secretary and the Director-General Health shall pay Rs,5,000 as special costs to the writ petitioners is not warranted by law.
6. It was contended by Raja Shiraz Kayani, the learned Advocate-General, that the order of the High Court was implemented in letter and spirit and the direction issued by the High Court was acted upon. However, some doctors have been adjusted on the basis of waiting list of 1991 hence respondents Nos,4 to 9 cannot be discriminated against. The learned counsel submitted that all the same the High Court had no jurisdiction to impose exemplary costs to the appellants in the sum of Rs,5,000 besides the costs of litigation as there was no mala fide on the part of the appellants.
7. On the other hand, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, the learned counsel for respondents, submitted that the writ petitioners who qualified for the posts held by the Public Service Commission and fell within the quota fixed through the advertisement, they were totally recommended in merit by the Public Service Commission. In view of above a valuable right had accrued in favour of writ petitions which could not be taken back after the advertisement made and the writ petitioners could not in presence of the advertisement be deprived of its consequential benefits. According to the learned counsel it is the celebrated principle of law that once a right accrues in favour of a person it cannot be taken back by any subsequent action which culminates in the extinction of the earned legal right.
8. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, we are of the view that after having qualified the test and interview in accordance with the advertisement issued by the Public Service Commission and the Handout issued by it for their success in valuable right had accrued in favour of writ petitions which could not have been taken back by a subsequent action. Even no reason was given by the appellants as to why the quota was curtailed. In the absence of reasons the Court obliged to presume that respondents' right has been adversely affected with mala fide designs.
9. As regards the objection raised by the learned Advocate-General that the High Court could not award special costs to the appellants is devoid of any legal force. In a case reported as Inayatullah v. Sh. Muhammad Yousaf and 19 others (1997 SCM R 1020) it was observed at page 1025 in a following manner:-- "The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the learned High Court while dismissing writ petition could not award special costs of Rs,5,000 against the petitioner. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is, that there is no provision which authorized the High Court to award special costs and in case the learned Judges were inclined to award special costs to the respondents in terms of section 35-A, of the Code of Civil Procedure then an issue should have been framed and finding given on that issue justifying award cases. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that special costs could only be awarded in terms of section 35-A, C.P.C. The learned Judges in the case came to a definite conclusion that the proceedings initiated against respondent No,1 at the instance of petitioner were mala fide and that the petitioner has no reasonable ground to prosecute the same. In fact respondent No,1 was sentenced to one years' R.I. In the proceedings of the case initiated by the petitioner, which were ultimately found to be coram non judice. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully competent in exercise of its inherent power to grant appropriate compensation to the respondents. There being no positive ptohibition on the power of the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, to award costs to compensate a party made to suffer unnecessarily through frivolous litigation, the High Court in appropriate case, in exercise of its inherent power, may award adequate costs by way of compensation to a party made to suffer on account of such litigation. With these observations, the petition is dismissed and leave is refused."
' Similarly in a case reported as Mst. Maasoom Bibi v. Deputy Administrator, (R.P.) Sialkot and others (1988 CLC 2317) it was observed at page 2319 in the following words:- "Even on merits, the petitioner has no case. The transfer of the plot in question was refused after recording the finding of fact that the petitioner had not raised the construction before the target date, meaning thereby that he was not in possession of the plot before the target date and as such was not entitled to seek transfer under Settlement Scheme No,VIII. There is nothing to controvert this finding of fact. The petitioner as such has no locus standi to challenge the transfer made through auction in favour of respondent No,3. The petitioner as such cannot be allowed to urge that the auction is bad for non-assessme nt of the superstructure. The superstructure goes with the evacuee property and had to be disposed of alongwith the plot. In any case as far as the petitioner is concerned the value of the superstructure has been assessed and the same had been deposited with the Civil Court. The petitioner can receive the said amount from the Civil Court in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, The petitioner had no cause whatsoever, to involve the respondents in further litigation, by filing this frivolous petition. The petitioner is obviously guilty of wasting public time. For all these reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed with special costs of Rs,3,000 which shall be paid to contesting respondent No,4."
10. From the survey of the case law it becomes evident that the High Court is not debarred from awarding an exemplary cost to a petitioner who has no cause of action or who comes in a Court by bringing frivolous petitions to harass the other parties to burden them with the unnecessary expenses of litigation. On the same analogy this power is available where filing of a writ petition becomes necessary to challenge a totally insupportable or frivolous order. In this view of the matter in our view the High Court has committed no illegality in awarding the exemplary costs of Rs,5,000 in addition to the expenses of litigation.
' The nutshell of the above discussion is that the appeal having no merits in it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.